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PREFACE
Among the'fundamental and primary factors in the study of
natural phenomena none is more important than that of time, and
of these factors - space, time, mass - none has been the subject
of so much misunderstanding. Yet a sound grasp of the elements
and of the meaning of time is essential to philosophers, psychol¬
ogists, scientists and laymen alike. As Sir James Jeans, the
astronomer, has 3aid, "We are unlikely to reach any definite con¬
clusions on these questions (of determinancy and causation) until
we have a better understanding of the true nature of time." (28)
After criticising the idea of time as necessarily a steady, onward
flow, and suggesting that this idea may be an illusion, he goes on
to say that the theory of relativity "regards time merely as a
fourth dimension to be added to the three dimensions of space."
Even if we grant this assumption of the scientists, time is still
a fundamental factor and must be treated as such. •
In some respects, it is true, time is one of the most myster-
»
ious of our fundamental ideas, for the question inevitably arises
sooner or later - does time have any real existence apart from our
minds? On occasion we are very conscious of time, on another
occasion we almost forget its existence, as Shakespeare was well
aware when he wrote, "I'll tell you who Time ambles withal, who
Time trots withal, who Time gallops withal, and who he stands still
withal." The subjective variation of time is such that, if we
were to measure time by our own thoughts of it, it would be a very
uncertain measure we would have. But Nature, it would appear,
produces her phenomena in a uniform manner at uniform times - the
Newtonian concept - and so gives us at least a more certain measure
of the particular phenomenon we call time. There,are, then, as
another astronomer, Prof. Eddington has put it, "two questions -
first, what is the real nature of time? Second, what is the
nature of that qunatity which has under the name of time "become a
fundamental part of the structure of classical physics?" (20).
In more recent times we have a further physical problem, what is
the nature of Einstein's proper - time or interval? "That time
is the form of an order appertaining to the perception of the world
and not an absolute background against which the phenomena of
nature are observed, is the essential ground of the principle of
relativity," says Willdon Carr (14), thus suggesting a new point
of view altogether in regard to time.
Nov/, if we v/ere to believe v/ith Lotze (30) that "the psychol¬
ogist may, if he pleases, make the gradual development of our ideas
of time the object of his inquiry, though, beyond some obvious con¬
siderations v/hich lead to nothing, there is no hope of his arriving
.at any important result," then it would be wiser for us to abandon
our efforts here and now, and resign ourselves to our lack of under
standing. But, even if it proves impossible for us to elucidate
the entire mystery and so satisfy Jeans, it is incumbent upon us to
make the effort to arrive at results which may shed light on this
subject. As the Dean of Carlisle once said, "V/e may not under¬
stand Time, but we shall not understand it better by talking non¬
sense about it."
There are many avenues of approach to this subject of time,
but our inquiry has been limited to what we may call psychological
or subjective time, and its relations to objective or common time.
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This we have approached through the historical method, for we "bear
in mind the important results which have "been obtained in other
psychological and philosophical studies "by the use of this method
and we are "by nature and "by training inclined to the historical
method. Metaphysical and physical considerations have "been put
aside as far as practicable; the questions to which we have
addressed ourselves have beenjwhat is the real nature of time, how
are we sentient beings aware of it, what memory of it do we possess?
To achieve this end, the files of the philosophical and psycholog¬
ical journals and the works of the greater psychological writers
have been examined to find out the current opinions on these and
allied questions. Each of these writers - Kant, Wundt, Meumann,
Ward, James, Bergson, Stout, Myers, Benussi, Guyau and Pieron -
illustrates a fresh stage in the development of time ideas. We
shall, therefore, proceed to give some account of the earlier
ideas as expressed by these and other writers, adding the results
of some tests made among school children, to determine the ade¬
quacy of their concept of time, and to find out the method by which
this concept has developed in their awakening minds, before pro¬
ceeding to make a synthesis of these opinions and conclusions with
a view to arriving at a reasonable view of time as perceived and
as conceived.
INTRODUCTION.
The problem of time estimation, which ia one of the main
elements in the psychology of time and on which most of the experi¬
mental work has "been done, has been reviewed by psychological
writers from time to time. Of these reviewers we have selected
three, Titchener (4-5), Dunlap (82, 85, 86, 88), and Weber (178)
as giving us a guide to the work done on this and allied subjects.
Writing in 1905> Titchener (45) divides the work done on the
estimation of time intervals into four periods. The first is the
preliminary period, before the founding of Wundt's laboratory at
Leipzig in 1878, during which the work suffered from psychophy sics,
as was perhaps natural in the days when psychological work was
dominated by Fechner, who, in "Elemente der Psychophysik", tried
to formulate laws based on precise and methodical researches. Of
those who specially interested themselves in the problem of time,
the names of Czermak, to whom we owe the term "time sense" for the
ability to estimate intervals of time, of Mach, whose experiments
were directed to testing the validity of Weber's Law, and of Vier-
ordt, whose book, "Der Zeitsinn nach Versuchen", aimed "to work
out the various functions of the time sense as they are exhibited
in at least the most important sense departments, in the execution
of voluntary movements, and, finally, in the simple ideation of
temporal magnitudes," are remembered.
Then follows what Titchener calls the psychophysical period,
which comes after the publication of Wundt's laws covering the
whole science in "Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie", and
after the formation of the Leipzig laboratory and the publication
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of the work done there in "Philosophische Studien". Titchener
aelecta as representative of this period seven publications from
the pens of Kollert, Estel, Mehner, Glass and Fechner. The first
four writers were pupils of Wundt and their works show that they
were interested in such problems as the accuracy of our reproduct¬
ion of time intervals, the constant error, the indifference point,
and the "periodicity of the time sense". Kollert and Estel tended
to the mathematical point of view, while Mehner and Glass were more
influenced by the introspections of their subjects. In general
method we read that these investigators abandoned the method of
right and wrong cases for the method of average error. For appar¬
atus Estel and Mehner had a primitive form of what is now the
standard instrument for investigation into the estimation of time
intervals. Their works are also of very great interest because
they form the bases of the conclusions of William James on these
problems. The other writer, Fechner, like Mach of the earlier
period, was interested in testing the validity of Weber's Law.
The third period is distinguished as the intermediate period,
when there were many papers on work following up that of the earl¬
ier periods. These papers Titchener says were for the most part
off the straight line of psychophysical enquiry. In addition
there was also a rather rank growth of theory. Finally, there is
a fourth division called: the modern period, though this is no long¬
er an appropriate name for it, whose characteristic writer is
Meumann. His work like that of his contemporaries, Schumann,
Wrinch and Huttner, is marked by a combination of psychological
analysis with psychophysical method.
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By the time Dunlap (82, 85, 86, 88) wrote hie reviews under
the titles of "Time and Rhythm", the experimental work was consid¬
erably reduced in volume. In 1911 Gildmeister (98) stated his
conclusion ; that, for estimating a time interval without making use
qf mechanical aids, it was useful to play over a melody in march
tempo. He himself was able to come within 10^ of estimating 120
measures to the minute using a certain melody, and so, to estimate
an interval, all he required to do was to note the number of repet¬
itions of the melody, and the point of ending in the final repetit¬
ion. We must note, however, that 120 measures to the minute bears
quite a definite relation to objective time. There were studies
also in 1914 associated with Wundt's laboratory by Kant (ill) on
the estimation of time intervals. For l6 standard intervals rang¬
ing from 230 to 3850°"Kant found evidence of a periodic variation
in the constant error; the shortest standard was underestimated,
the standards from 300 to 680 underestimated or overestimated, and
the standards beyond 800 overestimated. But, by 1916, Dunlap
noted it as significant that experimental work on the perception
v »
of time and of rhythm had nearly ceased. Dunlap himself in 1911
(8l), had argued for the explicit consideration of rhythmic group¬
ing as a function of the specious present, and in 1912 (83), he
gave the results of experiments which had been undertaken with this
consideration in view. The threshold of difference for rate of
discrete auditory stimulation (50% discrimination in Dunlap's tables
and charts was taken as being the same as . 75% right judgments
by the traditional method) was lower with rhythmic grouping that
without; while it was not appreciably higher for series with
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irregular intensities and durations of stimuli than for regular
series. The difference thresholds for time intervals correspond¬
ing to the rates used, were appreciably higher. Experiments using
two intensities of auditory stimuli, and other experiments using
two modes of stimuli, say auditory and visual, gave results which
Dunlap thought spoke for strain-sensations as time-content. It
was at this time that Russell (150) developed a relational theory
of time on the assumption that the distinctions of past, present
and future depend on experience, that is, on the relations of ob¬
jects to subjects.
Since the work of Dunlap, much material, both theoretical and
experimental in character, has been made available for a study of
the psychology of time, and so we find the latest reviewer, Weber
(178), laying down as his purpose the consideration of the general
theoretical background and of the experimental work done since 1916.
We should, however, notice that in 1920 some reviewing of the work
was done by Swindle (172), which led him to the following general
conclusion on the nature of time perception. l?or him, time per-
•
ception meant that every response an organism could execute had a
specific temporal attribute and that to manifest a conscious res¬
ponse meant the perception of a characteristic and definite time,
independently of whether or not this conformed with any of our
physical measurements that might indicate the duration of the res¬
ponse .
Weber (173) does not follow chronological order, as had been
done by Titchener, but he divides the works according to their
character, whether on the nature of time generally, in which he
points out the theories which have been of greatest importance in
the development of the psychology of time, or on some special as¬
pect, such as the effect of interpolated matter and of the limiting
stimuli, in which he deals with recent experimental work on "filled
and "unfilled" intervals. His article is a very clear summary of
recent work in this field, and it is very suggestive as to the work
that still remains to "be done. Thus, in his concluding section,
he 3ays, "The greatest part of the experimental work on time estim¬
ation still remains to be done, as many of the most promising as¬
pects have as yet only been touched upon. Some significant work
has been done on the part played by organic and kinesthetic factors
This offers, however, only a starting point for a large number of
experiments regarding the operation of these factors under differ¬
ent conditions. For example, an experiment to test the ability
to estimate long periods of time under conditions which exclude as
far as possible the factor of external criteria, i.e. in a dark,
3ound-proof room, etc., would throw valuable light on this phase
of the temporal problem. Experiments of estimation under condit¬
ions of varying degrees of kinesthetic strain would also add mater-
•
ially to our understanding of the time sense. Another line of
attack on the problem of temporal estimation which might give inter
esting and significant results is that of an investigation into
differences in estimation as they might arise from filling the
interval with stimulation from the different sensory fields, stim¬
ulation being restricted to one field at a time and comparison
being made with estimation under other sensory stimulation. It
might be shown, for example, that there are considerable difference
in our estimation of time between an interval filled with auditory
stimuli and a similar interval filled with visual stimuli.
These examples represent, of course, only a few of the prob¬
lems, but they are of significance because they fit in with the
well-founded emphasis Upon direct investigation into the back¬
ground of our experience of time - to give us a more adequate
understanding of these bases of human temporal experience."
Earlier in his paper V/eber had noted the need for more data
on the development of the time sense in children and in primitive
people as the bases of a theory of the genetic development of the
concept of time. To 3ome of these problems our attention and work
has been directed and so we offer later in this thesis some data
obtained by experiment among High School Children. These experiments
may be open to the criticism noted by Weber that the technique for
approaching this problem, the method of the questionnaire, which is
the only available technique for some parts of the work, is lacking
in precision and definiteness; nevertheless, we offer our results
for what they are worth.
7.
THE NATURE OP TIMES.
The work of the standard writers on the nature of time may
"be divided according to the interests of these writers into
philosophical, scientific and psychological. In the first group,
that of philosophy, the writers whose views on this subject have
been most important, "both in themselves and in their influence on
other thinkers and writers, are Kant (29) and Bergson (6, 7, 8, 9)*
In reading over their work and that of other philosophers, the
thought has occurred that it is a pity there is no common agreement
on this question of the nature of time, since this so fundamental
a factor comes into philosophical discussion on so many occasions
and under so many guises.
If we consider the doctrine of time which Kant has propounded,
we find it laid down for U3 in some five dictates. Thus, in the
first place, he says that time is not an empirical concept deduced
from any experience, for neither coexistence nor succession would
enter into our perception, if the representation of time were not
given a priori. It is only when this a priori representation is .
given that we can imagine that certain things happen at the same
time, that is, simultaneously, or at different times, that is,
successively. Other philosophers, however, have definitely treated
time as conceptual in character, as does Mackenzie (123). In the
second place, Kant lay3 it down that time is a necessary represent-
a ;* ation on which all intuitions depend. We cannot take away time
from phenomena in general, though we can well take away phenomena
out of time. In time alone is reality of phenomena possible; or
as Watson (177) puts it, the time process must be real. All phen-
oraena may vanish, "but time itself, as the general condition of
their possibility, cannot be done away with. Kant goe3 on, in
the third place, to 3ay that on this a priori necessity depends
also the possibility of apodictic, or absolute,principles of the
relations of time, or of axioms of time in general, as, for instance,
that time has one dimension only, and that different times are not
simultaneous, but successive. Such principles cannot be derived
from experience, because experience could not impart to them absol¬
ute universality, nor apodictic certainty. In the fourth place,
Kant argues that time is not a discursive, or what is called a
general concept, but a pure form of sensuous intuition. Finally,
he writes that to say that time is infinite means no more than
that every definite quantity of time is possible only by limitations
of one time, which forms the foundations of all times. The orig¬
inal representation of time must therefore by given as unlimited.
But when the parts themselves and every quantity of an object can
be represented as determined by limitation only, the whole repres¬
entation cannot be given by concepts (for in that case the partial
representation comes first), but must be founded on immediate in¬
tuition.
To these views of Kant, it may be interesting to add 3ome of
Schopenhauer's (37) before summarising them. Like Kant, Schopen¬
hauer agrees that there is but one time, and that all different
times are parts of it. Though Schopenhauer agrees with Kant on
the whole, he makes some interesting additions to the doctrine.
Thus, he mentions that time has three divisions; past, present and
future, which form as it were two directions with a point of indiff¬
erence. Later writers, like Marshall (125, 126), have seized
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upon much the same idea when they regard the pa3t and future as
contradictory opp03ites, with the present as the norm. For them,
time is a general quality of all presentations, of a three-phased
nature, one of which is always predominant and excludes the others,
V/e must note, however, that Schopenhauer is like mo3t philosophical
writers in that he does not allow duration to the present, the now.
Some may, like Wordsworth (183},argue that there are no limits to
the present, that time is one eternal now, but the majority of
writers would agree with Schopenhauer. Another interesting sugg¬
estion made by him concerns the relations of time and space, for
he says that time is perceptible a priori only by means of a line
image. Though he may not go so far as Welby (179)» "by whom time
is regarded as a derivative from space, Schopenhauer does say that
motion is only possible in time and space, and that time is not
directly measurable by means of itself, but only by means of motion.
For Kant and Schopenhauer, time is an a priori form inherent
to the human mind; it cannot, however, stand alone, for its exist-
- ence depends on the events within it. The question of the reality
»
of time, which was for long a great source of contention among
philosophical writers, is settled by these writers in the affirm¬
ative. Schiller (l^l), opposing the views of Mclntyre (122), says
that "it is only in the abandonment of the prejudice against the
reality of Time that I can descry a future for hope, a future for
philosophy and a philosophy for the future."
More recently Bergson (6, 7, 8, 9) has insisted upon a doctrine
of time as fundamental to philosophy. Other contemporary philos¬
ophical writers are fully in agreement with this view, thus Dewey
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(78) says that perception is a temporal process, its temporality
being its fundamental characteristic for him.
In accordance with his general philosophical standpoint,
Bergson urges that time must be active and vital, based on exper¬
ience. He lays it down that it is the insufficiency of percept¬
ion which makes conception necessary, though conception and judg-
#
ment are based on these very perceptions. Perception, however,
is selective from among our experiences. Turning to the fact of
change in our experience, he says that, although contradiction is
inherent in change, these contradictions are soluble in time.
Just as change and movement are absolutely indivisible, so time is
indivisible, and it is this indivisible continuity of change which
constitutes true duration or time. That time implies succession,
that is, a future and a past joined together, is not denied. As
for the present, Bergson says an instant is a pure abstraction,
it has no real existance, but he does not stpp short at this phil¬
osophical or mathematical idea. He adds that for common-sense,
the present means a certain interval of duration, the field of
•
attention, which it is not possible .to fix exactly. The extent
of the field of attention determines the past and the present,
whose marks he finds in effort and interest. While it is still
influential, whether in individual or in national history, a fact
remains for Bergson in the present, thus the boundaries of past and
present are rather indeterminate. They can be distinguished,
nevertheless, for, while they are continuous, they are not simul¬
taneous. Im memory he sees the feature of the past, though he
does not require any special time memory. It is not our remembering
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of events "but rather our forgetting of them, for which he seeks a
physiological explanation in the structure of our "brain. The keep¬
ing of the past in the present is no other than the indivisibility
of change. Now, reality is change, change is indivisible, and,
in this indivisible change, the past is one with the present.
Change, life, movement are, for Bergson, the essence of eternity.
Neber (178) suras up the views of Bergson thus; "Nor him, time must
account for the new in experience and must therefore be an active,
vital agency which is capable of leaving its mark on events. He
assumes a multiplicity of durations, each flowing at a different
rate from one individual to another, and at different rates under
different conditions. This is in general agreement with the com¬
mon. experience of time, and gives U3 a basis for regarding the
psychological flow of time as a normal and valid adaptation to fit
the existing conditions, since it implies that the individual flow
of time is just as real as physical time."
From the work of the second group of writers, the scientific,
two general theories have emerged, each of which has been dominant
in its own day. First, there is the earlier mechanistic view of
time, the Newtonian conception, and second, there is the relativ-
istic conception, the Einsteinian view. Though both views are
open to criticism and objection as bases for a theory of the nature
of experienced time, nevertheless they have the advantage which
belongs to most scientific ideas - a greater definiteness of ex¬
pression and a great usefulness for astronomical, physical and
mathematical purposes.
12.
Scientific knowledge in the Middle Ages was dominated by-
Aristotle, whose vast range of books on various branches of science
yielded, as they thought, a mass of authentic information, but in
the seventeenth century men like Bacon, Galileo and Descartes advoc¬
ated a new kind of science. They insisted on the importance of
experimental investigation and on the necessity of exact apparatus.
These careful methods led Newton to his many discoveries, and part¬
icularly to his three great contribution to knowledge, the theory
of the differential calculus, the law of gravitation, and the dis¬
closure of the nature of white light. As Pope expressed it;
"Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in Night,
God said, Let Newton be, and all was light,"
or, as another critical writer, Voltaire put it: "It is to him
who masters our minds by the force of truth, not to those who en¬
slave men by violence; it is to him who understands the universe,
not to those who disfigure it, that we owe our reverence." Accord¬
ing to the Newtonian conception of the physical world, Nature knows
no uncertainty as regards time, but produces her phenomena in a .
uniform manner at uniform times, Time has an existence independ¬
ent of our thoughts and wills. "Time is a simple homogeneous
medium through which events flow without being affected." Weber
[17Q). By Newton and his disciples, Time is regarded a3 a single
continuous steady onward flow or series in which the events of
nature take place.
In recent times the theory which holds the field in astronomy
and physics is the Einsteinian theory of relativity. As a distin¬
guished modern astronomer, Jeans (28), after criticising the Newtonian
13-
concept as probably illusion, says, "The theory of relativity re¬
gards time merely as a fourth dimension to be added to the three
dimensions of space." In 1905 Einstein postulated his new law of
nature thus: "Nature is such that it is impossible to determine
absolute motion (and therefore absolute time) by any experiment
whatever." Einstein's first results show that time and space are
indissolubly linked together to form a continuum of four dimensions,
in which it is impossible to separate the space from the time in
any absolute manner. As Wildon Carr (14) has put this idea: "That
space and time are forms of an order appertaining to the perception
of the world, and not an absolute background against which the phen¬
omena of nature are observed, is the essential ground of the prin¬
ciple of relativity. Time is a concept, an idea of a homogeneous
duration, which doe3 not itself impinge on experience by sensible
impressions or otherwise affirm its physical existence, but which,
like space, is a necessary condition of the real existence of the
physical world." Now, as Eddington (20) says, there is a quantity
in Einsteinian physics, unrecognised in pre-relativity physics,
•
which more directly represents the time known to consciousness.
This is called proper-time or interval. But as the time of con¬
sciousness is really subjective time, which is not fixed and absol¬
ute, but erratic, varying from person to person, it has been aban¬
doned for physical time or Astronomer Royal's time, which is reck¬
oned to be the same for all people, and which can be used as a
standard for comparison. This physical time, this division of the
day into hours, minutes and seconds is, like space, a kind of use¬
ful frame in which we locate the events of the external world. In
addition to this indirect knowledge, derived through the events of
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the world outside us, we have also a direct subjective experience
of time, a feeling of enduring. Eddington admits that it i3 this
subjective feeling of duration which is so peculiarly characterist¬
ic of time, and so he says, "We have intimate acquaintance with the
nature of time, and so it baffles our comprehension."
This conception of time as the dimension which binds all the
others together certainly gives time a very fundamental glace in
scientific thought, but it does not help us to any clear concept
of psychological time, for, in ordinary experience, we are not con¬
cerned With the large distances in space which were investigated
by Einstein and his followers, but with smaller distances and spaces,
in which we can neglect the errors due to disregarding the time
taken by the movement of light through space. "We can assume"
with Weber (178), "that our time span takes place at a single,
localised point in space." With the relations between space and
time which are of psychological origin and value, we shall deal
later.
When we come to deal with the writers on time, whose work is
chiefly psychological in character, the difficulties of discrimin¬
ation become very great, and so for convenience we have arranged
these authors in three groups, not according to their theories,
for these are very diverse, but according to their country of ori¬
gin. Thus we have a German group, represented by such a3 Wundt,
Meumann and Benussi, a French group, represented by Janet and
Pieron, and an English and American group, represented by Ward,
James, Stout and others.
15.
The work of tho German group ia of outstanding importance,
for it begins with Wundt (50) , the father of modern experimental
psychology and it is continued "by Benussi (5)» who in 1913 wrote
the first monograph devoted to the psychology of time. Taking
first the views of ITundt (5o)> WQ find that he disagrees with Kant,
for, unlike Kant, he says that it is not true that the course of
inner events, pure internal perception, shows only the one dimen¬
sion of time. Rather he says that our sensations are intensive
magnitudes which form temporal series. Elsewhere (5o) he postu¬
lates that all our ideas are at once spatial and temporal. In
the section of his work (50) given over to a consideration of tem¬
poral ideas, his main views are expressed in the following terms:
"The primary sources of temporal ideas are two kinds of sensations,
the inner tactual sensations from movements, and the auditory sen¬
sations. But the psychological "bases of temporal ideas are gen¬
eral and are not determined "by the special structures of particular
sense-organs. Time ideas can arise from all possible sensations.
The original development of temporal ideas belongs to touch, through
the inner sensations which accompany movements." Rhythmical move¬
ments, by the principle of "the isochronism of oscillations of like
amplitude" are significant for the psychological development of
time ideas. The attribute of the auditory sense which most of all
adapts it to the more accurate apprehension of the temporal relat¬
ions in external processes, is the exceedingly short persistence
of its sensations after the external stimulation; so that any
temporal succession of sounds is reproduced with almost perfect
fidelity in the corresponding succession of sensations. In close
16.
connection with this, we have certain psychological properties of
temporal auditory ideas. In the first place, often only the ex¬
tremities of the single intervals that go to make up the total idea,
are marked hy sensations. In such a case the relations of such
intervals to one another are estimated essentially by the apparent¬
ly empty or heterogeneously filled intervals that lie between the
limiting sensations. Again, in both directions of faster and
3lower rates of sensation, limits are approached where the synthesis
of the impressions into a rhythmical time-idea is no longer possible.
The upper limit is about one second, and the lower limit about .1
second. It has also been observed that in general a period divided
into intervals is estimated as longer than one not so divided.
The different intensities of the subjective elements, the feel¬
ing of expectation, and the degree of concentration of the attent¬
ion, are reflected in the differences between temporal ideas. The
phenomenon of subjective accentuation and its influence on the sen¬
sation of rhythms, shows clearly that temporal ideas are not deriv¬
ed from objective impressions alone, but also from subjective ele¬
ments whose character determines the apprehension of the objective
impressions. Temporal ideas arise, for Y/undt, through the regular
combination of subjective sensational and affective elements with
objective impressions. But position in time can be possible only
when single psychical elements enter into certain characteristic
relations with other such elements.
In a temporal series, a. b. c. d., it is always "the impress¬
ion of the present moment" in relation to which the rest are arrang¬
ed in time. Now this "impression of the present moment" will be
17.
more clearly and distinctly perceived than other elements, though this
moat distinct perception is not connected with the physiological
organisation of the sense-organ, "but is due entirely to the general
attributes of the ideating subjects, as expressed in the affective
processes. The momentary feeling accompanying the immediately
present impression is what helps to its clearest apprehension.
This immediately present impression V/undt calls the inner fixation
point (fixationspunckt) "beyond which impressions are indirectly
perceived. These indirectly perceived, past impressions are
arranged in a regular gradation of diminishing degrees of clearness
from the fixation point. A unitary temporal idea is possible anly
so long as the degree of clearness for each of its elements has
some positive value.
Finally, V/undt says we may regard the feelings of expectation
as the qualitative, and the sensations of movements as the intens¬
ive, temporal signs (Zeitzeichen) of a temporal idea. The idea
itself must then be looked upon as a fusion of the two kinds of
temporal signs with each other and with the objective sensations
»
arranged in the temporal form.
As the work of the Zurich professor, Meumann (129, 130) Is
also of first rank importance, let us consider his contributions
to the problem of time. He early comes to the conclusions that,
to appreciate a duration, the recollections of known times must be
used as comparisons, that judgments on the relative durations of
various intervals must be made in order to concentrate attention
on the time factor and that the final judgment must take into account
the intensity, the quality, the number and the changing impressions
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filling the intervals and also the feeling accompanying the im¬
pressions. His conclusion that the impressions filling the inter¬
val are of prime importance makes Meumann advocate that "every
psychic process is a competent basis of time measurement." (Nichols
138) and deny that Munsterberg is right in attributing the sense of
time solely to organic sensations. For Meumann it is impossible
to separate time from its accompanying processes; we cannot isol¬
ate a duration from its limiting factors or from the impressions
filling it. He insists that there exists an immediate appreciat¬
ion of durations; the perception of time-content is an ultimate
and irreducible fact. Schumann (153)» His contemporary, says
there are other factors, waiting and surprise, which determine the
adaptation of attention, and this, in turn, determines our apprec¬
iation of time. For Meumann, there is an immediate perception of
duration.
Benussi (5)» the most recent of this group, wrote in 1913 his
treatise in order to find the different conditions in which sub¬
jective or perceived time corresponds to objective or real time.
The former, however, we may point out, is as much real time as the
latter. These conditions are, for Benussi, in ordinary everyday
life, the degrees of intensity of the attention given to time and
its passage, and the greater or lesser singularity (Auffalligkeit)
of the impressions limiting the interval of time. Benussi thinks
that the period which can be perceived as a whole, the specious
present, extends to about 7 or 8 seconds. Benussi's work is de¬
voted to an analysis of our perception of intervals, the effect of
the pauses between the intervals to be compared on our estimate,
and the effect of the filling or otherwise of the intervals in
v/hich he cornea to the concluaion that, in general, empty times
appear shorter than filled times of equal duration. He also
suggests that consciousness of time can "best "be considered as a
condition of memory. And finally, to summarise his views, we
find tha.lr he draws our notice to three factors in the perception
of time; first, the division of perceived time into three groups
of intervals, short, long and indifferent; second, the disposit¬
ion of the attention during the process of perceiving time; and
third, the disposition of the singularity or peculiarity of the
elements, the filling, the extent and the limitation of the inter¬
val, which struggle mutually for premier place in our consciousness.
If we turn now to the work of the French psychological writers,
it does not appear that they were much attracted to this particular
field of study until more recent years when Pieron "become the
director of L'Annee Psychologique. Previously there had "been
studies "by men like Fouill^e and Guyau, "but we shall delay our
examination of their views, particularly those of Guyau, who devoted
a whole volume to the origin of time ideas, until we come to the .
section which is given over to a consideration of the relations of
time and space, for it is in that connection that Guyau "is chief
contributions have been made.
Taking the work of an earlier French writer, we discover that
Bourdon (65) makes a very clear-cut distinction between the per¬
ception of short durations and of long durations, to which he nat¬
urally denies the term perception at all, for he says that the
perceptions of long durations, a month, a year, are not really
perceptions but conceptions; "nous arrivons a' concevoir un an da
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la meme maniere exactement qu'a concevoir une temperature de 1000°"
So far as duration and position in time are concerned Bourdon
argues that these are primitive phenomena; they are sensations
which are as irreducible as the sensations of colour, of sound,
and of number. In thus ascribing a primitiveness to time ideas
In our consciousness, in not going beyond these fundamental phen¬
omena to explain our temporal ideas, Bourdon differs radically
from writers like Wundt and Munsterberg, who find duration in the
perception of rhythmic movements, or in muscular tension, or in
the waning of memory images.
In another direction we have the work of Bard (58)> whose
enquiries are directed to determining the physiological bases of
our perception of time. He begins by laying it down that the
part played by consciousness is "to read and interpret the mental
images", from which it follows that "the notioms of quantity give
place to presentations immediate to consciousness as well as to
those of quality". On the physiological side he adumbrates a
close correspondences between central and peripheral images, with¬
out which "the marvellous structural complication of sensorial
apparatus would have neither end nor reason," How, it is our
sensorial apparatus which registers the smallest details of ex¬
terior phenomena, and so he goes on to say that the perception
of duration is made partly by the integration of the central
image at intensity and that the superior centres are only to sort
out time from the elements of duration contained in the images.
"Et il y a un indice local de temps comme un inuice local d'espace."
In addition to the pages devoted to time in his work on ex¬
perimental psychology, Pieron gives over a complete article in
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L'anna's Psychologique (14-5) to the problem of time. In this art-
*
icle, he analyses the fundamental elements in time into these two;
distance'or interval, which he regards as essential, and position
in a simplified form, which is that of order, the intervals being
polarised, so to 3peak. The impression of distance in a definite
order imposing itself on experience is at the foundation of the
specific notion of time. The former of these elements he says
can be subdivided into simultaneity, succession and rhythm, dur¬
ation with both an upper and a lower threshold, and finally change.
He then proceeds to devote quite a considerable space to an exam¬
ination of the'length of the psychological present, but with thie
we shall deal later. So far as the perception of temporal mag¬
nitudes is concerned, Pie'ron says that although the "time sense"
has been the subject of much experiment, it has equally been a
subject of much disagreement, and, in particular, he says that the
part played by organic sensations has not been clearly elucidated.
He makes the interesting suggestion that, if the unity of time
varies from one individual to another, and even in the same indiv¬
idual from time to time, it is probable that the perception of
durations and even the value of the differential threshold, varies
correlatively. He agrees with the theory which assumes a connect¬
ion between objective or physical time and subjective or experienced
time, for he says that it is a legitimate postulate of scientific
psychology,that of integrating psychological time with physical
time, of not seeing in the mental unity of duration an absolute
measure, but a temporal magnitude which is a function of the speed
of certain physico-chemical processes, such as those set in motion
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by a change of temperature, With regard to this last point, it
is noteworthy that Francois (95) concludes from his researches
that it is impossible to separate psychological from physiological
factors in the 3tudy of time. He seems to have established a
close dependence between these factors, at least so far as internal
temperature is concerned. This may some day have to be taken into
account in theories of time.
Janet (26) divides hi3 work on time into three sections.
The first section deals with duration, the second with elementary
memory, and the third with the organisation of time. Now, from
hi3 work there emerges the general notion that time is built up
psychologically by the union of duration with memory. Time, for
Janet, is not a form, but a construction of the mind.
The most recent idea from the French writers is that in each
human group, the idea of time is constituted by contact with real¬
ity and with the developing needs of everyday life, as the group
becomes civilised. Thus the human mind arrives eventually at the
idea of an infinite and homogeneous time. Such is the idea of
Pichon (144) and of Bos (64), who gives expression to it in terms
suggesting that time is man himself, since time is in all sensat¬
ion. Finally, Rageot (148) says that time is born from our per¬
sonal changesj later time becomes for us the times of others and
so we are led from the idea of an individual, personal time to the
idea of a universal, world time.
Finally, we have the Anglo-Saxon group of writers, from among
whom we have chosen Ward, Jame3 and Stout as exponents of the main
points of view held by English psychologists. If we first consider
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the view of Ward (48) wa find that there are three main elements
in our .knowledge of time to which he devotes his mind; the dis¬
tinction of past, present and future; the ordering of events in
the past; and duration or protensity. Now, Ward relies upon the
theory of movements of attention to explain the psychological
bases of these elements of time. In dealing with the first two,
he combines that theory with the waning or sinking of the prim¬
ary memory images in intensity and distinctness, the working of
obliviscence; in the first he also introduces the waxing of the
ordinary images and the attitude or feeling of expectation. One
further point worthy of notice in his distinction of past and
future is the reference he makes to the conative factor - the
active attitude to which the event or memory leads or tends to
lead. The temporal signs due to movements of attention and fading
brain states are his chief explanations of the phenomena of time,
but, even while relying on them, he admits imperfections in his
theory. Mistakes in the ordering of events in past time contin¬
ually occur when the memory train is imperfect; it may happen and
does happen that more vivid representations in the past may "be con¬
founded with fainter one3 nearer the present, which would not be
the case if the theory were absolutely sound. His theory is also
open to the further objection that in actual everyday life, we do
not work back from the present or from events immediately past at
maximum intensity to events of still earlior occurrence at lesser
degrees of intensity. Our minds are not like cinematograph films,
tobe unrolled at need. If that were the way in which our minds
worked, our memories would be stored with a great many useless
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images which we could not avoid recalling. Rather it seems that
we do Have the power of selecting from our store of memories not
merely the.particular portion of the memory-continuum containing
the particular memory image we wish to recall, "but we can eliminate
within that portion all save the particular item we are striving
to recall. This power of selection demands some "better psychol¬
ogical explanation than that offered by Ward, for, if we depended
on the sinking of the memory images we would have.to go through
the various items until we came to our particular item. In act¬
ual practice, we do not pass in review a number of images until we
come to the one we desire; we seem to recall it right away.
Spearman (38) also attacks this theory on the grounds that
sequence can be detected down to intervals of extremely minute
dimensions, which may be perhaps as low as .002 second, a result
he quotes from Exner (92); and that shifts of attention, which
he defines as the focus of cognitive intensity, have been proved
to need as much as .3 second for their accomplishment, the best
result in Spearman's laboratory being .2 second. It is interest-1
ing to note in passing Spearman's own explanation (33) of our per¬
ception of time. He says that the answer lies in regarding the
perception of the present as an elementary case of apprehending
the characters of experience, and the perception of sequence or
definite ordering of events as an elementary case of educing the
relations betv/een these characters;; and these are integrated to
give us our idea of the present, past and future.
To bring in the temporal signs due to movements of attention
as the explanation doe3 not seem adequate, for this theory would
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lead also to the 3ifting of our memory images beginning with the
more recent and working backwards; otherwise it would be a contra-
diction of the other part of Ward's theory. We recall events, it
seems to us either because of their outstanding connotations which
leap them ,irrespective of their place in the memory-continuum, clear
and distinct in our memory, or because we follow some chronological
ordering; we recall the events in their straightforward order of
occurrence, with no thought at all of their memory intensity, until
we come to the one we are anxious to recall. Reasoning, for we
probably have knowingly or unknowingly invented,some bonds, some
connotations by which to remember an event, and the ordinary work¬
ing of recall, seem sufficient to explain our ordering of events
in the past. On the other hand,while we agree with Spearman and
others that the theory of movements of attention is not adequate
to explain the ordering of events, we can allow its usefulness as
a factor in helping us to estimate short periods of duration.
Attention and the overlapping of memory images are two of the
factors admitted by Myers (33) the estimation of short intervals.
Another writer whose work on the perception and memory of time
ha3 been of outstanding importance is Jame3 (27). From an analy¬
sis of his work it is clearly seen that the principal contribution
made by him to the problem of time perception is his insistence on
the specious present as the original intuition of time. Though
the term was suggested earlier by Clay (15) the idea of the specious
present, the fragment of duration "with a rearward - and a forward-
looking end," the unit of a few seconds ranging from 3*6 to 6 sec¬
onds, which i3 perceived by us as a whole, and with which every
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writer on the subject agrees, has been popularised by James. As
he" says,that it is probably caused by the simultaneous presence in
the mind of brain-processes of different phase, he agrees with Ward
in ascribing importance to fading brain states, the overlapping of
images, as an explanation of how we can perceive time at all.
James adds however, that our perception of time is due to our per¬
ception of the events within the interval; we are aware of the
events and of their changes, and it is this awareness of change
which gives us our perception of time as paving duration or pro-
tensity. Longer durations than thosb of the specious present are
symbolically conceived and constructed by mental addition. This
gives James an easy means of distinguishing perception from con¬
ception in time, and the present from the past or the future. The
latter are concepts, the former is a percept.
Another important contribution by James i3 his explanation
of the phenomena which most writers on time have noted and have
felt impelled to explain, the facts that filled time appears short
in passing, but long in retrospect, and that so-called empty time .
appears long in passing, but short in retrospect. To account for
these, and also for the foreshortening of the years as we grow
older, James explains that the content of the interval becomes
monotonous in empty time with "a consequent simplification of the
backward-glancing view", and so, in passing, we have ample opport¬
unity to pay attention to the duration. In recalling the interval,
however,and in thinking over later years, the content stimulates
few brain-tracts. When these few brain-tracts are restimulated





Finally, we must emphasise James's analysis of the phenomenon
of memory into primary memory and memory proper or secondary memory,
which comprises the following elements: revival of an image of the
original event; symbolic conception of the fact imagined as in our
own particular past; and the restimulation of the brain tracts
stimulated by the original event. James, however, allows a sel¬
ective function to the mind whereby it can select from the memory-
continuum those particular memory images and their associates it
desires to recall and whereby it can discard the others. This is
a restriction upon the pure theory of fading brain processes by
which we would be absolutely dependent on the clearness of the im¬
ages recalled for our memory of time and for our ordering of events;
we are not at the mercy of our memories, as Fouillde and to some
extent Ward,would suggest. James recognises the independence of
our minds and so he makes more reasonable this view that our know¬
ledge of time is due to fading brain states.
»
In the introduction to the fourth edition of Stout's Manual
of Psychology (40), the reviser, Mace, states that "time is either
mental in nature or dependent for its existence upon some mind's
awareness of it." He admits, however, that Stout is not committed
to this view, and he outlines briefly Stout's view of time as
follows: "We directly apprehend only fragments of the material
world, and fragments of space and time. Our knowledge of what we
do not directly apprehend is reached through 'trains of ideas' and
through a process of 'ideal construction'". >
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The first main point in Stout's work, which remains as it was
in the first edition, is that he regards our apprehension of time
as a complex product of mental development, suggesting that he
looks on time as a concept built up by man in the course of his
history. Our perception of time depends on the changes which are
constantly taking place within our conscious life, and it is the
experience of transience involved which is the basis of our thought
of succession in time, of the transition from the past to the fut¬
ure. Our direct apprehension of time is limited to fragments of
time, the specious present, which we perceive because of change and
transition in the physical world around us and in the mental world
within us. We must note that Stout, unlike many others, is not
committed to the view, though he leans towards it, that time is
subjective. He does not rule out objective time, or Newtonian
time, from psychological study because he regards it as an ideal
construction, and yet he does not deny that subjective time and
objective time do not necessarily or always coincide. Our know¬
ledge of periods longer than the specious present and of temporal
»
relations Stout says is reached through "trains of free ideas,"
which give us a definite apprehension of a time-series, and through
a process of "ideal construction", whose starting point for the
development of time order in both the past and the future is the
absolute present. Now, as both trains of free ideas and ideal
construction ar.e mental processes, we are justified in thinking
that Stout leans towards the common view among psychologists that
time is subjective in character. _
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Another of his contributions to the subject of time is the
part he allows to conation. As we have already noted, he admits
that the present is something more than the transition from the
past to the future, a mere durationloss entity, but that it is the
specious present, a very brief duration containing fragments of
the past as well as the actual, immediate present. Now, Stout
brings in the success or failure of conation a3 the factor which
determines whether the amount of the recent past included is
smaller or greater. Conation he regards, and we believe rightly
regards, as one of the direct sources of our perception of time.
The happy outcome or the frustration of conation explains for him
the apparent rapidity or slowness in the passage of time.
Still another factor on which he lays much emphasis is that
of the process of attention with its accompaniments and results.
Nor Stout, the measure of the lapse of time is the cumulative
effect of the process of attending. Attention, even in its most
primitive form, is essentially prospective in nature and so the
idea of the future arises, which certainly agrees with common ex¬
perience that the early stages of mental development are occupied
with the future rather than with the past. The idea of the past,
A , however, is involved in the cumulative effect of attention on its
own process. Attention is also a factor of prime importance in
the subjective measurement of duration; the psychological measure
of a period is the cumulative effect of the process of a period is
the cumulative effect of the process of attending. This is spec¬
ially true of our immediate estimate of duratiorrf it is attention
which determines whether the period will appear long or short.
When a period which was full of experiences and which therefore
appeared short to our immediate estimate because our attention
vra.3 agreeably aroused and passed easily from object to object, is
recalled it appears relatively long because of the plenitude of
experiences. The importance of attention and its processes is
therefore very much stressed by Stout as a factor on which our
knowledge of time and our awareness of its passing depends.
Finally, we must observe that Stout does not believe in a
duration line or block; he believes that time is empty save for
events and our perception of these events, and that this time is
measured by expectant attention and certainly not by ideal repro¬
duction of a series of events. He suggests that there is a dir¬
ect power of estimating lapse of time, even for comparatively long
periods. In this respect he agrees with Myers (33)» w^o finds
some evidence for the existence of the absolute impression.
Though the above writers are, as it were, the standard writers,
we cannot close this section without some reference to the work of
other writers. These views will naturally be somewhat miscellan-
eous in character, but we shall endeavour later to point out- the
main tendencies 'in the psychological theories of time. First, let
us note what Hodgson (106) has to say about our perception of a
time sequence. He suggests that for perception of a time sequence
to be possible at all, the presentations of the prior stages of the
sequence must persist in later stages, with a difference only in
vividness and in the position. McGilvary (121) sums up his admir¬
able discussion on time thus: "time is a common time experienced
by all or different times severally experienced and yet fundamentally
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similar. Time is experienced as a continuous succession of events,
some of which may "be experienced as simultaneous." Swindle's (172)
idea of the nature of time is given "by him in the following terms.
"Time perception means that every response an organism can e xecute
has a specific temporal attribute and that, to manifest a conscious
response means the perception of a characteristic and definite time,
independently of whether or not this conforms with any of our
physical measurements that may indicate the duration of the res¬
ponse." Collins and Drever (l6) didtinguish the problem of time
perception from the wider one of time estimation on the ground that
the former, the so-called "time-sense", is purely perceptual, being
the apprehension of the present moment with its associations and
its context, while the latter may require the introduction of high¬
er mental processes as an explanation. Time perception, they say,
i3 due to the attribute of protensity or duration inherent in all
sensations and to the experience of change or transition.
In dealing with the problem of duration, Washburn (176) puts
forward the idea that it is really a four-fold problem. It may
concern the methods of measuring the objective duration of a con¬
scious process, or it may concern our simple consciousness of pre¬
sent duration. Again, it may concern the conditions which make a
duration appear long or short to the subjective estimate, or it
may concern the subjective factors on which our estimate of present
duration depends. Setting aside the third aspect of the problem,
he says that we find two opposite tendencies showing themselves.
"On the one hand, the simple consciousness of a present duration
is identified with the objective duration of a mental process,
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measurable by physical duration, and on the other hand, this simple
consciousness is identified with subjective estimates, or measure¬
ments of it." He adds further that there has often been a tend¬
ency to say that the measurement of duration is aided by the fact
that the objective duration of a mental process is measurable in
the same terms as the duration of a physical process, but he qual¬
ifies this attractive assumption when he denies that objective
duration is the same as consciousness of duration. For him, also,
we must observe, the psychologically primitive time judgment is
one of succession, not of duration. Sturt (41, 169, 170), both
in her articles and in her book, generally confirms the idea that
time estimation is based on the quantity of thoughts filling the
interval. The disagreeable or agreeable character of the events
or thoughts does not appreciably modify the perception of the dur¬
ation. It may be argued that, as her experiments are too few in
number, they do not allow of such definite conclusions. There
emerges in her book, however, clearly a point of view which is an
endeavour to ally objective or common time with subjective or
psychological time. For her, time is a concept, that is, it is
subjective or individual in character but she allows a place to
social or common time, which, as it is based on the Newtonian idea,
has the merit of greater constancy. This idea of time as a con¬
cept we shall elaborate later.
And now, we shall conclude this discursive expedition among
the Anglo-Saxon writers by noting the extremely interesting suggest
ions of Dibblee (18). After defining time as roughly the applicat
ion of thought to extension, he goes on to say that subjective or
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personal time ia measured by the number and rate of our physical
pulsations and by the amount of conscious attention given to our
own time rate. Nevertheless, the accuracy of the conventional
time divisions is psychologically imposed on us until we imagine
that astronomical time is real time, whereas all real time is sub¬
jective and remains within ourselves. He arrives at this same
conclusion also from the differences between the various subject ive
times of each individual at different moments of his existence
and from the differences between the subjective times of different
people, due to the varying cycles of feeling. These discrepan¬
cies he says are shelved but not solved by the adoption of common
time. Another pretty problem he raises is how we perceive suc¬
cession in time, or the order of events within the span of our
direct perception. The reality of succession we can only grasp
by selecting one kind of sensation and concentrating our attention
on that particular kind. These necessitate, as a hypothesis,
either a time sense or a method of making an automatic succession
estimate. This latter is the likelier hypothesis, for, in order
to make an automatic estimate of our time rate as the clue to our
succession estimate, Dibblee suggests a very interesting physiol¬
ogical explanation in "the peculiar and unexplained relations of
the vestibular and auditory senses." He suggests that "the one
furnishes the material and the other effectually acts as the instru¬
ment of comparison. The vestibular registers the internal move¬
ments of our plastic organisation. By the auditory sense we per¬
ceive the rhythm of our interior pulsations and vibrations."
This physiological time rate is only indirectly manifest to
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consciousness, and yet psychological time rate may he a compromise
between our individual physiological time and common, measured
time. This is probably real time for each of us.
To wind up our survey of these views, we note that most psycho¬
logical writers make a very useful distinction between objective or
physical time and subjective or psychological time. Yet in ordin¬
ary circumstances and apart from temporal illusions, there is a sort
of relation between them. By writers like Russell (1J?0) and
Troland (46) a sort of parallelism is assumed, by which there are
representations in subjective time corresponding roughly to events
in physical time. This theory, v/hich Weber calls the "subjective-
objective dichotomy," is specially useful in experimental work on
time perception, for physical time gives us a common standard and
a criterion of accuracy. But Weber (178) also notes the danger
inherent in this perhaps too easy assumption of parallelism, for
he says, "Our knowledge of the objective world is conditioned by
perceptual processes, so we are simply pushing our inquiry back
another step by our assumption of objective.; time. The psycholog-
»
ical problem involved cannot be explained on the basis of objective
time; rather the ansv/er must be sought for in the conditions that
operate directly on our conceptions of time. A causal analysis of
time perception can be made only through the discovery of those
conditions v/hich give rise to variations in our experience of time."
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RELATIONS OF SPACE AND TIME
Most writers on temporal ideas, whether philosophical, scient¬
ific or psychological, have noted the close relationship "between
these two fundamental ideas of space and time. As Wundt (50) says,
"All our ideas are at once spatial and temporal," Later in his
work he adds, "Temporal ideas develop along with spatial ideas.
The ability to form temporal ideas shows itself in a child's first
months in the movement of its limbs and in the tendency to accom¬
pany rhythms." Mclntyre (122) quotes Lotze as pointing out that
our ordinary notions of time are largely derived from space images,
thus we speak of time as a line, extending infinitely in two direct¬
ions, or again, as a stream flowing from the past to the future, or
from the future to the past. Even a writer on the metaphysics of
time, Smith (159) says that the first thing to be noticed is the
spatial character of time. Events, he goes on, are arranged in
spatial order, the past being distant and the future near.
The experiments which have been made to determine the full
extent and character of these relationships have most often proved
rather inconclusive, thus Manchester's (124) contention is that
"time as a factor enters more largely into the surface ideas of
men; space is more often a prominent feature of the surface ideas
of women." Among the various investigations carried out by the
Sterns (39) into the use of words by children, they show that the
notion of space is prior to the notion of time and that the idea
and designation of the past appear much later than those of the
present or the near future as the past is the object only of mem¬
ory and not of voluntary activity; now the development of the child
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proceeds from voluntary to involuntary in character. And Stock¬
ton's (165) experiments, when both "boys and girls were given the
same list of time and 3pace words and asked to make their choice
in each pair, lead to the conclusion that a noticeable predominance
of time interest is shown "by "both hoys and girls, though there is
a slightly greater predominance of time interest among the hoys.
Of all the writers who note this characteristic, perhaps the
one who gives most attention and emphasis to it is the French writer,
Guyau. Guyau (23) generally does not regard time from the Kantian
point of view as an a priori form imposed on us, hut as the result
of a long evolution, of the adaptation of our desires and activity.
According to Guyau, we project into our past part of the represent¬
ations acquired hy us in the course of our experience; now this
projection is mental. Time exists in the mind, though it is con¬
ditioned hy the real existence of succession and movement outside
ourselves. From our perception of the present, which is limited
to our actual experience of the present state together with the
actual tendency to another state, and which therefore has a hrief
duration, we abstract a mass of relations among the phenomena and
arrive at a concept of time.
With this general view in mind, we soon discover, however,
that the principal thesis maintained hy Guyau is that time will he
formed in our mind3 only when our experiences (and he lays stress
on the experiential basis of our notion of time) are disposed in a
line of one dimension, length. In this connection it is interest¬
ing to note the fact that the principle of relativity shows us that
there is no way of conceiving time hy itself; we can only form a
notion of time "by reference to the distance traversed in an instant.
Time and space are, for the relativists, intimately and indissol-
ubly linked together, or, as Jeans (28) says, "Space and Time, as
separate entities, have already disappeared from the Universe."
This thesis of the relation of time and space Guyau proceeds to
demonstrate in various ways. For instance, he says that purpose,
by which he means our reaction to conscious pleasures and pains,
creates our notions of time and space. Succession is purpose
followed by a sentiment of satisfaction, when the wants towards
which we have been tending have been satisfied. Purpose then,
is an effort exercised in space and so succession takes for our
minds a spatial forrp. Again, he says that repetition of the same
sensations and of the same muscular efforts forms a series stretch¬
ing from the present into the future. The past is simply this
interior perspective when it is reversed. There is, however, a
profound difference between present impressions which are making
new tracts in our brains and memories of the past which are prev¬
iously made images filing past without effort. Some of these mem¬
ory images, he admits, have greater intensity than others, but even
the feebler images are disposed in a certain order which imposes
itself on us. The bonds attaching these feebler images to other
sensations are the means which produce the perspective of time, the
spatial order imposed on us. Memory, then, is the means by which
we distinguish one image from another and from present sensations
and by which we arrive at an exact order of images: memory enables
us to place a present image in time and place. Guyau (23), Taine
(43) and Ribot (35) say we determine its position in time, as we
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do positions in space, by reference to some fixed point, which is
the present for time. Now Ribot suggests that "the number of
states of consciousness thus 'determined', gone over retrogressive-
ly, and- their quantity of duration", (exact consciousness of which
is also given by memory) "give the position of any state whatever
by reference to the present, its remoteness in time." It is also
suggested that to simplify this process we employ "landmarks,"
that is, outstanding events whose dates are well known and which
serve to guide us in the placing of lesser known events, Now
these landmarks are localised in space, by which means alone they
can be localised in time. From the very first we fix and measure
time by space. In this spatial localisation, Guyau sees a very
useful analogy, a very convenient mechanism for our thought about
time, but Ribot would go further, for he says there is identity;
A " that we think of time only by this spatial configuration. Now
while it is true for the majority of people that the representation
which they have of time is in this very convenient and easily recalled
spatial form, there are people who do not think in such a way.
It all depends on the type of imagery they use. Thus a person of purely
verbal imagery might find it difficult to understand these arguments
of Guyau and Ribot. Nevertheless, most people, it will be agreed,
do think of time as a line stretching behind them into the past and
fowards into the future, and thus visualise for themselves the
continuity of time. Personally, w-e do not think that it is a mere
convention, but a psychological necessity which impels us to arrange
our experiences in a time line beginning with events of early
occurrence and moving on steadily to events of very recent occurrence.
Mention must be made of Sturt's (41) attitude to Guyau*s con-
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tention that the ordering of time takes place "by reference to space.
She admits this as one factor or one possibility, also as a common,
if not the commonest, method of time representation, hut she does
not regard it as a universal or absolute method. For her it is a
late development; even though the savage.tells off time on a not¬
ched stick, she says this spatial method involves reasoning and
conscious arrangement, which are late mental developments, and
visual imagery. Further, as all people do not employ visual imag¬
ery, a spatial arrangement may not actually exist for them at all.
The convenience, the utility and frequency of a spatial arrangement,
say, of a history chart, no one would deny, but it is denied by
Sturt that it is sole method or the only innate method. With this
conclusion we agree.
In more recent time there have been two lines of enquiry in this
particular field; on one ifaand, Guilford (101) has studied the use of
spatial symbols in our apprehension of time, and on the other hand,
v/riters like Brown (67> 68, 69} have enquired into real and apparent
movement in different sensory fields as a clue to the organic
relationship between time and space in ordinary perceptual experience.
If we take the earlier work of Guilford (101) first, we find that
some 90% of his subjects admit using spatial symbols in thinking
of time. These spatial representations are of three general types:
the time may be a vertical line cut horizontally by a short line
representing the present, the portion of the vertical line above
this horizontal representing the future, and the portion below
representing the past; or it may be a horizontal line stretching from
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left to right, the left representing the past and the right
the future with a short vertical line to represent the present;
or, again, it may be a line moving diagonally from the bottom
left hand corner to the upper right hand corner, with the
present represented by a short horizontal line between the left
hand portion which represents the past and the right hand portion
which represents the future. Of these three forms of representat¬
ion, Guilford says of his subjects use the first, while the
third is the least used form of the three. He also finds that
many have spatial schemes by which they represent to themselves
the idea of historical time. In general, he says, the perception
and the representation of time appear to follow the perception and
the representation of space; time is thought of as a space trav¬
ersed.
Following up the investigations and suggestions of Benussi (5)
and Scholz (152) into movements in the fields of auditory, visual
and tactual senses, Be Silva (15&) finds that time is the most im¬
portant factor in determining our perception of movement. Later
Guilford (102), in another of his investigations, finds a very close
relationship between the muscular adjustments of the eye and our
experience of time. In 1931 Brown {67, 68, 69) published the re¬
sults of his series of experiments in the fields of visual percept¬
ion, from which the conclusions he draws are that time illusions,
or failures in the integration of subjective and objective time,
are not so occasional as to deserve the title of illusions and an
explanation as such, but are continuous and are conditioned by
almost any change in the structure of the entire field of visual
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movement. • He also points out that our experience of duration in
these experiments in visual movement is conditioned "by the total
field of movement. These experiments, along with those of Helson
and King (105)» in the field of tactual space, have demonstrated
the close dependence of time and space in perception. The feeling
of duration gives us a clue to the space traversed, while equally
the feeling of the space traversed gives us an indication of the
duration.
PART PLAYED BY ORGANIC AND KIN-AESTHETIC SENSATIONS
IN THE ESTIMATION OP TIME.
Another very interesting speculation concerns the relations
"between our knowledge and estimation of time and our organic and
kinaesthetic sensations. With a certain group of writers, those
who are interested in physiology especially, this has "been a very
popular explanation of our ability to estimate time. Perhaps the
writer who has most popularised this view, is Munsterberg, who re-
«
gards our organic sensation as the only sensible explanation,
though he does admit that the number of presentations exercises a
constant influence upon the estimate of the time interval. He
says, however, that subjective conditions affect the estimate
greatly, thus in an article by Munsterberg and Wylie (134), we
read that "the subjective measure for such time-lengths, eight to
twelve seconds, seems to me to lie in sensations peripherally
aroused by muscular activity, especially by the strains and relax¬
ations which take place in the various groups of muscles conditioned
upon bodily reactions to changing intensities of stimuli. Such
42.
reactions occur in the functions of "breathing, in the voluntary
movement of the eyes, limbs, etc. We can therefore compare inter¬
vals with some certainty, even when the number of outer stimuli
filling them i3 quite varied. On the other hand, we lose that
standard of comparison as soon as our attention is fully directed
to those outer stimuli and thus withdrawn from our muscular sensat¬
ions In actual practice, one learns to divide the attention
between the presentations of the outer stimuli and the bodily sen¬
sations. The more strongly these stimuli absorb the attention,
the more must the bodily sensations retreat into the background of
consciousness, even with experienced observers, and the shorter
must the'lapse of time appear. The less interesting the stimuli,
the more obtrusive the bodily sensations and the longer the apparent
time." This general conclusion Munsterberg says holds good for
different kinds of stimuli. In this view he is in agreement with
Mach (32), who doe3 not lay as much emphasis upon it, or regard it
as the sole explanation. Mach begins, like many others, by sugg¬
esting the all-pervasiveness of time; "time-sensation, accompanies
every other sensation, and can be wholly separated from none."
He goe3 on to- say that it is probable that time sensation is conn¬
ected with "the organic consumption necessarily associated with
consciousness." Nov/, if it is true that time sensation is condit¬
ioned by progressive organic consumption, or by the corresponding
steady increase of the effort following upon attention, then it i3
intelligible why physiological time is not reversible, but moves
only in one direction. On the other hand, a writer on experimental
psychology of the standing of Myers (33) criticises the view of
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Munsterberg that our ability to estimate a fairly long 'empty'
interval depends on the organic and kinaesthetic sensations arising
from various sources and occupying the interval. He admits that
it i3 true that, when they are allowed to use whatever aids they
like by which to remember the length of an interval people at first
have recourse to voluntary movements of the head or limbs, or to
the voluntary regulation of their breathing, and then they attempt
to reproduce during the second interval the same sensations with
which they filled the first interval, the success of their estimate
depending on the exactitude with which the second interval is filled
by them. But he adds that these sensory, organic methods are grad¬
ually discarded as the subjects become increasingly expert in est¬
imating time, as these aids become eventually an hindrance. Bin-
ally no conscious use is made of such devices. Now, Myers leaves
his reader with the definite impre33ions that he does not agree
entirely with Munsterberg. It is a great pity that he is not more
explicit in his criticisms. His own explanation of our estimation
of time is given earlier when he says that the apparent length of
an interval is influenced by the number'and the nature of the exper¬
iences occurring during that interval. He does, however, suggest
the need for a careful investigation into this problem when ho
deals with the indifference point and the claims of observers to
have found other indifference intervals at odd multiples of the
original indifference point. Munsterberg, he says, attributes
these multiples of the shortest indifference interval to multiples
of the respiratory rhythm, and even to multiples of the other or¬
ganic and deeper rhythms. We are entitled to ask why this
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phenomena 3hould he confined to the odd multiples, and why it does
■*
not extend to the even multiples as well.
Among other writers who have taken up this point of view are
Abord and Searle (5^4-), whose examination into the individual diff¬
erences in the methods used for the reproduction of an interval
shows that the principal one3 are strain and relaxation, imagined
movements, auditory rhythm and the spontaneous occurrence of aud¬
itory images of the limiting stimuli. Curtis (76), writing in
1916 on duration and the temporal judgment, reckons that judgments
of duration, which are regarded by her as an attribute of sensation,
coordinate with quality and intensity, are made by voluntary move¬
ments of the body and by strains or general bodily kinaesthesis,
though she admits that a part is played by visual imagery, and by
a tendency to automatic immediate judgments with no conscious
basis save the bare sensation itself. In his chapter on percept¬
ion, Woodworth (49), after denying that time is a force that can
conceivably act as a stimulus to a sense organ, and after suggest¬
ing that it must be some change or process that i3 the stimulus
& y
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and that serves as an indication of duration, agrees that most
likely, "it is 3ome muscular or internal bodily change." At the
same time, he goes on to say that "none of the more precise suggest¬
ions that have been made square with all the facts. It cannot be
the movements of breathing that give us our perception of time, for
we can hold our breath, and still distinguish one short interval
from another. It cannot be the heart beat, for we can beat time
in a rhythm that cuts across the rate of the heart beat. When a
singer is accompanying himself on a piano, keeping good time in
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spite of the fact that the notes are uneven in length and meanwhile
using his feet on the pedals, what has he got left to "beat time
with? No one has located the stimulus to which accurate time per¬
ception responds, though, in a general way, we are pretty certain
that change of one sort or another is the datum. With longer
intervals, from a minute to several hours, the sign of duration is
probably the amount happening in the interval, or such progressive
bodily changes as hunger and fatigue. Pie'ron (34) is also of the
same opinion, for he notes that the part played by organic sensat¬
ions in the perception of temporal magnitudes ha3 not been clearly
elucidated, in which connection let us quote his own statement that
"it is a legitimate , postulate of seientific psychology that the
mental unity of duration is a temporal magnitude which is a function
of the 3peed of certain physico-chemical processes, such as those
set in motion by a change of temperature." Arising out1 of these
remarks, we have the work of Francois (95)» a collaborator of
Pieron's in L'anne'e Psychologique, who concludes that it is imposs¬
ible to separate mental factors from physiological factors in the
study of time. This close dependence, at least so far as inter¬
nal temperature is concerned, appears to be established as an
experimental fact by his researches, which will someday have to be
given a greater place in the theories of time.
Along a somewhat different line is the work of Hall (104),
whose experiments on time sense by guessing at the precise minute
shown on an unseen watch, by willing, beforehand, to consult a
watch'at a precise minute, and by willing, before sleep, to'wake
at a precise minute, lead him to the conclusions that a time
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sense exists, that this time sense works "best below the threshold
of consciousness, and that the time sense, therefore, is evidence
of a sub-conscious self. Hall says there is no lack of evidence
that a subconscious measurement of the lapse of time takes place.
He quotes the fact that domesticated animals are often strikingly
punctual, and that many men can judge the hour correctly without
looking at a clock, while others can wake at a predetermined min¬
ute. In my own experience I have come across a case of an elder¬
ly lady whose ability to guage the time, usually during the night,
is as accurate almost as a clock. On no less than one hundred
such estimates, her judgment has very rarely been wrong, and, when
wrong, the error ha3 never exceeded five minutes. She does not
know how she makes her judgment; she simply pauses for a moment
and says, "I think it is ten minutes past three." If a clock be
then read, it will almost invariably give the same time. Beyond
the fact that 3he is a musician of no mean ability, it is imposs-
* ible to account for this remarkable accuracy unless by the hypo¬
thesis of some internal or subconscious estimate. This ability
she ha3 been conscious of all her days. Further, as a rule, post¬
hypnotic suggestions take effect with startling and cryptic punct¬
uality. Another interesting point made by Hall is that time
.A .*
guaging is much more accurate during sleep and trance than during
the waking state. Now, though he does not specifically say so,
we are led to infer that behind this subconscious time sense, this
absolute impression, organic factors must be at work, otherwise no
explanation of its existence can be forthcoming. For the subcon¬
scious to lunction at all, deeper organic sensations must be set
in motion.
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Like Hall, Brush (72) is interested in the possibility of
judging time during a period of sleep, and he comes to the conclus¬
ion that it is possible to do so with considerable accuracy. The
judgment appeared as awakening under a determination. The average
actual time of awakening is far closer to the time set in the ex¬
periment than to any time, absolute or relative, that one may have
expected for the awakening on the basis of habit. Certain con¬
ditions appear as favourable or unfavourable for the operation of
the determination, the more important of which are the general
physical condition, the amount and the character of sleep, the
mental activity subsequent to the setting up of the determination,
both before and after going to sleep, the illumination in the
room on awakening, and the motivation.
Boring and Boring (63) deal with the accuracy of the estimates
of the time of night by subjects just awakened from sleep with a
view to finding out the conscious cues to the estimates so far as
the subjects can tell these cues. In general, the errors tend
to be greatest when the awakening occurs about the third hour of
sleep. The most frequent cues, the designation of which all the
observers find difficult, are those which depend on the general
bodily state, such as feelings of fatigue or restedness, sleepiness,
"bladder sensations". Other cues are found in what are called
"associative cues," i.e., clearness of consciousness, the facility
with which the mind renews the thought of the previous evening,
and the memory of previous periods of waking or dreaming. The
accuracy of these estimates is found by them to be twice as great
as can be expected from random guessing. There are apparently
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sufficient conscious internal cues to account for the ability to
estimate time without having to resort to such a theory as that of
"unconscious cerebration."
Still another more definite exponent of the organic theory
appears in the person of Pavlov (142), for whom the sense of time
has its primary source in the action of the energy of the pulsat¬
ory waves or surges. As he puts it himself, "En resume', l'e'coule-
ment du temps est la perception immediate et subconsciente des
actions de l'energie qui aliments de sang toutes les parties de
1•organisms."
Yet another line of approach has suggested the importance of
our organic structure in this matter. Guilford (101, 102),
Gaehr (96), Packard (140), and Gradle (100) have all noted the
phenomenon, which is often noticed or unnoticed by us when watch¬
ing a cinema film, namely the apparent lack of movement in a
moving wheel. It may even appear to us as completely stopped,
for we can see in detail the spokes of the wheel. These writers
suggest that this phenomenon is an example of our experience of
time, on the muscular adjustments of the eye.
finally, the part played by our organic sensations in the
estimates of time is said to depend on our sense of rhythm. There
is no doubt that the organic factors in our general bodily state,
particularly those connected with the excretory and digestive funct¬
ions, are connected with rhythm. Now, these physiological rhythms,
as we have seen above, play a very important part in our judgment of
time. Even our sense "of rhythm in music may influence our judgment
of intervals, as has been suggested by Anderson and V/hitely (55).
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This important field still requires some clearing up "before an
authoritative answer as to the exact place taken by these organic
sensations, whether rhythmical in character or not, can be given.
MISCELLANEOUS EXPERTMENTAL WORK.
Ever since the days when Y/undt and his fellow-workers popul¬
arised the idea of experiment in the realms of mental activities,
a great deal of experimental work has "been carried on in connect¬
ion with time. This work has been devoted to such matters as the
determination of thresholds, for instance, the shortest perceptible
duration, and the largest duration which can be directly perceived
as a whole. The indifference point, the influence of a pause,
the estimation of long durations, the phenomenon of foreshortening,
the influence of the content filling the interval, the ordering of
events and the influence of the limiting stimuli have all been the
subjects of much investigation. Let us now consider these in turn
THE SMALLEST PERCEPTIBLE DURATION.
This question of the shortest perceptible interval used to be
the subject of a considerable amount of experiment and discussion,
for the limit of sensibility in this direction was thought to be a
•
matter of very great interest and concern. Thus James (27), in
his admirable chapter on time perception devotes some space to the
work that had been done before his time. He says that "to be con¬
scious of a time interval at all is one thing; to tell whether it
be shorter or longer than another interval is a different thing.
The problem in the latter is that of the smallest difference betwee
two times which we can perceive. The minimum absolute difference
perceived appears to be .355 seconds." He quotes the results ob¬
tained by Exner (92), who used different senses: for auditory
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stimuli .002, for visual .044, and for different senses, visual to
tactual .071, tactual to visual .053» visual to auditory .16, aud-
1
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itory to visual .06, and for one ear to another .064 seconds.
Finally, James notes that the minimum absolute difference increases
as the intervals compared grow long. Now, though much less work
has been done on this subject during the twentieth century, its im¬
portance still holds good for an understanding of many fundamental
*
perceptual processes, particularly those associated with the phen¬
omena of flicker and fusion. G-eigel (97)» working with auditory
stimuli in 1910, concludes that an interval of less than rfar between
1 |; I'
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weaker sounds, still smaller intervals can be detected. But in
more recent days the limit has been considerably reduced. I ,
/ ' I
Aggazzotti (53) finds that the smallest perceptible interval is
f I
less than a thousandth of a second. Dunlap (87), experimenting
I • • !■ *
with flashes of light, reduces Exner's result for the threshold 1,j !! ,
cr <*- !' '' !
from 12 to 44°" down to 5 to 20<7~at the most. It is instructive !: j r\
' !
to note, however, that Spearman, like James, quotes Exner in giving
the interval where sequence can still be determined as low as .002
seconds. In this work Dunlap reports that a very great difficulty
he encountered is the apparent "twoness" of single light flashes.
.! I
He suggests possible causes of this effect and, in conclusion, say3
» ! '
that "the effects of the brightness of the flashes under varying
1 I »
conditions are so unreliable as to permit of no definite statements."
Adaptation is found to be a very important factor. More recently
still, Pieron (34) has done some work in this field. According to
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of a perceptive experience which is such that it ceases to appear
as instantaneous and has a temporal extent; or with the minimum
duration which must occur "between two experiences for them to cease
to appear simultaneous and manifest succession; or, finally, with
the minimum duration of a pause in order that it may be perceived
in a changing process. The threshold of pause is variable, but
is about a few hundredths of a second. This is the threshold which
has a practical value in the cinema for obviating flicker. The
threshold of succession is also variable; for two similar sense
impressions, say of a visual character, the average threshold is
from 5 to 10 hundredths of a second, for auditory or tactual it is
from 1 to 2. When dissimilar sense stimuli mark off the intervals,
the average thresholds are 5 to 6 hundredths of a second between
visual and tactual, 8 to 10 between visual and auditory, and 3 "to 6
between auditory and tactual. Now, although it is possible to
take account of the differences due to the varying speeds of sound
and light, it is very difficult to consider the losses of time
which may take place at the level of the sensory apparatus, losses
»
due to nerve transmission, and to connections at the relay centres.
These losses may vary from 2 or 3 hundredths of a second up to or
even beyond a second itself. It appears, then, that the shortest
perceptible interval is a few hundredths of a second for all pract¬
ical purposes.
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THE SENSORY PRESENT OR THE LARGEST DIRECTLY PERCEPTIBLE DURATION.
The fact that the present, for psychology, has a certain dur¬
ation was first popularised "by William James (27). He quotes
from Clay (15) the term "specious present," which has "been in com¬
mon use by most psychologists since that date. Whether we think
of it in Clay's terms as "the present to which the datum refers is
really a part of the past - a recent past - delusively given as
being a time that intervenes between the past and the future," or,
in the terms of a modern writer, Broad (ll), as "the greatest poss¬
ible duration for a single sensible field, that is, the total event
sensed throughout the whole of any process of sensing," the useful¬
ness of the idea cannot be denied. Jame3 says that "the units of
duration, which all the time-sense is able to take in at a single
stroke, are groups of a few seconds," and he quotes from Wundt and
Wundt's pupil, Dietze, the result of their experiments to determine
the maximal extent of the immediate distinct consciousness for suc¬
cessive impressions as being between 3,6 and 6 seconds (50).
Dietze (79) is inclined to give a greater duration, one of 12 sec-'
onds, as the maximum filled duration of which we can be both dis¬
tinctly and directly aware. The maximum unfilled or empty duration
seems, from the work of Estel (91) and Mehner (128) to lie within
the same objective range. As James puts it, "These figures may be
roughly taken to stand for the most important part of the specious
present. The specious present has, in addition, a vaguely vanish¬
ing backward and forward fringe, but its nucleus is probably the
dozen seconds or less that have just elapsed." We must note,
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however, that criticisms have "been directed against this point of
view. lor instance, writing in 1900, Stanley (l6l), after post¬
ulating that pure subjective time is a mode of introspection and
self-consciousness, and that the rate of consciousness determines
the amount of time perception, goes on to say, "Yet it is plain to
simple introspection that any given act of consciousness is per se
timeless, is merely the time unit or point. There is then no
•duration-block' as the 'unit' of our perception of time", as is
demanded by James. Stanley says he cannot find in his introspect¬
ions that the psychic moment ever directly perceives itself, but
he sees each psychic beat as a timeless, instantaneous act, yet the
sum of these acts constitutes, for him, subjective time.
Foucault (94) suggests that our immediate perception of the
sensory present, "the original paragon and prototype of all con¬
ceived time," may be founded, not merely on the immediately seized
or recognised sensorial qualities, but also on such other factors
as emotional retentiveness, the sum total of the organic sensations
which can be aroused by a given stimulus, and the greater or lesser
capacity of the stimulus to impose itself, so to speak, on our
.attention. Myers (33) also makes use of the idea of the specious
present. He first notes the interval of 550 ^between two soundsas
having the character of what he calls "moderate" or "adequate"
length, because this interval of 550^is the same length as that
required for the development of the complete effect of a sound on
consciousness. This "satisfying" interval lies within the specious
present since the various changes within the interval can be appre¬
hended as a single whole. How, he says further that this interval,
which can be perceived as a unitary state of consciousness, can be
increased by an increasing effort on the part of our active attent¬
ion up to about 4 seconds. The qualifying "about" is put there
for the very good and sufficient reason that the limits of the
specious present are not absolute, but relative; they vary with
individuals, with the nature and intensity of the limiting stimuli,
and with the state of the individual himself, whether normal, hyp¬
notic or drugged. Benussi (5) gives the specious present as 7 or
8 seconds.
Dunlap (Si) gives the results of experiments undertaken to
support the view that we should consider rhythmic grouping as a
function of the specious present. The threshold of difference for
the rate of discrete auditory stimulation is lower with rhythmic
grouping than without; while it is not appreciably higher for
series with irregular intensities and durations of sound stimuli
than for regular series. The difference thresholds for time inter¬
vals corresponding to the rates used are appreciably higher. Ex¬
periments with two intensities of auditory stimuli, and other with •
two modes, such as auditory and visual, give results which Dunlap
thinks speak for strain sensations as the time content. Erom intro¬
spections made by Quasebarth (147) it appears that the greatest
duration which can be perceived as a whole is about 6 seconds for
visual stimuli and 5 seconds for auditory stimuli. Beyond this
sensory or psychic present, memory must be brought in, for beyond
these limits the beginning must be recalled by memory when the end
is reached. Eor Quasebarth, the basis of our perception of durat¬
ion is our perception of succession - such is his attitude to this
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classic problem. Drover and Collins (l6)f who agree that the
specious present is a time interval or duration, state that its
length varies with such variable factors as the nature of the sense
experience filling the interval, the nature of the stimuli marking
off an interval for comparison or reproduction, the relative ease
or difficulty with which the attention is maintained, and the bodily
condition, whether normal or abnormal. The limit given by them
for the specious present, during which we have an immediate impress¬
ion of duration, is 4- seconds, but even that interval demands close
concentration.
In reviewing the problems associated with the psychology of
'*time, Bonaventura (62) gives particular heed to those of simultan¬
eity and the limit of the psychic present. From his studies, and
those of others, he concludes that its limit ranges from 3"fr to 12
seconds. He goes on further to suggest a use for this knowledge
in determining the least fatiguing rhythms for work. Pie'ron (34-),
a worker who has done much to maintain the prestige of the French
school of experimental psychology, says that there is quite a small
limit to our capacity for direct, naive perceptive reactions to
durations. This limit he places at 5 to 6 seconds at the maximum.
THE IHDIFFEKEHCE POINT
It was Vierordt (4-7) who first drew attention to the existence
of the indifference point, for there is to be found an interval
which is judged with the maximum degree of accuracy and away from
which, in both directions, errors increase their size. Below the
indifference point, the intervals are over-estimated, and above it
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they are underestimated. Much experimenting was done in the nine¬
teenth century to determine the value of this indifference interval
and James (27) gives the average indifference point as established
"by Wundt at .72 second, "by Kollert at .75* "by Estel at .75» "by
Mehner at .71, "by Stevens at *71» and "by Glass at .8. Myers (33)
naturally has a section devoted to this phenomenon, which he finds
occurs with "both the reproductive and the comparative methods of
time estimation. According to him, the earliest experimenters J
found the value of the indifference interval to range "between 1500
and 3500^ "but this result Myers rejects on the grounds that the
apparatus was not delicate enough, that the psycho-physical method
chosen was not employed with sufficient care, and that the volit¬
ional movements used by the subjects in reproducing an interval
introduced disturbing features. Under the improved conditions of
later experiments, especially in the comparison method, the indiff¬
erence interval has been shown to lie between 700 and- 800^ though
certain writers claim to have observed other indifference intervals
at odd multiples of this primary indifference point. But we are
entitled to ask once more, why should these occur at the odd mult¬
iples and not at the even multiples as well?
Absolute agreement on this point, as on the value of the spec¬
ious present, has not been reached, thus, though we find Kastenholz
(112) saying that he gets underestimation generally for standard
intervals over .7 second while overestimation is unusual, except
for times less than .7 second, when it is frequent, we hage other
writers who deny this tendency. Guyau (23) has one very interesting
suggestion to make, when, after noting that the point where the
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interval of estimated time is, on the average, equal to the inter¬
val of real time and is reproduced exactly is round about .72 sec¬
ond, he says that this is also the average length of duration nec¬
essary for reproduction by memory or representation. The processes
of reproduction and of association accomplish themselves most easily
at a speed of about second. From this Wundt concludes that, when
we have to represent to ourselves objective times longer or shorter,
we try involuntarily to make them equal to this normal speed of
representation, or at least approach close to it. Wundt's further
remark that thi3 same figure of 4 second is also the duration which
the leg takes of make a pace in a rapid walk suggests to Guyau that
it is by the duration of a pace in space that we meaaure time.
Hulser's (108) researches into the differential threshold gives
him results of 2 seconds, 1.55 seconds and .75 second. Koehler
(114) also finds similar thresholds when investigating comparisons
and time errors. Swift and McGeogh (171) find that short durations
are in general overestimated, and so they agree with the general
^conclusions about the indifference interval, which appears to be
accepted at a .value of about .75 second.
In recent years, however, this same certainty does not seem
to bind investigators. Pieron (34-) says that within the limits
of direct perception, there exists an optimal duration for which
comparisons are be3t and this duration he places at about second.
At this optimal duration of jr second, the differential fraction
remains fairly constant at about 1/20. In determining the psychic
present from introspections, Calabresi (13) notes that .7 second
gives a sort of durect intuition of unified duration. The greatest
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blow, however, has come from Y/oodrow (l8l) who, using the repro¬
duction method for intervals ranging from .2 second up to 3° seconds,
finds no evidence for a tendency to overestimate short intervals
and underestimate long ones. He finds a great number of variations,
even with the same subject, and he suggests that these variations
may depend on the different emotional attitude of the subjects.
These individual variations are reflected very closely in the re¬
sults of time experiments, and so they may give us a rough measure¬
ment of the subjective variations of any particular subject. This
research, as Y/eber points out, shows the complexity of the judgment
of time and throws considerable doubts on the efforts of earlier
workers to find constancy. The general weight of evidence, however,
tends to confirm the earlier conclusions.
EFZBCT Off PAUSE.
«
Katz's experiments (113) on the effect of pause on the estim¬
ation of time intervals yields him an indifference interval of 6oO<7_
In intervals less than 600Cr"tend to be overestimated, while those
greater than 600^are inclined to be underestimated. Those about
600^ are easy to note, Katz says, for the attention is easily
applied ("Angenehem zu arfassende Zeiten.") On this subject of
pause, Myers (33) says that in the reproduction method, the length
of the pause between the two intervals affects the judgment. YThen
the subject is unrestricted as to the length of the pause, it is
found to be "relatively longest when the given interval is shortest
and that, as the interval is increased, the pause absolutely in¬
creases up to a certain length of interval, after which it again
6o.
declines." Myers suggests that the effect of the pause is really
due to the feelings of expectation or surprise aroused by the
length or "brevity of the pause.
ESTIMATION OF LONG DURATIONS.
So far we have "been concerned almost entirely with the estim¬
ation of short intervals, that is to say, those which lie within
the limits of the specious present, and with its characteristics.
Yet it is with longer durations that we have most contact in ord¬
inary life. How, then, do we estimate these longer and more pract¬
ical intervals?
To "begin with, we must note that the durations we have to deal
with in everyday life - minutes, hours and days - lie "beyond the
bounds of our perception and have to be "symbolically conceived and
constructed by mental addition." James (27) says that, for these
longer durations, our impressions become vague and our only way of
knowing them accurately is by counting or by noticing the clock or
through some other symbolic conception. This is especially the
case when the time3 exceed hours or days; "our conception of long
durations is absolutely symbolic." James suggests that we think
of the amount of time in the interval either solely as a name, say
an hour, or by running over a few salient dates within the interval,
with no attempt to imagine the full durations that lie between them.
It is impossible to have any perception of the greater length of
time between now and the birth of Christ than of that between now
and the Norman Conquest. To an historian, of course, the former
interval will suggest a host of additional events and so appear a
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more multitudinous thing; in other words, the historian will base
his judgment on the amount of the content. There is, however, as
James points out, properly no comparative time intuition at all in
this case; "it is but dates and events, representing time, their
abundance symbolising its length."
As we have seen, Stout'3 view (4-0) of our knowledge of durat¬
ions longer than the mere fragments of time which we can directly
apprehend is that this knowledge is reached through "trains of
ideas" and through a process of "ideal construction." For Stout,
the measure of the lapse of time is the cumulative effedt of the
process of attending. Our experiences of durations, Stout says,
are unique and do not consist in having the parts of our experiences
spread out before us in a sort of durations-line or duration block.
From the experimental results of other workers Stout arrives at the
conclusion that "there undoubtedly seems to be some power of estim¬
ating lapse of time, even for comparatively long periods." Y/ith
practice he says there is a tolerable approach to accuracy. When
we estimate a long duration, or when we ideally recall a period of
time and estimate it by the number and variety of the events fill¬
ing the interval, a period agreeably spent is apt to appear relat¬
ively longer and a period not agreeably spent, shorter. "In ideal
retrospect, periods which appeared interminable while they were
passing, shrink as it were; whereas periods that seemed on their
actual occurrence to pass rapidly are correspondingly expanded when
we review them in the form of a train of ideas."
llyers (33) says an interval greater than the specious present
splits up into a number of component parts and only by representation
or conception can it be regarded aa a single whole. For the est¬
imation of these longer intervals Myers suggests that at first we
make use of organic sensations by voluntary movements of the head
or limbs, or of voluntary regulation of the breathing. These aids,
however, are abandoned altogether later. Myers further brings
forward some evidence for the existence of an absolute impression,
a direct judgment based on concentration on the second interval.
Our estimation of these longer durations depends, according to
Drever and Collins (l6) on complex and somewhat obscure conditions,
though they do not demand for this ideal representation. For
these longer durations, Drever and Collins say "we must assume a
cumulative effect of obscure organic changes, which never enter
clear consciousness at all." The exact nature of this cumulative
effect,due partly to these organic changes and partly"to interest
and attention has never been determined. Affective factors also
play a considerable part in determining our estimation, the agree-
ablenes3 or otherwise of the events and sensations filling the
interval determining our judgment as short or long.
THE PHKITOMSITON OF FORESHORTENING
(So-called by Ribot)
James (27) notes what nearly every writer on time has noted -
the apparent foreshortening of the years as we grow older. He
says that "in general, a time filled with varied and interesting
experiences seems short in passing, but long as we look back. On
the other hand, a tract of time empty of experiences seems long in
passing, but in retrospect short." He also notes the other very
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interesting phenomenon that "the same 3pace of time seems shorter
as we grow older." The years are certainly subject to this fore¬
shortening, the days also, "but whether the hours are subject to it
is doubtful. The minutes and seconds James says remain outside
its scope and remain about the same to all appearance. To account
for this phenomenon Jame3 explains that the content of the interval
[becomes monotonous both in empty times and also in later years of
life, with a "consequent simplification of the backward-glancing
view," and so the content stimulates fewer brain tracts. When
these brain tracts are restimulated in memory, fewer images are
recalled and so the period in retrospect appears short. Accord¬
ing to Guyau (23) the apparent length of time appreciated at a dis¬
tance is due to the number of decided and intense differences
noticed in the recalled events. A year full of memorable and
diverse happenings appears longer; an empty and monotonous year
shorter; now this is analogous to what happens in space. In the t
same way, the fact that years appear long in youth and short in
old age can be explained. The years of youth are full, but in old .
age there is a monotonous train of events. Guyau quotes the very
interesting suggestion made by Janet (Revue Philosophique, 1877)
that the apparent length of a certain portion of time, in the life
of each man, will be "proportional to the total duration of his
life," but, though he agrees that this law expresses a real tendency
of the imagination, Guyau thinks that, as proposed by Janet, it is
far too mathematical and too simple an explanation of the contract¬
ion of the years in the life of an old man. To Guyau, the contract¬
ion is due to the fact that, whereas the child has many varied and
distinct representations to put in a year, the adult has only some
salient points. Guyau maintains that this is the principal explan¬
ation of the apparent shortening of the years.
ORDERING OF EVENTS
James (27) makes our ordering of events depend on our memory.
Our memory is strewn with dated events. Now, dating is a mere
relation of before or after the present event, or some past or
future event. This dating, however, is rather vague and must be
replaced by some more exact dating as when we fit an event between
two events of a past or future series explicitly conceived. The
ability to arrange events in serial order is a factor of great im¬
portance for everyday life. It is very largely the need for such
arrangements that leads us, as a matter of convenience, to divide
time into the three divisions of past, present and future, though
the exact boundary lines between these divisions and the means by
which we make the divisions have been the sources of much controversy.
Sturt (41) suggests that the division arose through a combination
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of memory and purpose. At first the divisions was vague, but
/ *
later it became more exact, as culture advanced and as the practical
needs of life demanded a more exact arrangement. The psycho-^
logical means by which this exactness has been brought about,
as put by James and Ward (48), are fading brain states or move¬
ments of attention. To these explanations there are some
objections, and Sturt adds a process of construction or reasoning,
whether witting or unwitting, as an explanation. When Ward and
Eouillee (22) suggest that it is the clearness of the memory images
which gives us our serial order, they do not allow for the fact
that our minds do not work backwards; the scroll of history, personal
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or national, is not unrolled, from the present until, stage "by stage,
the earlier ages are disclosed. We think rather of some outstand¬
ing events round which we group other and less outstanding events,
or we think of a simple chronological order. Personally, we do
not think that it is a mere convention, but a psychological necess¬
ity, which impels us to arrange events in a chronological line of
time beginning with events of early occurrence and moving on stead¬
ily to events of recent occurrence. The theory of fading brain
states, which depends on the clearness of the memory images as its
dynamic force, does not explain the vividness of certain past
events as compared with others. Ward introduces movements of
attention, but it is open to the same objection that it would lead
to a reverse order of presentation; further it does not aid us
when we are dealing with events of the remote pa3t. These theories,
then, are rejected, though the theory of movements of attention may
be one factor in the ordering of very recent events. To arrange
«
events in order involves a definite act of memory, which may depend
on the conscious creation, probably by reasoning, of some connect- .
ing idea. In ordinary life, we may remember the strict chronol¬
ogical order and give no weight to the importance of the events, or
we may make our arrangement a matter of inference based on 3ome
apprehended dates or other associations, such as a scheme of pur¬
pose, cau39 and effect relation between different events, or space.
Dating is the method used for dealing with historical events.
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THE EFFECT 0? TIE LIMITING STIMULI PIT TIME ESTIMATION
Even in the days of the earlier experiments, such as those of
Meumann, it i3 noticed that the perception of short intervals of
time limited "by two impressions varies with the quality and with
i;he intensity of these impressions. Later Alvord and Searle (54-)
among the individual differences of method used for the reproduct¬
ion of an interval, note the spontaneous occurrence of auditory
images of the limiting stimuli. In considering the effect of
limiting
varying the stimuli/an interval, Myers (33) says that with inter¬
vals of less than 400°", the nature of the stimuli, whether auditory,
visual or tactual, determines the apparent length of the interval,
and he suggests as an explanation that "such variations are doubt¬
less dependent upon the different courses which different sensations
pursue, some coming and going quickly, other occupying the attention
for a longer period. Doubtless the extent to which the fading mem¬
ory image of the first stimulus is overlapped by the arrival of the
second presentation constitutes an important factor in the estimat¬
ion of short intervals." Woodrow's (182) work in the investigation
of temporal illusions in short temporal stimulus patterns due to
different lengths of the bounding auditory stimuli yields these re¬
sults. A long initial s.timulus constantly causes the interval to
be judged longer, though a long terminal stimulus gives the same
effect, but not to the same marked degree. Kastenholz (112) finds
that for very short intervals, those less than 500 or 600^", the per¬
ception and estimate are based on the rhythm of succession for
auditory stimuli, and on the quantity of light for visual stimuli..
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Drever and Collins (l6) state that the immediate impression of an
interval "between two stimuli is considerably modified "by the nature
of the stimuli. "With any particular type of sense stimulus there
is always a definite interval which has a peculiarly Satisfying'
character, due to the full development of the series of changes in¬
volved in a sensory stimulus," that is, the developing, full and
fading sensation, the after sensation and the primary memory image.
THE JUDGMENT OF FILLED AND UNFILLED INTERVALS AND THE EFFECT
Off THE INTERPOLATED MATERIAL
On this particular subject of our estimation of intervals and
on the influence of the filling on the apparent length of the inter¬
vals, a very great amount of work has been done, but, before going
on to summarise the work, there i3 one great general caution we
mu3t lay down. We have preferred to write of unfilled intervals
rather than empty ones, because of the difficulty of getting such
a thing as a really empty interval of time. It is impossible,
even when we are trying our utmost, to empty an interval of its
experiences, inward or outward. Even when an interval is devoid
of the special experiences due to the stimuli marking its beginning
and its end, there are motor and organic experiences going on which
we cannot stop. An empty interval, then, is real-ly one which is
empty of any special sensations or experiences, one which is
unfilled.
Meumann (129, 130) writes that our final judgment on the length
of an interval must take into account the intensity, the quality,
the number and the changing impressions filling the interval and
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also the feeling which accompanies these. After criticising
Munsterberg's theory of organic sensations, Meumann arrives at the
opposite conclusion that it is the impressions which are of prime
importance, and so "every psychic process is a competent "basis of
time measurement." (Nichols 138). He says it is impossible to
separate time from its accompanying processes; we cannot isolate
a duration from its limiting factors or from the impressions fill¬
ing it. Meumann further insists that there exists an immediate
appreciation or perception of durations: "the perception of time
content is an ultimate and irreducible fact." Schumann (l53)>his
contemporary, would introduce other factors, waiting and surprise,
v/hich determine the adaptation of attention, which in turn deter¬
mines our perception of time, that is to say, Schumann believes
that our judgment of duration is mediate. It is true that we must
concentrate our attention on the time factor in order to arrive at
a sound judgment of a duration. Meumann's studies are in the com¬
parison of filled and unfilled intervals, and one conclusion he
arrives at is that our perception of short intervals, of less than
half a second are of very different nature from that of long or
'middle intervals, for the manner of filling influences our judgments
of the latter. In the case of short intervals, the perception is
of the quickness of succession of the limiting stimuli, whereas in
long intervals the judgment is of the duration of the interval it-
sAel.f. The appreciation of short intervals varies with the degree
of concentration of the attention. Meumann tried a series of
comparisons allowing his subjects to use muscular or other organic
means of comparison, but, as.we have already noted, his results
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show no corroboration for Munsterberg's theory. For Meumann,
there ia an immediate perception of duration.
James (27) draws this conclusion from the work of Wundt that
"tracts of time filled with clicks of sound 3eem longer than vacant
onosof the same duration, when the latter does not exceed a second
or two." James also suggests in this section of his chapter that
there is a certain emotional feeling accompanying intervals of time,
a feeling of haste going with one measure of rapidity, that of de¬
lay with another. The next main point which he goes on to make is
that we have no sense for empty time. Our perception of time is
due to the filling and to our memory of its changing content; "we
cannot intuit a duration devoid of all sensible content." Aware¬
ness of change is thus the condition on which James makes our per¬
ception of time depend; the change must be of some concrete kind -
an outward or inward sensible series, or a process of attention or
volition. In experiencing a duration of empty time, however, there
is a feeling of discrete or continuous flow, the discreteness being
due to the discreteness of our successive acts of recognition or
apperception.
Munsterberg's earlier experiments (134) give the general re¬
sult that time intervals of from 8 to 12 seconds, marked off and
filled-with auditory impressions, can, with the most varied content,
be compared with sufficient accuracy to show that the presentations
do exercise a constant influence on the estimate of the time. It
is shown that those durations whose contents highly engrossed the
interest of the subject are constantly underestimated. Words
appear shorter than noises, verses'than the strokes of the
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pendulum, chorda than simple tones and sentences than strings of
nonsense-syllables. Stanley (l6l) says the amount of time per¬
ception is determined by the rate of consciousness itself. A
time interval is underestimated when consciousness is proceeding
at it3 normal rate, but it is overestimated when specially filled,
say while taking exercise. Thus a period of 150 seconds was
estimated as occupying $0 seconds under normal conditions, while a
period of 55 seconds exercise waa equally estimated as occupying
90 seconds. The variation in the periods is ascribed by Stanley
to increased rate of consciousness. Under primitive conditions
this subjective time increases with expectant attention and rapid¬
ity of consciousness. Thus, in the case of drowning, consciousness
is forced to top speed and time perception becomes most acute.
Nelson (137)» after remarking that it has been found by
Meumann and others that the estimate of small time intervals is
influenced by the number of stimuli that fall within the interval,
gives the results of his own experiments on the effect of subdiv¬
ision on the visual estimate of time. Prom Meumann's results in .
the comparison of unfilled time with filled time that for short
times from .1 second to 4 seconds, when the filled time is given
first, the error in estimating is constantly positive, while for
longer times the error is negative, Nelson deduces that the error
is not due to the filling alone, but to two other factors. It is
generally conceded that even when two empty times are compared,
there is a similar constant error, positive for short times and
negative for longer. That there is a difference other than this
constant error, which must be attributed to the filling, Meumann
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shows, for, in those cases where the unfilled interval is given
first, the sign of the error is also reversed, but the quantity
of the error due to the filling alone he does not show, as these
two factors are not quantitatively separated. Nelson's own ex¬
periments are carried on with longer intervals, from to 10 min¬
utes, and the filling is sensations of light. During the longer
periods it is impossible to keep the attention so closely fixed
as during the intervals of 1, or at most 2 minutes. It is
about this point that the change of sign occurs in the estimates.
The general feeling of weariness seems to be the chief criterion
in the longer intervals. Another interesting point Nelson makes
is that the filled time is psychologically the more empty or
barren of the two, for the time is filled with monotonous sensat¬
ions of light, and empty of vivid or interesting trains of thought.
On looking back, there are fewer changes in consciousness to remem¬
ber and hence the time seems shorter. Nrom his results Nelson
agrees with Meumann that in relatively short intervals, as well as
in small spaces, the estimate is influenced by the number of im¬
pressions that fall within the interval. There is no evidence of
a shortening up of the estimate due to the division of the standard
interval into halves, As a final result Nelson finds, in intervals
of 3 60 seconds evidence of a temporal illusion closely corres¬
ponding to the space illusion. Both in intervals of time and in
visual spaces, when there is more than a single division, the
filled stretch is overestimated. As the length of the intervals
is increased to minutes, there is not a direct reversal of the
effect of the filling, as is found with tactual stimuli; the
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illusion either decreases or is entirely lost. The experimental
work of Edgel (90) with unfilled intervals leads her to these two
main conclusions; that short durations of 1 second and less are
overestimated, while longer durations of 2 seconds and more are
underestimated, and that the perception of durations presents err¬
ors which do not follow Weber's Law.
On this particular topic Stout (4-0) writes that the amount of
the recent past included in our perception varies according to the
conditions of introspection. It is smallest probably in experi¬
ments on the estimation of very brief intervals; it is longer when
conation is obstructed or delayed, shorter when conation proceeds
successfully and easily towards the attainment of its object. This
affords us, according to Stout, an explanation as to why time seems
to pass quickly when we are absorbed in our work ;or play, or when
we are enjoying ourselves. Stout quotes the experimental results
of Myers, with whom he is apparently in agreement, that filled inter¬
vals appear longer than empty ones. To explain this result Stout
says "the most essential factor conditioning this immediate aware¬
ness of varying degrees of duration is probably to be found in the
process of attention with its accompaniments and results. When
and so far as there is continuity of attention, successive exper¬
iences are modified by the cumulative effect of retentiveness.
This cumulative effect varies in its nature with the amount of time
the process has taken." Eor Stout, the measure of the lapse of
time is the cumulative effect of the process of attending. Our ex¬
periences of durations are unique and do not consist in having the
parts of our experience spread out before us in a sort of duration-
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block. We measure so-called empty intervals by the process of
expectant attention.
Myers, one of our chief authorities on experimental work, (33),
begins by repeating the statement that "the apparent length of an
interval is influenced by the number and nature of the experiences
occurring during that interval," and proceeds to examine the in¬
fluence of filling and emptying on our judgment of the length of
the interval. He says that by the method of comparison, a filled
interval almost invariably appears shorter than an idle or empty
interval, no matter the order of the intervals, but when sound
stimuli limit the interval, the interval "filled" with sounds
appears longer, "the error of estimation increasing up to a certain
point with the number of sounds filling the interval. The same
holds for visual and still more markedly for tactile stimuli.
"His explanation is that there is free development of experiences
in the empty interval, but in the filled interval there is inter¬
ference, "and the attention is directed successively to numerous
discrete presentations." That he says holds good for short inter-
•
vals, but as the intervals increase in length the error of estimat¬
ion is said to diminish and eventually to be reversed. To get a
completely unfilled interval Myers says is impossible. And fin¬
ally, Myers brings forward some experimental evidence in favour of
the existence of the absolute impression, in which we do not make
a true comparison, and in the exercise of which we pay attention
to the second interval only. In comparing pairs of intervals,
with considerable variations in the length of the pause between,
"the fact that the number of judgments "second interval shorter"
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is found to "be practically uniform in spite of the variations in
the length of the pause" hints at the existence of this absolute
impression. "If the two intervals, standard and variable, "be
really compared, we should expect the length of the pause "between
them to have a distinct effect upon the frequency of any particular
judgment. Moreover, the judgments 'second interval distinctly
shorter' are found to increase in frequency with the length of the
pause. This, again, we should not expect if a true process of
comparison takes place; it points rather to reliance on the absolutely
judgment, which becomes all the more striking in effect, the longer
the pause before the occurrence of the time interval to which it
refers
It is interesting to note as a criticism of the view that our
knowledge of time is derived from the perpetual changings of our
consciousness, the remarks of Spearman (38). He says that this
theory of change breaks down for research has not succeeded in dis¬
covering any direct dependence between the amount of the changes of
consciousness and the seeming or estimated duration. He bases
this statement upon the comparative failure of the experiments on
filled and unfilled periods of time. There is no doubt consider¬
able conflict among the results, but to base such a sweeping contra¬
diction on this conflict is scarcely justifiable. The balance of
opinion, and the results of experiments also, seem to point to some
correspondence between the changes of consciousness and estimated
duration. Though not conclusive, there appears to be estimation
also by the absolute impression, which is probably due to the con¬
sciousness changes.
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Benussi (5)» his monograph on the psychology of time, sets
himself to find out the different conditions in which subjective
or perceived time corresponds to objective or clock time. Now,
among these conditions he notes the greater or lesser singularity
(Auffalligkeit) of the impressions limiting the interval and fill¬
ing it. From his analysis of our perception of intervals, he finds
that unfilled times appear shorter than filled time of the same
duration. G.G. Myers (135)> in his tests on the incidental per¬
ception of time intervals, finds that 1 minute is usually over¬
estimated by about one half. Longer periods of minutes are
overestimated by about one half by men and by twice by women. He
also finds very little difference between the estimations of per¬
iods of 1 minute which are incidentally perceived and those that
are purposely perceived. Woodrow's experiments (l3o, l3l, 182)
on the influence of the order of presentation of the standard and
variable intervals suggests to him the existence of the absolute
impression. In addition he notes the extreme variations of the
errors of temporal judgments which he thinks casts doubts on any
such regularity of judgmant in over or underestimation as is sup¬
posed to exist by many other writers. In his experiments the methed
of reproduction is used. Cary (73)> after noting the general
tendency to overestimate periods of 15 minutes, which are practic¬
ally one hundredths of a day, a conclusion which our own experiments
do not confirm, also notes the disparity between different estimates
of the 3ame period of time due to the different filling, thus a
speaker and a hearer have a very different appreciation and there¬
fore estimate of the same time. Spencer (l6o) first of all
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endeavours to eliminate the influence of conventional ideas and con¬
ventional units of time, whose use had "been noted "by Yerkes and
Urban (185). This he does by using the method of reproduction
rather than that of comparison or estimation, which are in essence
the 3ame, and he finds that the intervals he uses in his experiments,
15» 30» 60 and 100 seconds, are generally overestimated. He uses
six different interpolations, getting the result as above, but when
estimation in conventional terms is allowed, underestimation of all
intervals of greater length than 18 seconds is the result. Two
other of hi3 results are worth noting: the interpolation of poetry
malce3 the time seem longer than prose or none; the interval is
also apparently longer if the subject reads than if the experiment¬
er reads.
Kastenholz (112) makes researches in the comparison of inter¬
vals, using auditory stimuli to mark off the periods. The first
result he arrives at is that the standard time and the compared
time are perceived separately. This is generally true for mean
or superior times, that is, those over 700 . During the intervals
to be compared the attention is directed essentially on the stand¬
ard time, and when it ends, there is a feeling of equality or
otherwise, thus surprise becomes the criterion of perception.
Sometimes the attention is directed to the compared time and then
the judgment is based on the perception of the time itself. When,
however, as in the case of inferior intervals, the standard time
and the compared time are perceived as a whole, the perception is
based on the growth of a state of tension and the judgment is
based on the strength of the tension, or a feeling of expectation.
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For the average or mean standard times, from .7 seconds to 2 seconds
underestimation of the standard time is generally found. Kasten-
holz explains the constant error "by the variation of the attention.
His theory is thht the primitive datum is change or simple success¬
ion, and that duration is perceived only by the quantity of observed
successions.
Sturt (41) generally confirms the idea that estimation is
based on the quantity of thoughts filling the interval. She does
not find that the agreeable or disagreeable nature of the events
or thoughts modifies the perception of the duration, but as her
experiments are too few in number and made with two subjects only,
they do not allow of definite conclusions. In her larger work,
Sturt (41) says that duration i3 a subjective element of late devel¬
opment, the measurement of which is liable to subjective variations
and so our ability to estimate durations is never very accurate.
From her analysis of the nature of time and from her analysis of
the various ways in which duration may be measured, she lays down
as the factors involved in any estimate of duration the following:
division of attention between the actual experiences and our aware¬
ness of these experiences, which gives us the real material for
our estimate; the number of events; the pleasantness or unpleas¬
antness of these experiences; the continuity or disconnectedness
of these events, that is, their quality; and finally, the compar¬
ison of the experienced duration with 3ome ideal scheme. From
her consideration of dream material, she arrives at her peculiar
contribution, that not only does our estimate of duration d epend
very largely upon the number of events filling the period, but also
upon a judgment of the nature, the quality, o.f the mental events,
a judgment "based partly upon the amount of attention given to them
and to the passage of time as such. This demands a fairly good
memory for time durations and a certain ability to divide them,
which her experiments show we have. Sturt does not, as Weber
suggests (178), hold in its cruder form, even for moderately short
intervals, the old and widely spread theory that our estimate of
time intervals depends on the amount of the mental content. "Weber
(178), however, malce3 use of this to note another point, the cor¬
relation between the level of behaviour and the tendency to over or
underestimate a duration, for he says, ""While it is true that the
<
greater complexity of mental processes which we assume to take
place at the higher levels of behaviour may be regarded simply as
giving a greater number of elements in the mental content, never¬
theless there are definite differences between mere amount of mental
content and greater complexity. It is possible," he adds, "that
this distinction is of significance." Guyau (23), on the other
hand, points out that what proves best that we measure time by the
number of sensations, and not by the real duration, is the way by
which we evaluate approximately the length of a dream. It is
solely, says Guyau, by the number of images that we judge passing
time in a dream, thus a dream may appear long while in reality it
lasts for seconds only. He goes on later to remark that the est¬
imation of duration, being only a phenomenon of interior illusion,
a perspective of images, cannot refrain from offering a character
of essential relativity. It is relative "to the intensity of the
images represented, to the intensity of the differences among these
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images, to the number of these images and to the number of their
differences, to the rate of succession of the images, to the mutual
relations among them, their intensities, their resemblances or diff¬
erences, their diverse durations, and finally their positions in
time, to the time necessary for the perception of these images and
of their relations, to the intensity of our attention to these
images or to the emotions of.pleasure or of pain which accompany
them, to the appetites, desires or affections which accompany them,
and to the relation of these images with our expectation, with our
prevision." Romanes (3^) says that, beyond the number of states
of consciousness, the additional factor which acts to lengthen or
to shorten time is "the relation of the states of consciousness to
their own succession." Time appears relatively long when the
attention is concentrated on the latter, on the production of a
single and unique series of changes. Sully (4-2) says that the
apparent distance of an event not clearly localised in the past
series varies in inverse ratio with the nmenonic image. Another
cause of error in our perception of duration, according to Guyau,
is that we are brought to combine the time enforced by the repres¬
entation of an event with the real time the event has lasted.
Effort, then, rapid and brief, plays a considerable part in our idea
of time. When all the events hold together and are similar, the
effort of attention necessary to recall the memories adapts itself
immediately to each of the successive images, as Wundt remarks, and
the smoothly flowing series appears shorter; on the other hand, if
the events are not continuous, without bonds, or very diverse and
dissimilar, the effort of reproduction demands more time and the
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series of events itself appears longer.
Guyau also remarks on the well-known influence of expectation
on apparent duration. Our desire tends to show us the future as
present and to jump the intermediate steps; consequently we under¬
stand time to "be shorter than it is or can be. By comparison with
ideal time, real time appears to drag in a desperate fashion. On
the other hand, happy or filled time fly quickly because, by ideal
anticipation we promise ourselves a long happiness, but by compar¬
ison with the origin of our desire and of our expectation, the
reality appears to us brief. Wundt explains the majority of the
errors relating to duration by the variations of the apperception,
that is, of the attention to the representations which is in a more
or less great state of tension, brought about by desire or longing.
It is by desire that we measure in spite of ourselves the length of
time: apparent time varies according to the appetite or desire.
In history, certain centuries appear longer; "the period from to¬
day to the fall of Constantinople appears longer than from that fall
to the First Crusade, though both are almost equal chronologically.
This is probably because the first period is better known to us and
we mix with it our personal memories." (Sully 42).
Swift and McGeogh (171) use intervals of 30 seconds, 1 minute,
2 minutes, 5 minutes and 10 minutes in their experimental study of
the perception of filled and unfilled time, with the following re¬
sults. Short durations are in general overestimated, but there
i3 no sensible difference in this respect between periods of filled
and periods of unfilled time. For the longest period of 10
minutes underestimation is found equally as well when the filling
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(copying a text) is interesting as when it is dull. But when
listening to a story the long period is overestimated. As we
shall see, our results do not confirm this latter statement, under¬
estimation for a period of 15 minutes being found in all cases.
Swift and McGeogh further state that overestimated time is that in
which we do 3ome work. They conclude also, in opposition to
McDougall (ll8, 119) Yerkes and Urban (185), Gulliksen (103) and
our own results, that women appear to estimate time more correctly
than men. But of this more anon. Drever and Collins (16) state
that filled intervals seem longer than equal unfilled intervals,
especially when the stimuli are tactual. This they suggest may
be due tartly to the impeding of the attention and partly to the
fact that the impressions filling the interval tend to interfere
with each other's full development. Gulliksen (103), from his
experiments using a standard interval of 200 seconds, variously
filled by resting, by a metronome beating 184- per minute, by a
metronome beating 66 per minute, by working problems in long div¬
ision, by reading a set of direction in a mirror, by enduring
»
slight pain, by becoming tired through holding the arms extended,
and by taking dictation from a text, comes to the conclusion that
time appears longer or shorter according to the occupation which
fills it. Thus the order of .the lengths of the estimations from
the longest to the shortest is found by his experiment to be the
first of these conditions first, the seventh second, the third
third, the fourth fourth, the sixth fifth, the fifth sixth, the
eighth seventh and the second last. His results, as we have
already suggested, confirm McDougall, and Yerkes and Urban by finding
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matfked sex differences, women generally estimating the time as
longer, though in other respects the coefficient of variability
differs little from one sex to the other.
Prom the fairly extensive researches of Axel (5&) with stand¬
ardised interpolations of four kinds, unfilled, tapping, cancelling
figures and analogies and number completions for students and add¬
ing for children, the following results emerge: the type of fill¬
ing has a marked effect on the estimation of short durations, for
there is a greater tendency to underestimation the higher the level
of behaviour employed. Empty time does not show different results
from tapping as regards over-e3timation, which Axel says is evi¬
dence that there is no marked line of demarcation between the est¬
imation of filled and unfilled times.
DURATION TESTS
In an attempt to summarise the views on time estimation given
by the above writers, we must, in the first instance, make .a very
clear distinction between the results obtained by those who have
been working with intervals lying within the specious present and-
the results of those who have been dealing with intervals lying
without the specious present. So far as the first group of re¬
sults is concerned, two conclusions are agreed upon by almost
every experimenter and writer: that, whether the method in use in
the experiment be the method of reproduction or the method of com¬
parison, intervals shorter than the indifference interval of about
•7 second are overestimated and those longer than this same indiff¬
erence point are underestimated; and that in the words of Wundt (pO)
"tracts of filled time seem longer than empty ones of the same
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duration, when the latter does not exceed a second or two.w With
these highly interesting and well corroborated results, we see no
reason whatever to disagree.
However definite these results for periods of time,within the
specious present may be, the results and conclusions for intervals
of time, which are greater in extent than the specfous present of
say 4 seconds, are not so clearly defined or agreed upon, probably
because considerably less attention has been devoted to these long¬
er intervals in the psychological laboratories, and yet, for the
practical purposes of everyday life, these are the more important
intervals. One does not dBny the usefulness to psychology of the
idea of the specious present and its limited duration as the limit
of perception in this field, but the sort of period one is likely
to be called upon to estimate in everyday life is only in very rare
and extreme instances within the bounds of the specious present;
it is, in the proverbial ninety nine cases out of a hundred, certain
to bo a period of greater duration. Thu3, in a recent railway
accident inquiry, a witness, who had declared that a period of 3
minutes had elapsed between certain happenings, was asked by the
presiding magistrate to give the court his impression of 3 minutes.
The actual time given by the witness as equal to 3 minutes was 47
seconds. This result seems at first sight rather unexpected,
nevertheless,the enormous difference may be due to the lack of fill¬
ing in the second case. Witnessing the accident, full of momentous
happenings, time would appear very full and therefore long. In the
silence of the courtroom, time would appear to drag and so a short
period would seem equal to the longer one.
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If the results of Stanley (l6l), Cary (73)» Spencer (l6o),
and Swift and McGeogh (171) on the estimation of longer intervals
are tabulated, we have the following table

























(a) 3hort intervals show over-
estimation with no material
difference between filled and
unfilled intervals.
(b) long interval of 10 min¬
utes shows underestimation,
save when filled with stories.
(c) women estimate more correct¬
ly than men.
With a view to finding out how such longer intervals are
estimated by children, four intervals of 30 seconds, 1 minute, 5
minutes and 15 minutes were selected and a number of school child- ~
ren between the ages of 10 and 14 were tested. After a few pre-
*
J
liminary questions of a general character on time and clocks, and
r '•
our conventional measurements, the children were asked to put up
their hands when they considered that a period of 1 minute had
elapsed from the given starting signal, which consisted of a single
« clear tap of a pencil on the desk. As was anticipated, hands went
up within 15 seconds of the beginning, and only in exceptional
cases was there a near approach to accuracy. The experimenter
then estimated a period of 1 minute, the pupils checking his en¬
deavour. On one occasion only did the error exceed 5 seconds, a
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result to "be attributed to practice and not to any special ability.
Having thus been shown that a minute of objective time occupies a
considerably longer duration of subjective time than is expected
^
. the experiment proper was begun. Three series of experi¬
ments were carried out. On the first occasion, the intervals were
nominally unfilled, and every endeavour was made to keep them as
such,- for the counting and other devices which would have been
adopted by many pupils, especially in the junior classes, as a
method of estimation,were forbidden. That is not to 3ay that they
were not used, for silent counting could not be detected, and the
honesty of the children had to be relied on. How, a schoolboy's
code of honour would not regard with any degree of horror such an
easy way of cheating. Hence the unfilled intervals are so called
because, as far a3 it was possible, they were emptied of any act¬
ive mental activity. In the second series, the intervals were
filled with stories told by the experimenter. These were more
or less standardised tales from the bypaths of history. The
scholars simply noted, as in the first series, their estimates on
a slip of paper in front of them and then continued their enjoyment
of the stories. In order to encourage genuine answers or estimates,
no names were asked for, but merely the age of the pupils in years
and months and the sex, denoted by E. or G. A third series was
carried through with the senior pupils when the filling consisted
of silent reading. As each pupil provided his or her own reading
material, we are safe in assuming that the filling was interesting
in character and therefore likely to distract attention from the
passage of time. As we have already indicated, the age3 of the
\ 86.
pupils taking part in these experiments ranged from 10 to 14-.
Except for the last age group of 14- to 14—11 there was no selection
whatever as these comprised representative groups in each case.
Owing to circumstances over which the experimenter had no control,
it was not possible to test all the pupils in each grade, and so
the results, though thoroughly representative, are not so full as
they might otherwise have "been. These results are set out in
detail in the tables in the appendix.
Erom the results of the first series, the detailed tables of
155
which will be found on pages 156, the following summary table has
been drawn up.































































































































































Erom the above table the following conclusions can be drawn:
that for a period of 30 seconds unfilled time the general tendency
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for all pupils between 10 and 14- i3 to overestimate the duration;
and that at most ages the boys show a superiority over the girls in
the matter of accuracy of estimation, for, except at age 10 the %
of overe3timation is lower for the boys than for the girls by about
20 on the average. If these results are plotted in the form of
graphs, a very curious result is produced, for while the graph indie
ates that the boys show most accuracy, or least inaccuracy, at age
11, the girls show the greatest degree of over-estimation, or most
inaccuracy, at that age and at 12. The graphs tend to coalesce
after age 13.
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For a period of 1 minute much the 3ame general result is ob¬
tained: there is a general tendency to overestimate the interval.
There are, however, some exceptions in this case which may indicate
88.
that the interval approaches one where a change of sign is likely
to occur. These exceptions are all in the cases of boys; at age
'
11 there is an approach to equality between under and overestim-
ation with a slight advantage on the side of underestimation; at
age 12 underestimation has the advantage by over 10^; and then at
age 13 there is comparative equality again. It is quite remark¬
able that in each of these cases it is the boys who are concerned:
it may show that the boys have greater aptitude for estimation than
the girls, for at all ages the girls overestimate. The graphs for
this interval show that the tendency is for least overestimation
or greatest accuracy at ages 11 and 12 for boys, while the graph
for the girls' results shows a reverse tendency; greatest over-
estimation comes at age 11 with a decrease thereafter. The graphs
are similar in general character to those for 3° seconds.
If we consider the period of 5 minutes as a long interval then
our table shows agreement with the results of Swift and McGeogh
that long intervals are in general underestimated, for the balance
ha3 definitely swung in favour of underestimation, in every case,
except for girls at age 14 where there is a slight advantage v/ith
overestimation. This time, however, the greater degree of inacc¬
uracy is displayed by the boys, though the extent is not great.
For this period, the graphs for both boys and girls show greater
similarity of contour than for either of the shorter periods.
The apex of the curve may be reached later by the girls, but the
general outline is the same, for both show a gradual rise and fall
with the greatest tendency to underestimation at ages 11 and 12
for the boys. In the case of the girls the inaccuracy reaches
89.
its height between 12 and 13 with improvement thereafter.
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And finally for the longest unfilled period of 15 minutes N
the same general tendency is observed. Underestimation is the
rule though we must note the cases of the boys at 10 and 11 where
there is more overestimation than underestimation. Again, except
in the one case of age 12, the girls show a greater degree of
underestimation. The graphs show no regular features; they sim¬
ply confirm the above conclusions.
Our results, then, with periods of unfilled times, suggest the-
conclusion that, for the shorter intervals of 1 minute and less, the
general tendency is for overestimation, while for the longer
intervals of 5 minutes and more, the general tendency is for under¬
estimation. A further conclusion may also emerge, that boys tend
to show a lesser degree of under or overestimation than girls.
In order to see whether the filling of the interval had any
appreciable effect on the estimation, a second and third series
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of tests were carried out using interpolated material of a story
nature for the junior classes and silent reading for the senior
classes. The results are set out below with the detailed results
in the appendix I.

























Nature of Filling - Story Telling
i
I
10 B 30.5 6.5 63 17 33 50 50.5 20 29.5 30.5 40 29.5
;
G 26.5 8 65.5 18 37 45 53.5 21 25.5 58.5 13 28.5
11 B 17.5 13 69.5 16.5 39-5 44 44 22 34 .9 26 65 !■
G 29 6 65 12 23.5 64.5 29.5 23-5 47 29.5 23.5 47 1
12 B 46 28.5 25.5 37 17 46 71.5 8.5 20 28.5 43 28.5 I j
II




13 B 26 16 58 20 16 64 48 20 32 32 36 32 i■' 4' 1
' i
G 8 15 77 8 4 88 19 35 46 19 50 31
'
Nature of Filling - Silent Reading
13 B 3 16 81 2 2 96 3 24.5 72.5 34 46 20' i '
G 1 40 59 1 27 72
^
35 9 56 69.5 27 3.5
1 1 .




G 19-5|po 30.5 25 25 50 19.5 25 55.5 69.5 5.5 25
As can be seen from the tables, for intervals of 30 seconds
and 1 minute of time filled with either stories or silent reading,
there is a general tendency for overestixnation to take place.
There are two slight exceptions to this general rule, for with
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stories for "boys of 12, the amount of underestimation exceeds the
amount of overestimation by some 20% in the case of the interval
of 30 seconds, and for silent reading for the boys of 14 by some
2in the case of the interval of 1 minute. Apart from these,
hov/ever, overestimation takes place in every case. For the per¬
iod of 5 minutes filled with stories, the result is very mixed
and difficult to determine, underestimation being the general rule
with the boys, while the girls of 11, 12 and 13 show quite decided
overestimation by fully 20%> on the average. V/hen the filling
consists of silent reading, overestimation exceeds underestimation
with both boys and girls of 13 and 14.- For the interval of 15
minutes, a very curious result is found; when the filling consists
of stories, the general tendency for practically all the pupils is
overestimation or equality of overestimation and underestimation.
In the case of the girls of 10 alone does underestimation exceed
overestimation. When, however, the filling is silent reading,
the result is reversed, for definite and considerable underestim¬
ation takes place for pupils of 13 and 14.
If we plot graphs of these results, using the overestimation
column, we again find that for the shorter intervals, the boys are
»
best when the girls are worst, at age 12. This divergence dis¬
appears with graphs of the longer intervals. On the whole, also,
it is clear that the boys are better than the girls at estimation;
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(b) for 1 minute
11 12 13 14
(d) for 15 minutes
11 12 13 14
These graphs are for the story filling only, as the results
for silent reading are not spread over a sufficiently wide age
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grouping, We may claim that the results, both for these filled
intervals and for the unfilled intervals as well, may "be regarded
as thoroughly reliable and representative, as the numbers of
pupils tested were $68 for the unfilled intervals, 213 *"o:r inter¬
vals filled with stories and 248 for intervals filled with silent
reading.
Before stating the general conclusions to which our experi¬
ments have led us, let us first consider a table comparing the
results for the unfilled intervals with thccse for the filled inter¬
vals. In this table the amount by which overestimation exceeds
underestimation is given with the necessary plus or minus sign.
Table showing comparison of filled and unfilled intervals,
with story telling as the filling.























































































































































In the case of age 14 the filling is silent reading. The
difference column is obtained by subtracting the results of the
filled intervals from those for unfilled intervals, thus a minus
sign in the difference column will indicate greater overestimation
for the filled intervals and a plU3 sign will indicate lesser over-
estimation for the filled intervals. Unfortunately the results
are not at all illuminating as to the effect of the filling, ex¬
cept to suggest that on the whole there is more overestimation
in the case of filled intervals.
The general conclusions of this study of the effect of fill¬
ing may be laid down as,that the filling of an interval, especially
the nature,of the filling, has a definite effect upon the estim-
* ation of it, for there is more tendency to overestimation than
that
underestimation; /there are also fewer wild guesses as to the
length of the interval; and that there are definite sex differ¬
ences, the boys tending to estimate better than the girls. No
other explanation than sex difference can be brought forward to
account for the curious results of the 5 minutes' intervals




THE GENETIC DEVELOPMENT 0? THE CONCEPT OP TIL1E
Bagley, in his instructive book on the Educative Process (2)
says, "An important task of education is to lead the pupil to con¬
dense his experiences and attach symbols to the concepts thus
formed. The fundamental principle that governs this process has
been recognised almost from the beginning - recognised in theory
but often sadly neglected in practice. This principle is formu¬
lated in the pedagogical maxim: 'Proceed from particulars to
generals and from the concrete to the abstract.' Rightly inter¬
preted, this dictum lies at the basis of all national instruction.
It means that there is no way to reach concepts that will function
efficiently save through a series of experiences with the concrete
and particular and passing gradually through the various stages of
condensation. There is no 'royal road to learning' and there is
no short cut to the concept." All this is very true of the con¬
cept of time, for the normal method of its growth is that the
individual is subjected to a great number of experiences of a
concrete nature and is led consciously to make the analyses, com¬
parisons and abstractions that are necessary to the formation of
the time concept. This idea of genetic development lies also at
the basis of the theory of recapitulation, which, though it arose
first of all as an attempt to explain the play activities of
children, has been and can be applied also in wider senses. The
early activities ana ideas of the race are said by Stanley Kail
(24) to be recapitulated, retraced, in the form of play. Now,
this tendency to recapitulate must have been preserved by Nature
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"because of its use in subserving the function of preparation for
adult activities. The child*s ideas of time follow the same
course; at first the crude sense of time due to hunger corresponds
to primitive man's knowledge of time, then the more developed ideas
of duration correspond to the ideas of the developing savage, and
finally, a fully developed apprehension of time corresponds to the
cultured man's knowledge of time.
This idea of genetic development has "been sometimes explicit¬
ly and sometimes implicitly avowed "by writers on time. Ward (4-8),
for instance, says that the conditions "by which an adult distin¬
guishes past, present and future, in turn will "be found "to depend
upon all that is implied in the formation of the memory train and
upon the recurrence of like series of impressions," without which
"our knowledge of time would "be impossible," Another writer, who
inclines to the genetic viewpoint, though he does not expressly
say so, i3 James (27). There is much in his chapters, however,
to make the inference clear, as, for example, when he writes of
our referring events and dates to our own particular past. Or
again, when he writes that the excellence or otherwise of our mem¬
ory is dependent partly on the number and partly on the persist¬
ence of the brain tracts, the latter being "a physiological pro¬
perty of the brain tissue of the individual, whilst their number
is altogether due to the facts of his mental experience." Exper¬
ience is then, for James, a very important factor in the formation
of our ideas on time, but there is the further factor of the use
made of the mental experiences, for "the one who thinks over his
experiences .most, and weaves them into systematic relations with
each other, will "be the one with the "beat memory," native tenacity
being equal. James also says that our perception of time is due
to our perception of the events within the interval; we are aware
of the events and of their changes, and it is this awareness of
change which gives us our perception of time as having duration
or protensity. "Longer durations than the specious present are
symbolically conceived and constructed by mental addition."
Stout (4-0), in his chapter on temporal perception, regards
our apprehension of temporal relations as an extremely complex
product of mental development, in which the part played by trains
of free ideas is of predominant importance, for these trains of
free ideas give us our definite apprehension of a time series.
Later, Stout regards the reference to the future made by attent¬
ion as being as primitive as conative consciousness. This cer¬
tainly agrees with common experience that the early stages of
mental development are occupied with the future rather than with
of attention
the past. He adds further that the prospective nature/"would
seem also to be a primary condition of the possibility of learn¬
ing to adjust future behaviour to the lessons furnished by past
experience." Again, in distinguishing the past and the future,
he says that the future is in our own hands and we must be con¬
tinually adjusting our actions so as to modify this future if we
are to survive and to live a tolerable life, but the past is be¬
yond our control; "retrospection can only be of use in supplying,
data for pre-arranging the future."
Stanley (l6l), definitely maintaining this point of view,
writes that "the genesis of time perception under conditions of
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natural selection is in a felt relation of the individual to its
environment, and it is a complex of the sense of unrealisation and
of position with reference to realization. It is plain that time
perception is experience of delayed succession. Time perception
is seen to "be an adaptive psychosis to exigencies; giving fore¬
sight and preparedness and reducing fright to caution. The rise
and growth of time perception are then involved in expectant attent¬
ion which implies memory and the cognition of the break between
the real and the ideal. Rageot (14-8) says time is born from our
personal changes at first, but later it becomes for us the common
time due to the changes of others, that is to say, we proceed from
individual time to general or universal time. Mackenzie also (123)
treats time as conceptual in development.
Of the writers who assume genetic development in the course
of individual and social experience, one of the most important is
Sturt (4-1, 169, 170). As we shall see later, Sturt distinguishes
three stages of development of the time concept. In her earlier
work, in collaboration with Oakden (170), she shows that the growth
of the child's knowledge of time is slow, beginning before the age'
of 4 and arriving at nearly adult level at about 13 or 14, though
thd most important period of growth takes place for all different
aspects of time knowledge at about 11. The most difficult,and so
latest, factor is what is called temporal organization or the
arrangement of events in order. They note also, as one result
of their experimental work, that time indications play a less im¬
portant part in the lives and thought of children than do those
of space. This agrees with the findings of Eurt. In her larger
work (41) on the psychology of time, Sturt makes it her starting
point and also her final conclusion that our knowledge of time is
built up during our early years from vague percepts into a workable
concept, more or less complete according to the circumstances and
the intelligence of the individual. For her, time is a concept
based on these vague percepts of earlier years, which passes through
the three stages of simple animal, complex animal and educated
adult development. These stages are gone through anew by each
individual who thu3 parallels in his progress the development of
the idea of time in the race. There is a case for phyolgenetic
development made out by Sturt in her chapter on the social organ¬
ization of time. Now, after a differentiation of past, present
and future, Sturt proceeds to the main point in her work, which is
to show from studies of children's concepts and from experiments
conducted among children that the development of the individual's
concept of time follows the stages outlined by her as those in
the development of the racial or cultural concept. From the
studies of children's words and from her own experiments, her gen¬
eral conclusions are that the child has to acquire laboriously
during his early years, up to about the age of 11, a knowledge of
the time scheme in general use, and that this labour sufficiently
corresponds to the racial development of it as to justify her con¬
tention that there is a very close relation between the social and
the individual learning of the concept of time. Though there are
some differences, such as the ready-made system of abstract time
names and the use of numbers available for the civilised child,
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these can "be accounted for "by the higher stage of culture reached.
Moreover, these differences are outweighed "by the striking simil¬
arities. Reverting finally to the nature of time, Sturt regards
it as a concept. Time is not denied an experiential "basis, which
is constituted "by what has "been well named the specious present,
that brief present which is perceived as a unitary whole. This
experiential basis comprises our awareness, the succession of our
mental states, at a particular moment, the time setting of this
awareness or individual time, the concept of universal or Newtonian
time, and the perception of change in external objects or cdmmon
time. For the individual time is the complex of consciousness
at any instant, a state of mind possessing no structure but pec¬
uliar to the individual and determined by his interaction with
external objects. This psychological definition of time marks
it off completely from time as understood by the relationists, the
fourth dimension of space-time.
Passing now to the work of Guyau (23), we find that he and
hi3 friend Pouillee, believe that it is only after a more or less
long evolution that the animal projects into the past part of the
representations acquired by it and so arrives at the idea of time.
Opposing the ideas of Kant, they 3ay that our ideas of time must
be slowly and laboriously built up by memories and representations.
"In normal beings, the true condition of the idea of time, is in
the real existence of succession and of movement outside ourselves,
and also in our minds." They go on to say that "at first, the
animal has, as a fact, a representation, then a succession of re¬
presentations, then a representation of representations which he
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has had, and that, in a certain imposed order; he has in conse¬
quence a representation of the succession of representations;
finally this succession takes the form, "built up slowly as the
"brain develops and as experiences accumulate, of time." Later •
it is said that "the idea of unitary time is the refined product
of human reflection. The succession of representations is grad¬
ually elevated by the reflection of the experiencing mind on the
experience by means of the repetition and condensing organs into
the representation of a series, intensive, extensive and proten-
sive." They agree that we have no other perception of time than
our actual experience of the present state with the actual tend¬
ency to another state. Time is the object partly of perception
and partly of conception. Guyau, then, like Stout, is a partisan
of experience as the basis of our idea of time. He takes for
granted the experience of time together with the physiological and
psychological phenomena which make it possible. The immediate
perception, the experimental intuition, is implied in the internal
experience of change in being, which, according to Guyau, is the
essential and primitive element of all ideas, space and movement.
In the dynamical representation, "the image of the. constant tension
and transition which have accompanied each term of the series,"
gives us the idea of time.
Dealing with what he calls the period of primitive confusion,
Guy'au almost takes for granted the idea that time is a concept
slowly and laboriously built up. That the idea of time is the
result of a long evolution he says is difficult to deny and he
refers to our language for proof. Further he says that ideas of
103.
ime are slowly imposed on children through the organisation of
he confused mass of memories of the past into a perspective of
"lowing days. Finally, in concluding his study, he says that
'rom all his arguments we shall conclude that "time is not a coa¬
lition, but a simple effect of consciousness; it does not consti-
;ute consciousness, it springs from it. It is not a form a
jriori that we shall impose on phenomena, it is a mass of relations
;hat experience establishes among them. It is not a ready-made
lould into which our sensations and our desires can be poured; it
.s a bed that they trace for themselves and a course that they
spontaneously take in this bed." Time is, for Guyau, no other
ihan a certain regular disposition, an organisation of images,
lemory is only the art of calling up and organising these images,
'here is no time outside of desires and memories, that is, of cer-
;ain images which, juxtaposing themselves as the objects are juxta-
sosed which have produced them, give rise all at once to the appear-
mce of time and space. Not/, beyond consciousness, Guyau asks,
.s there a reality corresponding to the idea which we create for
lurselves of duration? According to Guyau, time is only one of
;he forms of evolution, it does not produce evolution, it comes
"rom it. Time, in effect, is a consequence of the passage from
lomogeneous to heterogeneous; it is a differentiation introduced
.nto things. In place of saying that time is the essential factor
.n change and so in progress, Guyau states that it would be true
;o 3ay that time has progress for factor and fundamental element;
.ime is the abstract formula of changes in the universe. "Life
.nd consciousness suppose variety and variety creates duration.
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Eternity is either nothing or cha03j with the introduction of
order into sensations and thoughts begins time."
Other writers, particularly of recent years, have assumed
this theory. Thus Burt (12), writing on composition, ssays that
"the changes in the child's intellectual outlook are clearly
mirrored in his compositions. Through out school life it is
evident, his comprehension of space relations is gradually widen¬
ing. His horizon becomes enlarged; his world more systematica¬
lly arranged. And, by somewhat later stages, it would appear,
his notion of time pursues a parallel development. There is, too,
a constant progress in the degree of generality or abstraction
which his mind can envisage; the concrete conception yields to a
more general conception and this in turn gives way ultimately to
an abstract conception." As Janet (25) says, "time is not a form,
but a construction of the mind," or, as Pichon (144) suggests, the
idea of time is gradually developed. "In each human group, as
the group becomes civilised, the idea of time is constituted by
contact with reality, and gradually our mind arrives at the idea
of infinite and homogeneous time, the common time experienced by
all, or different times severally experienced and yet fundament¬
ally similar. This is the result of time being experienced as a
continuous succession of events." How, the relation between the
child's learning and the social construction of the idea of time
has been the subject of an extensive investigation by Axel (5&).
His primary aim is to note the differences in time estimation in
children of 9 to 14 and in college students. His material is
standardised into four groups, 'Unfilled" time, time filled with
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tapping - motor activity, time filled with cancelling 5's -
sensori-motor activy, and time filled with mental activty - adding
7's for children and analogies and number completions for the
students. Nov/, the results of his experiments are summarised by
Weber (173) as follows: "for the children,the interpolated mater¬
ial exercised a strong influence on the estimation of small durat¬
ions. The higher the level ef behaviour the greater is the tend¬
ency towards equal accuracy between the children of different
ages; up to ages 11 or 12 there is a definite tendency for a de¬
crease in extremes of judgment; while from 11 and 12 no further
significant decrease in extreme estimates appears; the higher the
level the greater is the tendency towards underestimation and the
less the tendency to overestimation in the case of a given group;
and finally, the type of the interpolated material largely deter¬
mines the difference in accuracy of estimation between a group of
boys of 11 to 14 and a group of college students."
It would certainly be a very profitable line of attach on this
problem, as Weber suggests, if we could get some reliable data on
the development of the time idea among children and also among
primitive people. As yet, there is no great body of data avail¬
able on which to base definite conclusions. Weber further sugg¬
ests that this dearth may be due in part to the lack of a precise
technique for approaching some phases of the problem, for we are re¬
duced to the use of the questionnaire method, which is lacking in
that very precision and definiteness we need. This general weak¬
ness of method, however, has not deterred us from making an attempt ,
in the first place, to add to the body of data available and, in
io6.
the second place, to suggest some definite conclusions. After
this has "been 3et down, we propose to add a resume of views devel-
oped in the course of this study with the object of arriving at a
reasonable theory of time as perceived and conceived.
TIM TESTS
Such, then, are the general ideas of time and of its devel¬
opment as a concept in our minds with which we approach our own
particular problem, the growth of time ideas in the minds of school
children, and especially the growth of the idea of historical time.
Already it will be clear that any partiality to the Kantian con¬
ception of time as an a priori form merely requiring elucidation
has been abandoned and that the idea of time as a concept as sug¬
gested by the work of the above writers, as a concept gradually
developed as a result of individual and social needs and following
a course of development in every child from a very crude and im-
»
mature concept to a fully-formed and fully-elaborated concept, more
or less complete in accordance with the culture and education of
.the individual concerned, has been adopted in its place.
In order to test out certain sections of this general suppos¬
ition, two group tests were constructed, copies of which are
appended (Appendix'^)- The first test, which will be referred
to as Test l,.was gradually evolved from a consideration of var¬
ious mental tests. The Binet-Simon scale and other mental tests
were examined and the various items in these tests which had a
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"bearing on time and our knowledge of it were collected together,
and from them, after due consideration, Test 1 was made up. A-
part from the heading in which a knowledge of age and date was
involved, the test was divided into four sections. Section A
was devoted to a number of very simple questions., mostly drawn
from the Binet scale, and involving answers to 3uch questions as,
name the days of the week or name the months of the year. Sect¬
ion B was given over to five smaller divisions, making use of the
usual forms of group test in order to test the children's ability
to use ordinary time words, or to use ordinary time ideas. Sect¬
ion C was composed of a number of instructions and problems in¬
volving reasoning where the material to be reasoned out dealt ex¬
clusively with time ideas and symbols. Section D, the final
section, was an absurdity test. Some paragraphs dealing with the
Battle of Bannockburn were written, but in these paragraphs many
absurdities were introduced. This subject was chosen because of
its probable familiarity to the pupils test. As can be seen, in
the general construction of this test 1, the lines laid down by
Burt in his Mental and Scholastic Tests ( 12 )have been followed,
for there he has said that the three most reliable tests are voc¬
abulary, reasoning and absurdity tests and so a due place has been
given to test3 of those descriptions.
Test 2 (Appendix 2) was constructed in order to test our
children's knowledge of the conventional scheme of time marking
as used in dealing with history and also in order to find out the
methods by which our pupils think of historical time. To carry
out the first of these objects, a number of short tests involving
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well-known historical material was set; in some cases not merely
were the events, hut the dates also were given, as it was not a
case of testing historical' knowledge, hut of the ability to arrange
historical data in serial order. In Section B three separate
tests were grouped together, the first of which was devised to find
out a child's concept of certain periods and his ability- to dis¬
tinguish these periods from one another. The second consisted of
five questions, one of which proved useless in practice, directed
to find out the method used by children in thinking about histor¬
ical data. The third subdivision was also an attempt, though
couched in a different form, to analyse our children's concepts of
different historical periods and to find out to what extent they
had clear and definite images of these periods in their minds.
■ These two group tests are the bases of the results set out
hereafter, and from these results certain general conclusions con¬
firming our general ideas have been obtained. These tests were
given during the summer term of 1931-32 to classes in Broxburn
High School. As many of the pupils had already undergone test¬
ing under the Mental Survey promoted by the National Council for
Research in Education, and as others had sat a Comprehension Test
prepared by the local West Lothian Research Committee, the result
was that many puTjils and most of the teachers were familiar with
the procedure adopted in giving these tests. In addition to the
instructions clearly printed at the beginning of the test form,
some general instructions were sent to the teachers in charge in¬
timating that there was to be no time limit for the tests. It
was not desired that these tests should be turned into an additional
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intelligence test, (though some 3ection3 would have proved quite
reliable in this respect), "but that as many results as possible
should be obtained. In view of the difficulty of setting all the
second test in a simple form, it was left to the discretion of the
individual teachers to determine whether or not the second test
should be given to their pupils. By permission of the Rector and
with the willing co-operation of the staff of Broxburn High School,
these tests were given, the first to 898 pupils ranging from 7
years of age to 17 years and over, and the second to 5^5 pupils
ranging from 9 years of age to 17 years and over. As the number ,
of pupils over 15 years of age and under 7 years 11 months in the
case of Test 1, and under 9 years 11 months in the case of Test 2
were, limited, the reliability of the percentages obtained for these
ages must also be considered as limited, an error, no matter how
slight, causing a fairly great variation in the percentage. It
has been suggested that only the 126, 165 and 156 at ages 11, 12
. and 13 are likely to be good samples and even of these the 11 year
olds have been suspected. Now, as these were all the pupils of
age 8 and upwards in this school, which draws in all the children
of the district and many from neighbouring districts as well, with
the one exception of the Roman Catholics, and as the district is
a modern industrial one, affected to some extent by unemployment,
surely these pupils can be looked upon as typical and representat¬
ive of an area with a typical and representative population, being
at neither end of the scales of wealth, social class or intelligence.
Bor these ages, then, we consider that the numbers are sufficient
to give a fairly representative result; the pupils below 14- are
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an entirely unselected group. For age 14 and over there is cer¬
tainly some selection. No doubt 60 at 14 is still a fairly large
number, but they are, as has been pointed out, the best 6o on the
whole out of some 150 or so who might have been expected in school
if say, the leaving age had been raised to 15• While we admit
the influence of the exodus of many pupils, (good pupils as well
as dull ones leaving at 14) on the results for age 14 and over,
we are inclined to think that those for ages 8 to 13 are reliable
and can be used as the bases of certain conclusions. Y/ith these
general considerations in mind, let us now proceed to examine the
results of these tests.
Taking first of all the heading of the test, three matters
of time knowledge are involved; age in years and months, birth¬
day, and the date. Unfortunately some teachers read the instruct¬
ions as applying only to the sections which followed, and so the
results particularly for the date, are better at the earlier ages
than would normally have been the case. It was a very simple
error which was not anticipated, as any preliminary tests had been
made with senior classes, or it might have been avoided. For
these three items, the following results are obtained;- in table
1 incorrect designates those who are unable to give their ages
correctly in years and months, those who are wrong, and those un¬
answered; and in table 2 incorrect means those unable to give their
birthday correctly or at all.
TABLE 1 - AGE♦
111.
Age of In¬ c*/° % In¬ % Improve¬
pupils. Correct. correct. Correct. correct. ment .
17 10
16 - 16.11 9 1
15 - 15.11 12
14 - 14.11 60
13 - i3.ll 142 12
12 - 12.11 158 7
11 - 11.11 100 26
10 - 10.11 79 32
9 - 9.11 59 51
8 - 3.11 19 93












The pupil at age l6 who was wrong in giving the months of his
age was one whose arithmetical ability was most markedly deficient.
In every case of age 11 and above the error is in the months.
Below 10.11 it is not uncommon to find children who cannot even
give the years correctly. It was not possible to test out pupils
of an earlier age and so to xorove whether or not this question was
ono
ari appropriate/for Scottish pupils at age 5 at which age it appears
in the Binet scale, but from the above results we can say that know¬
ledge of and ability to express age in years and months is normally
developed by the ages of 9 and 10, for at these age3 over ^0% are
able to answer correctly. The last column shows that the greatest
improvement occurs between the ages of 8.11 and 9.11 with consider¬
able improvement in the following year. There is an interesting
increase in improvement between ages 11.11 and 12.11; the curious
negative result for the following year may be due to the presence
of a small group of papers by M.Ds. v/hich occur in that age group.
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TABLE 2 - BIRTHDAY.
In¬
c/o Correct. % Incorrect.
■ % Improve¬





13 156 100 5.45
12 156 9 94.55 5.45 .-2.28
11 122 4 98.83 3.17 1.33
10 106 5 95-5 4-5 .04
Q 105 5 95.46 4.54 21.36
8 83 29 74.1 25.9 -6.7
7 21 5 80.77 19.23
From this table it appears as if the threshold is much lower
for this than for age, all ages having scored practically 75/*? or
over. The age showing a real and decided improvement is age 9, as
in Table 1. By the age of 13 all are able to give the birthday
correctly.
TABLE 3 - DATE.
In-
^ % Improve-
Age. Correct. correct. % Correct. % Incorrect. ment.
1? 10 10016 9 1 90 10
15 12 100
14 58 2 96.66 3-33
13 152 4 97.44 2.56
12 161 4 97.53 2.42
11 120 6 95.24 4.76
10 108 3 97.3 2.7
9 108 2 98.18 1.82
8 91 21 81.25 18.75









The results of the Binet scale show that this is an appropriate
test for age 9. Now, although the figures given above in"Table 3
seem to contradict this and suggest that for Scottish children it
could easily be lowered, the unreliability of these figures because
of the teacher's help in the case of the younger children has already
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"been noted. There emerges, however, the interesting fact that
A ..the improvement takes place at ages o and 9> confirming the im¬
pression obtained from Tables 1 and 2.
Let us pass now to Section A. which consisted of six questions
dealing with such simple time words and symbols as would be famil¬
iar to all children, the results of which are set out below. The
first question, is it morning or afternoon, yields practically no
results of importance, the lowest percentage being 90.
TABLE 4 - MORNING or AFTERNOON.
After¬ Unan¬
% Correct.
% In¬ % Improve¬
Age. Correct. noon. swered. correct. ment .
17 10 100
l6 10 100
15 12 100 5





13 155 1 99.36 .64 3-6
12 158 2 5 95.76 4.24 -1.85
11 123 2 1 97.61 2.39 4.87
10 103 '3 5 92.74 7.26 2.74
9 99 3 8 90
^
10 -4.65
8 106 6 94.65 5.35 2.35
7 24 2 92.3 7.7
The percentages in column 6 are insignificant; in fact, they
are so. low as compared with those in the corresponding columns of
Tables 1 and 2 that it suggests the misplacement of this question
in the scales. Usually it is given as a test at age 6 as compared
with the others at age j?. If these results can be relied on, and
no reason can be urged against their being accepted, then this
test could be given at an earlier age.
In question 2 the pupils were asked to name the days of the
week, a test usually given at age 7> a- placing more or less con¬
firmed by our results. In this table advantage was taken of the
results to find out whether Sunday or Monday was the more popular
day with which to begin the week, and the results are set out
correspondingly.
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TABLE 5 - DAYS of the WEEK.
% Cor- % In- % Improve-
Age. Correct Incorrect. rect. Correct. raent.
Sun- Hon- Any Sun- Mon¬
day. day. other day. day. Etc.
day,
The first point of interest to be noted is the preference
among the younger children to begin with Monday. Up to age 11
with the slight exception of age 3 where, however, the figures
are nearly equal, the majority begin with Monday. From age 12
upwards, with no exceptions at all, the preference is in favour
of beginning with Sunday, as we should naturally expect. Regard¬
ing the columns indicating errors the following observations may
be made:- the percentage of error when beginning with Sunday was
31.2 of the total error, but when beginning with Monday, it
accounted for 5l.4$Z, the remaining 17.4% being due to the last
column which, with one exception beginning on Wednesday, owes its
numbers to unanswered or very incomplete papers. It should be
'noted also that by gar the largest number of errors is caused by
the omission of the day at the end, for example, in the errors
when beginning with Sunday, out of the total of 34 no fewer than
31 are due to this reason, nevertheless it seems better to begin
with Sunday rather than with Monday. Finally, from the last three
columns wo are again forced to conclude that this particular item
of time information is practically fully developed by age 8, cer¬
tainly by age 9. It is usually given as a test for age 7, which
may be placing it rather low, at least for Scottish children.
Question 3 dealt in a similar way with the months, and the
results are as follows:-
115.
TABLE 6 - MONTHS.
Cor¬ In¬ Jum¬ Unan¬ Incom¬ % Cor¬ % In¬ % Improve*





' 13 156 100
7.88
7.88
12 152 9 2 1 1 92.12 4.82
11 110 7 2 2 5 87.3 12.7 7.12
10 89 14 3 5 80.18 19.82 16.54
9 70 18 4 13 5 63.64 36.36 11.39
0 58 28 15 10 52.25 57.75 17.65
7 9 6 7 4 34.6 65.4
The results here suggest at a first glance that the months
are "better known, or more easily learnt than the days of the week,
"but the percentages at the lower ages do not confirm the sound
knowledge of later years. It is not until age 10 that a sound
grip of the months can "be assumed and 30 to place it at age 9 in
an intelligence scale is probably correct. Another point to be
noted is the fairly large measure of improvement for the years 8,
9 and 10. A further point is that the months which gave trouble
are those about the end of the year, September, October, November,
especially October. Whether this was due to the similarity of
sound causing a pupil to omit one of them, or to their apparently
incorrect names, cannot be said, but the fact of their difficulty
cannot be doubted.
The next question concerned itself with the time. Now, as
the test was given throughout the school at approximately the
same hour and that hour one following the morning interval, the
results probably range too high. Again, some classes were in such
a position as to see the clock on the local Institute, and so here
again we have a factor militating against their reliability.
Nevertheless, the results are tabulated below for what they are
worth. A certain margin of error was allowed, within half an
hour, but all answers (morning, dinner time, summer time, etc.)
other than these are noted as incorrect.
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TABLE 7 - TIME.
Age • Correct within Correct.




14 55 2 3
13 135 6 17
12 121 29
11 100 6 20
10 64 12 35
9 42 15 53
8 74 5 33
7 4 9 13
In- In- % Improve-
% Correct within correct. ment.




91.67 3-33 5 6.4
85.27 3-64 10.89 II.94
73-33 9.09 17.58 - 6.04
79.37 4.76 15.87 21.71
57.66 10.81 31.53 19.48
38.18 13.64 48.18 -28.1
66.08 4.46 29.46 50.69
15.39 34.61 50
Although a margin of half an hour was allowed in the case of
the older pupils the margin was actually considerably less; it
did not exceed 15 minutes for ages 15 and 16 or 10 minutes for
ages 17 and over. Even allowing for the unreliability of the
figures, especially for age 8, it seems clear that the ability to
tell the time, outwith the adventitious help of the clock, is not
fully developed until age 11, which is somewhat higher than the
results for the days of the week or the months. The ability to
tell the time would appear to be a more difficult accomplishment.
Historically the clock was a much later development than the day, •
the season, or the month. Phylogenetic development may be, then,
finding fresh confirmation here.
The clook face itself would appear to be better known. It
may be that a spatial representation of the idea of the hours
precedes, or is earlier than, the ability to estimate the time
without the aid of the clock. At any rate, as Table 8 will show
us, the ability to indicate corractly, or partially correctly, a
specified hour on a blank clock face, seems to be developed by age10, a year earlier than we should have anticipated from the pre-"
ceding table. By partially correct is to be understood the.correct
placing of the minute hand, but. the incorrect placing of the hour







The final question in this section asked the pupil whether
he would "be older or younger when he was 14. The elliptical form
of the question may have confounded some of the older pupils, for
they answered, "I do not know", or "neither", of "I shall never "be
14 again". The fact that the question was not properly understood
may account for the low percentages among the senior pupils. The
only other point to note is the increase in uncertainty and in in¬
correctness at the given age of 14 and just over.
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TABLE 8 - CLOCK I1ACE.
Par- % Par¬
% In¬Corr- tially In- tially % Improve¬
Age. ect. Correct. Correct. % Correct. Correct. correct. ment .
17 + 8 2
16 6 4
15 10 2
14 36 23 1
13 77 72 7
12 69 ■ 5
11 48 66 12
10 28 64 19
9 15 58 37

























TABLE 9 - OLDER or ...YOUNGER.
Corr- In- Un- Unan- % In- % Improve-










6 2 2 60 40
6 1 1 ■ 2 60 40
6 1 3 2 50
34- 17 4 5 56.67 43.33
147 3 4 2 94.23 5.77
154. 4 2 5 93-33 6.67
H3 6 2 5 89.9 10.1
98 6 1 6 . 88.29 11.71
101 1 8 91.82 8.18
102 2 8 91.79
88.46
8.21











As already indicated, Section B of Test 1 is given over to
testing children's knowledge of time words. The first test is
an opposites test containing 3ome 15 words of which seven per¬
tained to time and eight to other things. In this case the act¬
ual score of the pupils was found and compared with the possible
score, the percentage of the actual score to the total possible
score being worked out. This was done for the time words and for
the other words separately so that a comparison of these might al¬
so be instituted. As this was the general method followed in
dealing with the whole of this section, it shall not be mentioned
again, but the results will simply be given in that form. The
table showing the results from which the ordinary table has been
complied will be given in Appendix 3*































































































































Prom this table we note that this opposites test yields re¬
sults suggesting the secure formation of time ideas at age 11.
Before that age or less can answer correctly. Por other ideas
the age is two years lower, 9> which suggests that there is a lag
in the learning of time ideas, that there is- greater difficulty
inherent in them. This would be sufficient to cast doubts upon
the Kantian theory of the development of time ideas. The percent¬
ages attained confirm this also, for the percentage scores for
other words exceed the percentage scores for time words by an aver¬
age of 14.35/a. In one case only, age 7> where the numbers tested
are not very considerable, is there anything approaching equality
attained. Another point of interest is the column indicating the
percentage improvement; there is a decided improvement at ages 8
and 9 followed by an equally decided slowing up until age 15 is
reached when there is again an increase. As this follows v/hat
may be expected from a learning curve, it would seem as if time
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ideas were less a matter of intuition than a matter of learning
forced upon us "by our individual and social needs. On the other
hand, this apparent increase in improvement at age 15 may not "be
a real improvement at all, for it may "be due to the change in the
composition of the age group. The source of the improvement may
be found in the fact that at 14- a great many pupils, especially
weaker pupils, have left the school and so the oo sitting the test
are selected pupils. The composition of this group may have been
changed first by the clever early qualifiers coming in from our
contributory schools in the neighbouring district and then by the
advent of the dull late qualifiers. The plateaux of our results
may be plateaux of quiescence in selection rather than plateaux in
child development. If this latter suggestion, rather than our
former suggestion, is correct, then the result we have noted of
an increased improvement about age 15 is due simply to the oxser-
ation of selection and not to any development of time knowledge
in children at all. The following notes were made during the
scoring: the mo3t difficult time words were "now" for those over
13 and "noon" for those under 13. To "now" in approximately half
the cases the answer given was "after" or "future". The easiest
words were "early, sunrise, day". The most difficult other word
was "here", but the others proved easy.
The next test was an analogies one which gives results as
follows






Age. Score Score « % Improve-
(a) (b) % b to a. ment























In many cases of low scores it appears that the cause is lack
of intelligence in reading the instructions rather than lack of
knowledge, for in many papers the first six or the last four were
Aleft completely alone, thus prejudicing the score considerably.
It is also apparent that where the fourth item was left blank, and
no alternative answers given, the score is greater on the whole;
in the case of score 6, for instance, more than half, 5 out of 8
to be precise, made a score of 3 for the blank analogies. Further,
in the correct or nearly correct papers the secondary pupils pre¬
dominated over advanced division pupils which shows that ability
and intelligence are the principal factors in this test; the exact
figures were 12 secondary pupils to 5 advanced division pupils.
The juniors of 7 did the written answers only. Beyond noting the
poor percentages recorded below age 12, there is really little of
importance. Again, however, there is the largest measure of im¬
provement at age 10.
The next test deserves a small corner only, partly because
of the few examples given and partly because it is not such an
adequate type of test as some of the others. The word "era"
apparently was not at all well known, and from the results it
would appear that there was a tendency to put the unknown first.
V/here it was not put first, it was dommonly put immediately before
century. There is once more decided improvements recorded at the
years 9» 10» and 11, especially for 10.
TABLE 12 - ARRANGING in ORDER.




2 ii- 1 JL2 0 (a) (b) ment. .
17+ 7 3 20 19 95
•
l6 7 3 20 19 95 - .83
15 10 2 24 23 95.83 15.83 -
14 30 20 6 4 120 96 80 5
13 42 94 9 11 312 234 75 2.58
12 49 90 5 2 19 330 2 39 72.42 8.92
11 21 6 1 24 252 100 63.5 18.5
:10 5 43 13 9 36 222 100 45 22.2728 7 1 74 220 50 22.73 20.06
2 l 3 106 224 6 2.67 • 75
i 7
♦ ,
l 25 52 1 1.92
The next test, took the form of completing sentences, a choice
of words being given and the correct one to be underlined. For
the sentences involving time words or time ideas, of which the
first sentences proved the most difficult, the following table
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shows much the same characteristics as the preceding ones.
\
TABLE 13 - COMPLETION of SENTENCES.






13 108 32 10
12 102 32 13
11 71 26 11
10 27 29 11
I 7 11 3
Score Score














































Then follows a definite vocabulary test with tine and other
words mixed. The detailed table of results from which the table
proper, as given below, has been constructed, will be found in
Appendix 3*















































































































The order of difficulty among the time words was "time,
simultaneous, duration". Most pupils found trouble in defining
time as was to be expected. Two answers from among the many given
were that "time is something no man can 3top" and that it is
"measurement on a clock". It would appear, and all experience
would lead us to expect, that abstract words are the ones which
give rise to difficulty; concrete words are more easily defined,
especially among the younger children. It is hardly fair to in-
A stitute a comparison between the time words and the other words,for
they were not balanced against one another in r egard to difficulty.
Even from a superficial glance the other words appear easier and
should render higher percentages, an expectation which is borne out
by the table. The percentages, d to c, exceed those of b to a by
about 15" on the average, which is, however, curiously similar to
the result found for Table 10. The column showing the percentage
improvement gives for time words marked increases at 9, 10, 13 and
15, and for other words at 9» H and 15•
From Section B we may conclude that though the tables may show
different ages at which the particular test can be done satisfact¬
orily, nevertheless the improvements in ability to perform the test
occur about age 9* In all seven cases that age shows a greater
advance; in two cases age 13, in five cases age 10 and in four
cases age 11.
In the third section of Test 1, the children were asked to
obey some simple instructions and to exercise 3ome simple reason¬
ing with time words and ideas. This was to ensure that they could
really use the words and ideas, the meaning of which they had been
asked in one form or another in the preceding section. The results
of this test are as followss-
TABLE 15 - INSTRUCTIONS.
Possible Actual
Score Score % b % Improve-




7 5 5 240
33 15 7 624
36 26 9 660
37 21 1^ 50432 16 444
26 26 42 440
7 33 65 448













2 38 95 5.42
21 43 89.58 15.83
14 177 73.75 2
56 15 624 429 68.75 6.48
411 62.27 3.54-
43 21 7 296 58.73 8.73
38 16 8 222 50 20.68




Two points alone deserve mention; the higher age, on the
who1e, of achievement in this test, and the chief increases in
improvement showing themselves again at ages 9» 1° and- 15« The
first instruction deceived many of the pupils, probably those who
were casual thinkers; the third instruction was the most diffi¬
cult one, no less than 21 out of 22 being wrong in a sample group.
Bor the reasoning test, the results give a table as belowj-
TABLE 16 - REASONING.
% Improve-
Age., Possible Score (a) Actual Score (b) % b to a. ment.
17+ 100 90 90 3
16 100 87 97 15.33
15 120 36 71.67 7.17
14 600 337 64.5 4.31
13 l56o 939 60.19 .19
12 1650 990 60 7.53
11 1260 661 52.47 13.1
10 1110 437 39.37 20.23
9 1100 210 19.09 12.04
3 1120 79 7.05 6.55
7 260 13 .5
The ages showing greatest improvement are one year later in
this test, ages 10 and l6 as against 9 and 15» "but the general
features are the same. Time words and ideas for reasoning give
age 12 as that at which the knowledge of time may be siid to be
developed. As for the items of the test, the last two were too
difficult for those under 14, while the seventh one caught the
easy thinkers at all ages. Taken together these tests would con¬
firm what the previous section has led us to surmise, the close
similarity between time learning and other learning, showing that
time is a concept slowly and laboriously acquired by children in
the ordinary course of learning. So far from being an innate
gift, our knowledge of time lags behind that of other ordinary
matters.
The final section of Test 1 was an absurdity test. A pass¬
age dealing with the Battle of Bannockburn was written containing
many absurd and wrong statements. The Battle of Bannockburn was
chosen as the subject because it was a topic about which most
children in a Scottish school would be likely to know something.
This had the advantage of familiarity. These absurd statements
whether connected with time or not, were to be underlined by the
A pupils. Burt (12) considers the absurdity test a very good one
for intelligence, and so this test was designed to test the child's
ability to use knowledge of time and to distinguish a historical
epoch from the present.
In marking this test, the child's score was arrived at by
deducting the number of incorrect underlinings from the number of
correct underlinings. That gave the number of absurdities which
he had correctly determined. Where, for instance, there was a
choice to be made, as, "Sunday, the 12th of June", "Sunday, the
23rd of June", dependence v/as placed on the child's general hist¬
orical knowledge that the battle v/as fought about Midsummer Day,
a fact always stressed about this battle. It is also commonly
known that the Scots spent the Sunday in prayer and preparation,
so that the difficulties of the passage are reduced for school
children.
The score, then, was reckoned as the number of absurdities
found minus the number of correct statements underlined as ab¬
surd or v/rong. A detailed table of the scores made at various
ages will be found in Appendix 3> an(i from this the following
summary table has been constructed:-
TABLE 17 - ABSURDITIES.
Poss- Score for Total
ible Actual Time Error
Score Score. % b % Improve- Words Score












178 63.57 -4.29 96 214- 4-4-.85
190 67.86 4.17 96 209 4-5.93
214- 63.69 23.87 121 ' 257 4-8.21
669 39.82 6.37 369 822 44.89
1461 33.45 l.ll 805 1738 45.02
1494 32.34 6.72 885 1392 46.77
904 25.62 5.74 587 1250 46.96
618 19.88 3.49 380 884 42.98
351 11.39 3.64 195 549 35.52
243 7.75 4.04 2o 290 9
27 3-71 25 71 35.2
Though the fourth column shows very low percentages below the
age of 15, at which age also the improvement is greatest, the test
appears to be quite adequate. The age which shows the next great¬
est degree of improvement is 10. So far as the last three columns
are concerned, we were interested in comparing the score for time
words with the total number of ideas underlined as wrong. With
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the exception of age 8, and to a lesser degree, ages 7 and 9»
there is a remarkable constancy in the percentages yielded, which
v/ould suggest that in this test time ideas stand as much chance
as other ideas of being noted by children above the age of 10.
From the absurdities test, then, we might conclude that for the
most part a knowledge of time ideas can be assumed as being ade¬
quate from age 10 upwards. The score for the time words was anal¬
ysed with a view to detecting which ideas were easy and which were
difficult. The order of difficulty j.n this instance proved to be
as follows: "Friday, still living, 25th June, 36th February, 12th
June, from ten to twelve, 1315» 23rd June, day's march, half an
hour, Sunday, morrow, long time, sunset, next morning, December."
Putting aside Friday as having undue attention drawn to it, and
December for the obscurity of its position in the title, it would
appear that the more precise dates were first to attract attention,
Combining the results of improvements for the Test 1, a com¬
posite table was constructed.










This table confirms the impressionawhich slowly grew during
the scoring of this test, that, although it may be the case that
for most children the more or less fully developed concept of time
has been arrived at by the ages of 9 or 10j which there are in¬
creases in improvement, there is also after a period of slow con¬
solidation of the concept, another improvement at age 15• Are
we to conclude that this is the normal method or is it exceptional?
If it is normal, then is not the conclusion of Sturt that the
adult concept can be assumed after ages 9 or 10, perhaps rather too
sweeping and dogmatic? Would it not be better to say that, while
a comparatively adequate concept has been arrived at by those ages,
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the adult concept cannot "be assumed until the age of 15? On
returning to this point again, and on giving it fresh consideration
we are inclined to the opinion that the improvement at qge 15 is
more apparent than real. It would "be exceptional if the age group
were thoroughly representative, which we are forced to conclude it
is not. And so, after all, we are entitled to conclude with Sturt
(41) that a comparatively adequate and adult concept of time has
been arrived at by most children at the ages of 9 or 10.
Test 2 was devised upon more normal school lines to test the
pupils' knowledge of the conventional scheme of time marking and
order as used in dealing with historical time. In some of the
tests, very considerable help was given by the dates; in a few
instances where simple reasoning rather than mere book knowledge
should have been sufficient to give a clue, the dates were omitted.
Here purpose rather than memory should have played its part in
determining the serial order. A second section was added with a
view to testing the adequacy of their historical concepts, and to
finding out the methods used in dealing with historical material.
The tables for Section A, question 1, are as follows:-
Table 18 gives the results for the arrangement of certain histor¬
ical events in their proper order for the two cases where the dates
are given. The results from which this table and the following
one have been constructed will be found in Appendix 3*
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-3.71 45 45 100 98.15
14.67
50 50 100 100
40 40 100 17.2 100
18.44 250 207 82.8 11.93 84.07
10.57 730 517 70.82 13.44 68.86
11.47 805 462 57.38 12.29 56.85
-3.35 550 248 45.09 - .14 44.97
-12.91 325 147 45.23-31.44 46.77
30 25 76.67
In the case of these tests it must be noted that no results
were obtained for pupils under 9 years of age, for the teachers
considered rightly that the tests were of too difficult a nature
for these young pupils. Very few below the age of 10 attempted
them, but these six being the brightest pupils of their year natur¬
ally scored fairly well and so gave absurdly high percentages for
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their achievement. They shall
criticising the tables. There
improvement showing in Table 18
steady improvement throughout
be disregarded, therefore, in
is not the same marked ages for
as in previous tests, rather a
The percentages suggest that where
the dates are given (and it would apply equally to historical mat¬
erial of which the dates are known) a knowledge of the conventional
scheme can be assumed at age 12.
Tor material where the dates were not given, the results give
the following table
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A frequent cause of error for age 13 and over in Test 2, A/d,
v/as the placing of John Knox before the Battle of Bannockburn.
Eor age 13 and under a less frequent error was caused by placing
the Jacobite Rising much too early. Again discounting the results
for age 9> cannot note any definite age for improvement, though
the results for test A/b at first sight suggested a return to the
general form for Test 1, nor can we say that there is a definite
age at which this type of material can be successfully arranged,,
though age 13 seems likeliest. The average percentages, it should
be noted, are about 13 below those for Table 18; at every age
they are lower, as would naturally be expected.
The second part of this test took a somewhat different form.
A list of dates was given, also a list of events and from the dates
the pupils had to select those appropriate to the events given.
In most cases, the choice of date would be guided by memory; in
a very few cases, by guess, but as the list of dates exceeded that
of events, it was hoped that this factor would be more or less
i eliminated. As a check, the pupils were also asked to arrange
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the events in order; this v/a3 to find out which was the easier,
picking out the correct dates or giving the correct order of events,
and to see whether memory or purpose played the greater part in
dealing with historical material.
A table showing the scores of the pupils for choice of dates
and for arrangement of the events in order will be found in
Appendix 3* These scores give the following percentages for
comparison:
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From the improvements column it is hardly possible to draw
any conclusion save that the first, where memory counts, shows a
steadier improvement than does the one representing purpose. From
the final column, where the percentage by which the order test,
purpose, is greater than or less than the date test, memory, is
noted, we gather that up to age 11 memory is a factor of greater
importance than purpose, but that after 11 purpose is more powerful
than memory. Beyond these tentative generalisations it is imposs¬
ible to go, for the degree by which the one exceeds the otheir is
neither constant nor definite in its trend.
An inverse form of the memory test was used in Section A, 3,
where a list of events was given and a select list of ten dates
below, to which the appropriate event had to be attached. The
results give the following table. Again the scores which form
the; basis of this table, will be found in appendix 3.
TABLE 21 - EVENTS.
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17+ 90 58
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The table would suggest that this type of test is more diffi¬
cult, for there is a negative sign at every entry in the last col¬
umn where the percentages for dates are compared with those for
events. This would give as an order of difficulty, the events
form, the date form, and the order form.
Section B was likewise given over to three main questions.
The first asked the pupils to compare various periods of history
with regard to length. Thi3 was to see if the idea of foreshorten¬
ing applied among school children; to see whether periods remote
in time, or about which fewer facts are known appear shorter than
more recent periods to them. As the pupils were asked to indicate
the longer period and as those chosen with one exception, occur
earlier in history, then an excess of errors would indicate this
foreshortening. The results show up as follows:-
TAB1E 22 - EOBESHORTENIIIG.
Age. Score Possible Actual











16 2 2 1 4 1
15 1 2 2 2 1
.14 1 4 7 3 20 10
13 2 12 33 5o 49
12 2 6 24 33 55 41
11 3 8 28 38 35
10 2 6 16 41
9 ■ 2 3 1
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This table would seem to show that for all ages below l6 this
foreshortening is a definite fact, but that from l6 upwards, whether
due to greater knowledge or greater maturity of intelligence, there
is a greater grasp of the reality and significance of historical
time.
The second question was an attempt to find out the methods
used by children in thinking about historical data. For the most
part, however, the results are disappointing; this may be due to
the rather unimaginative type of pupils to whom the test was given,
or to their difficulty in apprehending what was wanted; or this
may be due to difficulties of draughtmanship in the questions, thus
(c) do you think of historical dates as arranged in any particular
way? yielded no results of importance and is omitted from the
tables. Question 2 (a) was a connecting link with the previous
section, and gave much the same result, though suggesting a lower
threshold, 15 instead of l6 (Table 23)
TABLE 2 3 - BEFORE or AFTER.
Score Bo. Un-
Age. No. Right. No. Wrong. answered. % R. % V/.
17+ 6 2 1
16 7 3
15 5 2 1
14 19 29 2
13 22 96 23
12 .41 89 35
11 26 51 33
"10 14 36 15










To the second part of the question, which attempted to
find out any colour forms for time, the results are meagre, which
would show that when Sturt (41) say3 that spatial representation
may not be the only form of representation of time, and suggests
colour or sound forr/13 as alternative forms of representation she
is suggesting a form which is exceedingly rare and should there¬
for be discounted in her argument. We can, of course, speak of
the colour form only. One pupil had a colour form for some days
of the week: Sunday, bright; Monday, dull; Tuesday, blue;
Wednesday, crimson, but it did not extend beyond Wednesday, for
the remainder were colourless. To two other pupils the seasons
were coloured, and to another December appeared white "because of
the purity of Christ".
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Passing over the third part as unfruitful and coming to the
fourth part, where the pupils were asked whether history appears
as a series of events moving forwards, the organic point of view,
or a series of dates moving "backwards, the inorganic point of
view, the results are:-









% Forwards. % Backwards. F exceeds B
17+ 7 2 77.78
16 8 2 80
15 6 2 75
14 27 20 3 54
13 62 66 18 42.47
12 49 41 46.58
11 36 37 37 32.73
10 23 14 28 35.38









Judging "by the results in the final column, the preference
seems to be for the organic point of view, for the events of hist¬
ory as moving forwards rather than backwards except in two instances,
age 11, and age 13* As in both cases the percentage is hardly
significant our conclusion holds good.
The last section suggested five methods by which events might
be arranged in order, and asked the pupils to state which method
they took. So far as their honesty can be relied on, and it must
be noted many would not like to confess that they did their arrang-,
ing by guess, the results are:-
TABLE 2? - METHOD of MMGEMT.
Age. % Gue s s. Jo Da t e . % Epoch.- % Person. % How Long Ago.
17 + 88.89 11.11
16 100
15 50 12.5 12.5 12.5
14 4 52 14 16
13
.62
51.37 •7 13 12.33
12 52.16 1.24 9.94 8.07
11 3.64 36.36 8.18 15.45
10 1.54 27.7 1.54 3.08 12.32
9 I6.67 .
Detailed scores in Appendix 3.
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But whether we can trust the percentages or not, at least we
can say that the order of methods is "by date, "by how long ago, "by
persons, "by epoch and "by guess. The first two are the methods
in commonest use.
Finally there was a question consisting of thirteen parts to
which the answer yes or no had to "be given and testing whether the
pupils had a grasp of different epochs in history. In some res¬
pects the questions are comparable with absurdities, and the scores
give somewhat the same results, a real improvement at 11, and a
further apparent improvement at 15•
TABLE 26 - YBS or BO.
Age. Possible Score Actual Score % b to a. % Improvement,
(a). (b).
17 117 96 82.07 -3.31
16 130 111 85.38 -I.16
15 104- 90 86.54 15.77
14 650 456 70.77 6.49
13 I898 1220 64.28 1.6
12 2093 I3H 62.68 4.08
11 1430 838 58.6 6.06
10 845 454 52.54 3.82
9 78 38 48.72
Detailed scores in Appendix 3*
Though the actual percentages are greater than with the
absurdities (see Table 17) or with the time words' score alone in.
the same absurdity test, there is no real comparison because in
this case the apprehension of historical time is alone being tested,
whereas othor things were introduced into the previous test. This
table suggests that there is a fairly good grasp of the main epochs
of history by about 10 and 11, which points, as do some of the
other tests, to the desirability of not beginning any very exact
or scientific 3tudy of history before the age of 11.
CONCLUSIONS FROM TIME TESTS.
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Prom the body of results tabulated above, we venture to suggest
a
that the original opinion of time as/concept acquired by everyone
in the course of earlier years has been fully borne out. The
earlier tests with ordinary time words, whether vocabulary tests
or reasoning tests, all point to this conclusion .for the general
trend of the percentages is the same, normally an increased correct
percentage as the age grows greater, with somewhat greater 'improve¬
ments at ages 9> 10 and 11, and again at 15• The first of these
improvements is 3hown in the graph below by a slightly sharper rise
for these years compared with the flattening of the curve before
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Table from which this graph of correct results for Test 1 is con¬
structed:













8 529.2 • 33
7 391.6 24.5
As has already been suggested, the improvement at age 15 may
be more apparent than real. The amount of selection of the
group may be fairly considerable, for, though 6© at 14 may be a
fairly large number, it is, on the whole, the best 6o out of, say,
150, so that 90 have left the school and are not included in the
test. But even allowing for the influence of this selection, we
may be permitted to express the doubt of which we cannot rid out
mind3 that all this improvement is due to this cause. Hay not
some portion of the entire improvement at 15 be due to a real ad¬
vance in the concept of the children? Unfortunately no test of
this will be possible until the school age is raised. The general
nature of the graph, however, would suggest that time is a concept
built up in exactly the same way, and following the same course of
development as any other concept.
In one respect there is a difference, for, where comparison
has been made between a child's knowledge of other ideas and words
and his knowledge and grasp of time ideas and words, the comparison
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has always favoured his grasp of these other ideas. This means
that the development of the concept of time lags behind the devel¬
opment of many other concepts. There is to all appearance from
our tables a lag in the development of time ideas of about on
the average. This would corroborate Burt's statement (12) that
"the child's world is becoming more systematically organised
throughout school life. His comprehension of space relations is
gradually widening, and by somewhat later stages, it would appear
that his notion of time pursues a parallel development." This
lag would also seem to indicate the inherent difficulty common to
all people in building up a satisfactory concept of time; it is
not like.space or colour, it is not a quality adhering to partic¬
ular things, but it is an abstract idea permeating our whole wak¬
ing lives. We can escape from it only in 3leep, or in some very
special circumstances; it is for all practical purposes omnipres¬
ent but it is also intangible, hence arises the difficulty exper¬
ienced by the ordinary mind in comprehending it, in recognising
its parts and in synthe3ising these into a coherent concept.
Sturt says (4l) that we can assume for a child of 10 the adult
concept of time. From the results of our test, it would seem as
A -if this assumption could be made for most children, for it is
true that the elementary ideas can be taken for granted among
children of 10 years of age; the common, everyday terms are fam¬
iliar to them; they possess a sound, working concept. Such is
the main conclusion from Test 1.
In addition, there are some educational and other conclusions
of importance, which we shall now proceed to set down. First,
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from the main conclusion, it follows that a sound knowledge of
the"conventional time scheme, its language and its meaning should
"be inculcated in our school children before the age of 9 and that
this should be added to by bringing in the abstract notions and
words and consolidated between the ages of 9 an<I 11. It is clear
that the concrete time words and ideas are known earlier than the
%
abstract ones; words like time itself, simultaneity and duration
present very grave difficulties to pupils, even older pupils and
adults also failing with these, when asked to define them. Time
words and their meanings are, on the whole, known at age 9» reason¬
ing and instruction tests to find out whether these words and the
ideas they represent are really understood suggest that a year
later, age 10, would be more correct at which to assume this ability.
The absurdity tent also suggests 10 as the age. Second, the hist¬
orical time scheme should then, after the age of.10 or 11, be
stressed as a logical system. There appears to be no real purpose
served by attempting an exact 3tudy of history in its-modern semi-
scientific form before the ages of 11 or 12, for the general inab¬
ility to appreciate and understand the idea of historical time
will invalidate all the work we try along these lines. To suggest
a -this idea does not mean that we would deny a i^lace to history of
the romantic, story type for pupils under 11 years, but we do
suggest that this story type alone has any real significance and
value for pupils at these•earlier years. Third, the tendency,
especially among younger children, to think of Monday as the first
day of the week should be checked and corrected because the percentage
of errors when Sunday is thought of as the "beginning of the week
is loss than when Monday is to thought of. Fourth, the ability
to tell the time is a later accomplishment than knowing about the
day, the season or the month. As it is known that the clock is
a later development of time ideas than these, this is the expected
result and may suggest the influence of phylogenetic development,
the child recapitulating in his own experiences the historical
order of the development of 'time ideas in the race. Finally,
there is some evidence also of spatial representation, though the
results for Test 2 are very disappointing in this .respect. In
Test 1, with which we are dealing at the moment, the clock face
test yields results suggesting a development of this ability by
age 10 whereas the results of the preceding test would not have
led us to expect this development until a year later.
The principal interest in Test 2 centres in the relative im¬
portance to be assigned to memory and purpose as determining
factors in the growth of the idea of historical time. Historical
Atime differs from present time and even from our own past time in
that direct or primary memory images cannot be used, nor can sec¬
ondary images be recalled in order to establish any comparison.
No direct or experiential knowledge of historical time is vouch¬
safed to any of us; we are dependent on indirect and secondary
knowledge derived principally from books and on a general feeling
that time must have existed before us. Now, so far as our results
can be utilised to make such a generalisation, purpose seems to
outweigh memory as a factor in our dealings with historical time.
Yfriere the fact3 are given (Test 2, A/a and- A/c), it is true that
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the results are better than when the arrangement of the events
depends on purpose (Test 2, A/"b) or on a mixture of purpose and
memory (Test 2, A/d), hut these former are cases of visual per¬
ception rather than of memory. Up to age 11 memory seems to he
a greater factor than purpose in helping children to arrange events
in order, hut after that age purpose begins to play a far greater
part. To arrange events in order of occurrence rather than to
select the correct dates for them seems to he easier for pupils
over 11 years. If we compare tests A/b and A/d, the former,
which demands purpose alone as the guiding factor in arrangement,
gives results 7 per cent higher on the average than the latter,
which makes use of both purpose and memory. The part of this
test which gives the most direct evidence on this point is Test 2,
A2, and, a3 already indicated, the conclusion is in favour of
purpose as the more influential factor for pupils after the age
of 11. This suggests further that Stout (40) is correct in
stressing the importance of the conative element in our idea of
past time.
It also seems clear from Section B of this test that histor¬
ical time is subject to the phenomenon of foreshortening, that is
to say, a remote period of time equal in duration to a more recent
period of time will tend to appear shorter. This phenomenon is
not quite so prominent among senior pupils of l6 years af age and
over, probably because of their much greater familiarity with the
events of history. A younger pupil probably judges the length of
a period by the number of events in it or by the space these
events occupy in his history book. This would account for the
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foreshortening. Senior pupils, on the other hand, "because of
their wider experience, would "be more inclined to think of a per¬
iod in terms of its initial and its closing dates and so "be less
liable to fall victims to the phenomenon. Unfortunately, the
results of those questions in this test v/hich were devised in
order to find out how a pupil thought of historical time proved
to be jejune. Neither spatial nor colour forms seem much in use,
if we can accept our results. It may be that personal question¬
ing would have elicited more information on this point, but the
exigencies of school work prevented such on a large enough scale.
It appears to be very difficult for junior pupils, and even for
senior pupils and adults, to say just how they think of historical
time; few of them are natural introspectionists, interested in
the how of thinking. The only conclusion to which we come with
any degree of certainty is that teaching should disregard these
special forms and concentrate on giving pupils as clear an under¬
standing as possible of historical time by encouraging what has
been called the organic point of view, that is, by representing
the events of history as a series moving forwards along a straight
line, the left-hand portion of the line '.denoting events B.C., and
the right hand portion the events A.D., the future being represented
by the projection of this line to the right. Finally, the question
on the method of arrangement of events in order suggests that there
is a very worthy place in our development of the idea of historical
time for good, old-fashioned dates. They are, in the long run,
the pegs on which our notion of historical time depends and it
would be well if we were frankly to recognise this fact and give
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dates once more a fairly prominent place in historical teaching,
since, without them, history teaching is robbed of the possibility
of inculcating one of its main lessons, the ability to recognise
and to distinguish one epoch of historical time from another.
Finally among these conclusions, we would recall the three
stages in the development of the concept of time as analysed by
Sturt, the simple animal stage, the complex animal stage and the
educated adult stage, and we would recall also Stanley's theory
of recapitulation, and we would venture to combine these two and
arrive at the following conclusion, that we pass in infancy and
early childhood through the first of these three stages, gradually
passing with the addition of language and symbol into the second
stage, which in turn gives way for children brought up amid a nor¬
mal environment to the third stage, which is completed about the
age of 10 for all normal, practical purposes. For a peroon who
wishes a more highly specialised concept, say, of historical time,
a further delay for more study and greater maturity is necessary,
but for a sound, working concept (and we do not doubt for one
moment that time is anything other than a concept laboriously
acquired from our own experience and from the experience of others)
it is unnecessary to go beyond the one which has been emerging
during the first decade of our life.
i. -
GENERAL VIEW OF TIMS.
With this survey of the work of these writers, let us now
consider a general view of time as a subject of psychological
enquiry. We must first notice, however, that it is necessary
that metaphysical and physical considerations should "be put aside.
To the philosopher and metaphysician the present cannot have dur¬
ation; it must be the knive-edge between the past and the future;
yet to the psychologist, dealing with things as they are actually
thought of by us, the idea of the specious present is a very real,
as well as useful, consideration. To the physicist of the older
school, time is Newtonian time, that is, "time, absolute, true and
mathematical, which flows continuously and equably in itself with¬
out relation to any external thing", to the relativist, it is the
fourth dimension of space-time; to neither of these objective
considerations can the psychologist pay great attention.
What, then, it may be asked, is the psychological problem
involved? Eirst, to the psychologist time is subjective, not
objective, for if it were the latter, the experiencing mind would
be reduced to that of a mere observer; nor is it a quality of
objects, for it does not adhere to any particular objects, but is
universal. The time which is known to consciousness is proper-
time, or interval, as it ha3 been called by Eddington, or subject¬
ive time, measured by the number and rate of our physical pulsat¬
ions and the amount of conscious attention to our own time rate.
Now this subjective time ha3 to be brought into some kind of con¬
ventional ralation with objective time. The accuracy of the
142.
conventional time divisions of hours and minutes is psychologically
imposed on us "by our upbringing until we imagine that astronomical
time is real time, whereas all real time is subjective and remains
within ourselves. The adoption of this common or conventional
time gets over the difficulties of the differences of subjective
times at different moments with the same person, and with different
people; but real time is our psychological, subjective time.
Second, we mu3t note that there is no special sense for time.
None of the evidence, for instance, brought forward by Y/inslow
Brown (71) 3eems conclusive. It is usual to demand special organ¬
ic structure before admitting the existence of a sense, and Brown
fails to indicate any special structure. There is no direct per¬
ception of time; the perception is of change in things. Writers
like Munsterberg, whose investigations were directed almost entire¬
ly to the judgment of intervals, speak of a direct time-sense,
sensations peripherally aroused by muscular activity. We dismiss
the possibility of a special time sense because there is no special
organ, but we do not dismiss the possibility of a method of making
an automatic succession or time rate estimate to separate one kind
of thing from another kind of thing and to separate two things of
the same kind from one another. It has been suggested by Dibblee
(18) that an explanation of this automatic estimate may be found
in the peculiar and unexplained proximity and relations of the
vestibular and auditory sense organs, the former giving the data
by recording our organic movements and rhythms, and the latter
acting as an instrument of comparison and giving a perception of
these rhythms. Our subjective time is probably a compromise
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"between this physiological time and common, measured time. No
doubt Munsterberg would be delighted if he could know of this
partial return to his ideas. The third main point is that a past,
a future, and a scheme of organisation are all involved in the
concept of time. Now do we come by this concept of time? There
are two answers given, that it is inherent in our minds, a pure
a priori form of sensuous intuition in us - the view of Kant and
Schopenhauer - and that it is derived from experience, built up
by the individual mind and aided by the history of the race - the
view of Guyau and Sturt. It is to the latter of these views that
we give out adherence; our reasons for doing so have been ulade: clear
in the pages dealing with our own test3.
The next question naturally arises; what are the factors
involved in psychological time? Kant recognises three modes of
time, succession, simultaneity, and duration. This latter, the
feeling of enduring, has been called the peculiar characteristic
of time. The factors we shall consider are simultaneity, the
percept of the present, the concepts of the past and of the future,
duration, the perception of the succession of our ideas or serial
order, the conscious arrangement of events, the development of
conventional time, and the concept of historical time, The
psychological causes of the development and discrimination of
these various factors are the powers of memory - general retentive-
. ness - and of purpose - the consciousness of, and attention to,
instinctive aims.
Let U3 examine each of those factors separately beginning
with simultaneity, which is the basis of primitive time reckoning
14-4.
as it is concerned with external happenings, and primitive peoples
led very objective lives. Broad's definition (ll) completely
covers this idea: "two sensa (sensible events) would be said to
be simultaneous if each completely overlapped the other".
Ivluch more must be said, however, about the present. To the
physicist, an instant, (and the present cannot be greater than an
instant) is a mathematical abstraction, like points and the line.
To the psychologist it is a matter of perception of a certain
interval of finite, though short, duration, the "field of attent¬
ion" of Bergson. To adopt the words of James, the specious pres¬
ent is the shortest time in which we can experience a mental con¬
tent. Now, this time has duration, a duration which is peculiar
to the observer, though much the same for normal beings under nor¬
mal circumstances, It is this immediate intuitive perception
which has been called the "time sense", but, as we have seen, it
is much better to avoid the use of this phrase altogether. The
duration of the specious present, according to early writers,
like Dietze and James, is 12 seconds. Pieron says the limit to
our capacity for direct, naive perceptive reactions to durations
appears to be about 5 to 6 seconds. layers says 4 seconds, with
a nucleus of 550^- This brief duration, occupied by feeling and
extending into both past and present, is, for James, "the original
paragon and prototype of all conceived times", but Spearman warns
us that, though the specious present is a convenient fiction, it
-4
should not absorb the place of the real present, the boundary line
between the past and future. A boundary line, however, is too
small for consciousness to exist in it and so, for us, as for most
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writers, the present is the specious present, an interval of a
few seconds which we are able to grasp together as a whole. The
present, then, is the "greatest possible duration for a single
sensible field" (Broad), the duration with which we are in immed¬
iate contact. This specious present is not fixed, but varies
according to the nature of our sense experiences, the ease or
difficulty of attention and our bodily condition; it may extend
to 4- seconds with a great effort of attention.
Closely allied to the present are the past and the future.
Psychologically the past is an image, a memory image, and the
whole idea of the past is a concept based on these memory images,
which are easily distinguished from percepts by a finite lime
lapse from the latest part of the event. The past has reality,
for, if we agree with Mcllurray that what has significance has
reality, the past, which is of immense significance to man, must
have reality. Our consciousness of the immediate past, according
to Strong, is ideal, is representative, not actual or intuitive.
If it were not for memory, (and there is no need to postulate a
special time memory), we should never have any consciousness of
the past at all. According to Bergson, our memory images are dir-
a ected into the particular direction of the past by the mechanism
of the mind, "la nature". Memory, then, is the chief feature of
the past. At first,, the memory images are not arranged, but later
they are reduced to order, at about the ages of 10 and 11, as we
have tried to show earlier by the working of cause and effect.
Bor a fully adequate concept of the past, there must be both
reference to a name, or other symbol, and reference to other
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associated concrete events. These must he thought of, says
James, before the concept can develop * Finally we mote that the
memory of past experience, whether individual or historical - for
the historical is like the individual past on an extended scale -
is a guide to present activity.
The future exists in inference or as moments of the specious
present. The development of a concept of the future - "expectat¬
ion" of James, "becoming" of Broad - depends mainly on purpose,
and partly on memory. It depends on purpose because it is related
to an unfulfilled purpose, which in turn is made exact by memory.
If we now consider the factor of duration, "cette continuite/
indivisible de changement qui est le temps", (Bergson, 9)> we find
that the fully formed judgment of duration is one of the latest
developments in our knowledge of time. Duration, like the whole
concept of time, is subjective in nature; durations appear to
vary according to the number and nature of the events, physical
or mental, in them or according to the state of the mind. The
nature of duration has been analysed as follows: temporal ex¬
tension, which it possesses in common with the specious present,
awareness of mental events in the mind, a certain amount of fatigue
of attention, and certain changes in the external environment.
The two main factors on which our estimate of duration depends,
appear to be extensity and observed change. The great difficulty
of estimating a subjective experience, such as duration, is solved
by externalising duration and calculating it from a clock. A
direct estimate, without reference to a clock or other objective
aids, varies greatly, as it depends on the division of attention
A '
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which may be destroyed altogether, between the events and the
passage of time as such. It would appear that the factors in¬
fluencing the estimate of duration are the amount of attention
given to the passage of time as such, the number of events, ex¬
ternal or mental, filling the duration with the general result of
the greater the number of events, the longer the period .appears,
the quality of the events, meaning their connectedness or dis¬
connectedness , the pleasantness or otherwise of the experience,
and finally a comparison of the experienced duration with an ideal
scheme. The second and third factors demand a fairly good memory
for time durations and an ability in dividing them. The order of
influence of the factors may be psychologically as in the order
given above, though in actual practice, the second, the number of
the events is the most important. For short intervals of from 8
to 12 seconds, the number of events or presentations exercises a
constant influence upon the estimate, according to Miinsterberg' s
experiments. According to layers, attention, the overlapping of
memory images, expectation and surprise are the factors, in the
estimation of short intervals. Schumann went so far as to make
expectation and surprise the crucial elements in time judgment.
•Uyers has also, we must again note, brought forward some evidence
for judgment by the absolute impression.
If the concept of duration is of late origin, that of success¬
ion is early. To Washburn (176) the psychologically primitive
time judgment is that of succession. Time has been defined by
Hclntyre (122) following Lotze, as a relation or series of relat¬
ions of succession between events. Lotze (30) finds the reality
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of time in the succession of events; for Kant (29) knowledge of
succession presupposes that of time, while for a madern writer 1
like Willdon Carr (14) time is the order of successions. Again
memory and attention are essential to the consciousness of succ¬
ession. Dibblee's views on this last point are interesting (18).
He says that succession is grasped "by selection, through memory,
of one kind of sensation, and "by concentration of will-attention
on that particular kind. He further says that a method of per-*
ception of succession is provided for us "by the fixing of a physio¬
logical time-rate and a psychological time-rate, which is itself
a compromise "between physiological time and common measured time
made "by the individual.
In a certain order of events it is said, history exists.
How the unfication of time experiences, the integration of series
of experiences, the conscious and definite arrangements of events,
into individual or national history depends supremely on purpose,*
though to some extent on memory. It is habitual for us to make
a serial arrangement of events. How, the means by which this
highly organised mental phenomenon, the arrangement of events in
order, is made is not clear. The usual explanation, as we have
seen, (James , 27, Ward,48, Houillee , 22 ) are "movement of attention" ,
"fading brain states". Stout, following Schumann (153) an<l
Keinong (127), criticises the view that in order to apprehend time
sequence, we must necessarily retain in consciousness a group of
memory images of varying intensity. In practice we do not start
from an event at maximum memory intensity and work backwards to
events of ever lessening intensity and greater remoteness. The
vividness of a memory image depends on the character or importance
of the event as well as on memory. In arranging events in order
we think usually of the most outstanding event, not necessarily
the most recent, or we think of the chronological order; in many
cases the memory of the time order depends on the conscious in¬
dention of some connecting idea or form, or on an arrangement of
mental images. Now this special aid is not connected with either
"movement of attention", or with the relative clearness of the
different memory traces. Clearness of memory does not seem to
enter as a factor, and "movement of attention" play a very minor
part in arrangement, and even then, they play a part only when the
events are very recent. The method of arrangement is really the
result of different factors: a direct recollection of the order,
a matter of inference "based on times or dates or other associations
and is constructed "by the aid of various forms of reasoning.
Events in a long period are arranged "by conventional time marks
and by reasoning; in a short period by reference to some scheme
of purpose, or cause and effect, by reference to space, and by any
apprehended relation between different events, for instance, the
arrangement of historical events in order is done by precise dating
the precision depending on the accumulated knowledge and experience
of the individual. Of these methods, that of exact dating is the
most convenient, and we would add, the most common. In this conn¬
ection we must refer to Lotze (3° ) and Guyau's (23) idea that, all
this ordering of events in time is not really temporal but spatial,
"our image of time is in a spatial form". It is true that this
manner of .representation, whether the line stretch forwards or
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"backwards, is common, but it is not universal, nor is it the only
method of representing time. This very convenient time line
idea is a late development and involves reasoning and conscious
arrangement.
We are not concerned here with the development of convention¬
al time, except to notice that exact methods of time designation,
clocks and calendars, are necessary to enrich and to make more
precise our time concepts. The two factors of greatest import¬
ance for social life, and so for conventional time, are simultan¬
eity or synchronisation and duration, "when" and "how long".
Simultaneity is the basis of the early calendars, with their
numberless and concrete points of time for reckoning. Duration
requires for its organisation some external process which proceeds
with regularity, as the rising of the moon, the rising of some
constellation, the equinoxes or solstices, and some unit into
which to divide this process. The year has gradually become the
time unit.
There is, however, the idea of historical time, on which we
have touched earlier. It is really a generalisation made anew
by each individual. He begins with his own subjective time,
which is gradually unified by him and made subservient to the
needs of social life in conventional time. From this individual
unified and systematised time to the generalisation of a unitary
world time, with a scope far beyond that of individual time, ex¬
perience leads us. The idea of historical time, of time as
existing beyond the immediate necessities of the individual, has
arisen through the experiences and need3 of the race. This
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evolutionary view strikes at that of Kant.
Time we must recognise at two levels, the perceptual and the
representative. On the perceptual level, there is in time the
attribute of duration or protensity belonging to all sensation,
the experience of change or transition and a conative factor, for
a present conative process has sufficient unity of its own to give
rise to the idea of continuous succession or time. Together
these give us a percept of time. But time, as a necessary con¬
dition of the real existence of the physical world, is also a con¬
cept. It is "an idea of a homogeneous duration", as it has been
put by Willdon Carr (14) which is constructed afresh by each indiv¬
idual, the method and the precision of the construction depending
on the experiences of the individual, which in turn are influenced
by the society of which he is a member. Eddington has written,
"We have intimate acquaintance with the nature of time and so it
baffles our comprehension". (20). Nevertheless time as experienced
has been shown to possess two major and two minor elements, aware¬
ness of succession of mental states, awareness that these states
of consciousness fill a place in a time scheme, the universalising
of the individual time scheme, and a perception of change in exter¬
nal objects. Eor the individual time is simply the complex of
consciousness at any instance, for the psychologist it is an
individual, subjective matter, "a state of mind peculiar to the
experiencer".
It has been suggested that the concept of time shows consider¬
able development. As early as 1900 Stanley (l6l) suggested the
study of time perception under natural selection, that is to say,
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from the genetic point of view, and. he found in expectant attent¬
ion, implying memory and cognition of the break between the real
and the ideal, the factor making for this development. The three
stages of development have been named the simple animal, when time
perceptions are limited to experience of duration and to vague
feelings of familiarity (past) and appetition (future), the com¬
plex animal when knowledge of certain marks of time arises along
with a wider memory of the past and a definite anticipation of the
future, and the educated adult when the unified experience of the
complex animal stage has given place to a knowledge of all the
factors, when a social and universal time has emerged. From mere
perceptual patterns or images, the individual develops first a
vague feeling in time and finally a permanent thought pattern of
idea outside time. Now, this knowledge of time varies in indiv¬
iduals according to their age and culture. Children forget the
passing of time easily, adults rarely do,for they are more conscious
of it. The idea of unitary time is an acquired synthesis; our
power to apprehend a period of time as a unit depends on memory
and attention, which vary in individuals. If the theory of re¬
capitulation be correct and evolution be from the simple to the
complex degrees of civilisation and culture, then children should
pass, and, as we have seen, probably do pass through these three
stages in the development of the concept of time. This may also
account for the differing degrees of integration shown by differ¬
ent adults. Our problem, then, has been, does the individual
development correspond to the racial development? If we have
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shown, as we hope we have, that there is sufficient correspondence
to warrant it, we can say that time is a concept "built up by our
mental powers.
From Sturt's work ( 41), and from our own time tests, these
general conclusions can be drawn. After age 7 there is a general
knowledge of time words, the more personally interesting and those
relating to shorter periods being better known. Knowledge of
naming the year seems to be suddenly acquired about 8, probably
because counting in involved and Ballard (4) says counting is not
easy or habitual until 8. From about 9 we can assume a knowledge
of the conventional scheme of time marking, though it is not until
about 10 that it is realised that time is practically universal,
the same in all plades. In the understanding of historical time,
methods of teaching play a part as well as age, but two main
stages can be distinguished; a negative stage up to 8, when the




A and a positive stage about 10 and 11, when definite pictures of
successive epochs assume form, A is recognised as preceding B,
B as preceding C and so on, A—B —> C —-> D—* E. Accuracy of
dating improves greatly at this stage; there is also a steady in¬
crease in the ability to name a period. Still another conclusion
is that time details are remembered with more difficulty than space
or other details. A general summary of the development of time
ideas among children could be given thus; time knowledge begins
to assume its adult, form at about 10 or 11, and the relation .
betv/een this individual learning and the racial development is
1?4
sufficiently striking to warrant the conclusion that time is a
concept of slow development, a concept hased on the perception
of the specious present.
155.
APPENDIX 1.
Detailed Tables of Results of Duration Experiments.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Series II. Filled Intervals.















































































































Age <30 59 1 1.1 -
%
1.31 To tal
sees % sees % mm. cf/° 1.30 - 2 % >2 % Pupils
10 B 5 17 10 33 4 13 4 13 7 24 30
GI 2 5 5 13 14 37 5 13 6 16 6 16 38
11 B 3 13.5 1 3 9 39-5 7 30.5 3 13.5 23
G 2 12 4 23.5 2 12 3 17.5 6 35 17
12 B 6 17 7 20 6 17 8 23 2 6 6 17 35
1 4 1 4 5 20 10 40 8 32 25
13 B 4 20 3 16 10 52 2 12 19




Ago <4 4 - 5 5.1 6.1 Total
min3 % 4.59 cf/° mins % - 6 % - 7 c/o >7 /•> Pupils
10 13 11 37.5 4 13 6 20 3 10 4 13 2 6.5
G 12 32.5 8 21 8 21 1 2-5 2 7 7 13 38
11 B 7 30.5 3 13.5 .5 22 1 3 3 13.5 4 17.5 23
G 5 29.5 4 2,3.5 2 12 6 37
12 B 21 60 4 11.5 3 8.5 4 11.5 3 8.5 35
G 3 12 13 52 2 8 3 12 4 16 §5
13 B 6 32 3 16 14 20 6 32
G 5 19 9 35 5 19 7 27 26
(d) 15 minutes.
Under Correct Over
Age <10 10 - 15 15.1- 17.31
% >20 %
Total
mins /o 14.59 % mins 17.30 % *720 Pupi1s
10 B 2 6.5 7 24 12 40 3 10 4 13 2 6.5 30
G 14 37-5 0 21 5 13 1 2.5 10 26 38
11 B 2 9 6 26 7 30 3 13 5 22 23
G 2 12 3 174 4 23.5
§•*
2 12 6 35 17
12 B 6 17 4 11.7 15 4-3 3 1 3 6 17 35
G 3 12 6 24 2 8 2 8 12 48 25
13 B 6 32 7 38 6 32 !?
G 5 19 13 50 3 11-5 1 4 4 15.5 26
Series III. Filled Intervals.


























































































































































































































The following are copies of the Time Tests referred to in the
text on pages 106 to 154-.
No. 1.
Name
Age Years Months. Birthday
School Class
Today's date
This book contains a number of question, and you have to answer
them as quickly and as carefully as you can. Begin below and go
straight on. If any one seems too hard, miss it out; and try
the next. 'Work -on until you have finished all you can answer.
See now that your pencil is sharp enough. Read the instructions
carefully.
Ask no questions at all during the test.
A
1. Is it morning or afternoon ju3t now?
2. Write down the names of the days of the week:
3. Write down the names of the months:
4. What time is it just now?
5. Draw a clock face and put in the hands showing half-past three.
6. When you are 14, will you be older or younger?
B
1. Write down beside each word another word which means nearly











2. In each of the first six questions "below you have to underline
the word in the brackets that goes with the third as the second
goes with the first, as, e.g.:-
Prince is to princess as king is to (lady, duchess, queen).
In each of the last four you have to write down the word that
goes with the third as the second goes with the first, as e.g.:-
Sailor is to soldier as navy is to ... ? Ans. - army.
July is to month as Friday is to (day, week, year).
Day is to night as white is to (red, black, clear, pure).
January is to February as Monday is to (Sunday, winter Tuesday,
Wednesday).
When is to where as time is to (how, why, length, space).
Heat is to cold as summer is to (snow, spring, winter, ice).
The day before yesterday is to the day after to-morrow as
Saturday is to (3unday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday,
Friday).
July is to June as February is to
Day is to midday as night is to
Hour is to minute as minute is to
Three is to one as yard is to
3. Arrange the following groups of things, beginning with the
smallest and ending with the largest, as, e.g.:-
Pound, ounce, ton, stone, cwt. Ans. - ounce, pound, stone,
cwt., ton.
Minute, second, hour, year, day
Sixpence, penny, florin, sovereign, shilling
162.
Century, month, era, year, week
4-. In the sentences "below three or four words have been filled
in instead of one. Underline the right word to complete the
sentence, as e.g.:-
Snow is (white. red, black), but coal is (white, red, black).
Impatience makes the hours seem (shorter, sad, longer, happy).
Wednesday (usually, occasionally, always) comes after Tuesday.
The first day of the week is (usually, occasionally, always)
the wettest.
Y/hen it is wet 'people (usually, occasionally, always) carry
umbrellas.
Christmas (sometimes, usually, always) comes in December.
Children born in June (sometimes, usually, always) die in July,
Strong people (sometimes, usually, always) live longer than
weak people.














Do what you are told in the spaces on the right.
Two day of the week that come together begin with the same
letter. Write down that letter twice
Two other days of the week begin v/ith the same letter. Write
down the first letter of the day that come between them
If the number of days in the month is the same as the number
of days in the year, cross out the name of the day that comes
before Wednesday,; if not, cross out the day that comes before
the day after Wednesday. (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday, Friday, Saturday).
If February comes after January, mark two crosses here ;
if not, mark one cross
Answer the following. Where suggested answers are given,
underline the right answer or the right word.
1. A fast train takes one hour to make the journey from Glasgow
to Edinburgh. Mr. Smith left one morning at ten o'clock
and arrived in Edinburgh at (nine, eleven, one) o'clock.
2. How many days are there from midday December 29 to midday
January 2?
3. Nelson died in 1805 at the age of 4-7. In whq,t year was
he born?
4-. What time lie3 midway between 6 o'clock and 9 o'clock?
5. Why do we use clocks?
i. Because they look nice,
ii. Because thoy tell U3 the time,
iii. Because it is pleasant to hear the clocks strike
the hour.
6. Suppose it were Sunday to-day, what day would it have been
the day before yesterday? (Tuesday, Friday, Saturday).
7. Peter is two days younger than I am. I was born on Christmas
Day. When was Peter born? (Dec. 23, Dec. 25, Dec. 27,
Dec. 28)
8. Why do people carry watches?
i. Because they tell where a person is
ii. Because they are presents from other people,
iii. Because they are convenient for telling the time,
iv. Because it i3 the fashion.
164-.
f /Friday /before9. If to-day werelsaturday then the day|after to-morrow would(Sunday /precedinghuredayuesday.ednesday.
10. A man, writing on 1st January, 1922, said, "Ly sister, who
/died (p-898 /twenty-fiveJ was "born on 13th November ,<1858, will "be Jjthirty-three





Here is a story in which there are many things wrong or absurd.
Underling all the things you can find that are wrong or absurd.
The Battle of Bannoclcburn, December, 1314.
As the 30th of February drew near, everything else was for¬
gotten in the preparations for the coming conflict. On Sunday,
the 12th of June, 1315> Edward VIII crossed the Tweed at Carlisle,
and a day's march brought his magnificent army with sight of
Stirling Castle.
Robert Bruce took up his position in the Torwood, a mile or
two to the south-east of the Castle. Before the English came in
sight he had honeycombed the firm open ground to the north of the
Castle with innumerable pits, filled with bombs and much barbed-
wire entanglements. On Sunday, the 23rd of June, the enemy came
in sight. Embroidered banners floated over the tanks and field
artillery, and the sun glinted on the shining rifles of the knights.
Next morning, the 25th of June, the sun set upon the two
armies of the English and the French. The trumpets rang out, and
the Scots advanced to the attack at 60 miles per hour. A moment
later they dropped upon their knees, and, taking off their top-hats,
prayed, "0 Lord Jesus, may this day, Friday, by others regarded
as unlucky, prove fortunate to us." The issue was in doubt for
a long time for half an hour from ten o'clock to twelve until the
English saw a fifth body of Scots approaching. The English
broke and fled.
On the morrow Edinburgh Castle was surrendered by the Spanish





Age Years Months. Birthday;
School Class
To-day's date.
This "book contains a number of questions, and you have to
answer them as quickly and as carefully as you can. Begin below
and go straight on. If any one seems too hard, miss it out;
and try the next. Work on until you have finished all you can
ansv/er. See now that you pencil is sharp enough. Read the
instructions carefully.
Ask no questions at all during the test. *
Here are a number of tests connected with history. Do what
you are told in each test.
1. Write down the events i'n the following groups in the order in
which they happened, beginning with the one that happened
longest ago - furthest away back in history, as, e.g.:-




(a) Henry VII., 1485 Ans.
James '1. I0O3
William I. 1066
(b) Struggle between the British and
French for America. Ans.
Discovery of America
Settlement of America by
Europeans.
(c) English Revolution, 1688 Ans.
First English Parliament, 1265
Alfred defeated the Danes, 878
End of Franco-Scottish Alliance, 15&0
Landing of Julius Caesar, 55 B.C.
(d) Death of John Knox Ans.
Jacobite Rising under Bonnie
Prince Charlie
Union of the Parliaments
Bruce at Bannockburn
Union of the Crowns
Union of the Picts and the Scots
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2. From the following list of dates select those appropriate to
the events "below, s,nd then arrange the events in the order in
...which they happened.
55 B.C., A.D., 410, 664, 787, 1066, 1164, 1215, 1297, 1381,
1415, 1485, 1513, 1534-, 1588, 1603, 1628, 1649, 1688, 1704,
1713, 1759, 1789, 1800, 1805, .'1815, 1832, 1884, 1914, 1932.
Battle of Flodden. Ans.
First Reform Act.
Magna Carta.






Battle of Stirling Bridge.
A *
From the following list of events select those appropriate to
the dates "below.
Revolt of Boadicea, St Augustine, Synod of Whitby, Treaty of
Wedmore, Murder of Becket, Treaty of Northampton, Battle of
Crecy, Peasants' Revolt, Joan of Arc burned, Printing in England,
Battle of Flodden, Execution of Mary, Queen of Scots, Authorised
Version of the Bible, Execution of Charles I., Darien Scheme,
French Revolution, Union with Ireland, Indian Mutiny, Boer War,












Answer as many of the following questions as you can. If
there are any you cannot answer, or cannot understand, leave them
alone and go on to the next.
1. Of the following pairs of events, underline the one which
lasted the longer.
Roman Rule in Britain - British Rule in India
Scottish Y/ar of Independence - Great War
Reign of George V. - Reign of George III
English Revolution - French Revolution
League of Nations - Renaissance
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2. (a) Dogs the world have a longer history "before or after A.D.I?
(b) Do you think of the days of the week, or of the months, or
of dates as coloured in any way? If so, tell how; if
not, leave blank.
(c) Do you think of historical dates as arranged in any
particular way?
(d) Do you imagine history as a series of events moving for¬
wards, or as a series of dates stretching backwards?
(e) "What method do you take to arrange events in order, e.g.
by guess, by the date, by the epoch, by thinking of a
person who lived at the same time, or by thinking how long
ago?
3. To the following question answer yes or no.
(a) "I invaded Britain in 55 B.C." Could Caesar have written
this (in his own language)?
(b) Could Alfred have had the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle printed?
(c) Could William the Conqueror have consulted his watch at
the Battle of Hastings?
(d) "The archers must stand in front, and the spearsmen in the
rear". Could Bruce have said this?
(e) Could Q,ueen Elizabeth have drunk tea?
(f) Could the Atlantic have been crossed before the time of
Columbus?
(g) Could Shakespeare have seen his plays filmed in a cinema?
(h) If you had been alive at the time of the Union of the Crowns,
could your grandfather have fought at Bannockburn?
(i) If you had fought at Waterloo, could your son have fought
under Earl Haig?
(j) If you had been alive when the Romans left Britain, could
your great-grandfather have remembered their first coming
to Britain?
(k) Robin Hood lived in 1187. Would your mother be alive
then? Would you grandmother be alive then? Would
Christ be alive then?
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APPENDIX ^.
The following are the larger detailed tables of scores, from
which some of the tables given for the Time Tests have been con¬
structed.
TABLE 10A. - OBPOSITSS.
Age. Score for Time Words • Score for Other Words.
7 6 5 4 3 2 l 0 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
3 6 l 9 1
l6 3 6 l 10
15 7 5 n 1
14 14 21 15 6 l 2 43 13 1 1 1
13 20 53 58 23 l 1 128 25 2 1
12 18 48 6i 27 7 1 3 134 20 3 1 4 3
11 6 26 59 17 11 3 4 86 25 6 1 1 3 4-
10 1 16 45 24 11 4 2 8 66 22 6 8 1 l 7
9 l 13 35 22 11 4 3 21 50 20 11 2 1 4 1 21
8 1 5 22 19 5 7 5 47 25 14 9 5 4 1 3 4 46
7 l 1 24 1 1 24
TABLE HA. - ANALOGIES.
Age.
8
Score for Pime Analogies
9 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
1? 1 1 4 3 116 4 3 ■1 2
15 4 3 2 4- 1 1
14 3 14 9 16 7 2 5 2 1 1
13 7 32 42 24
'
23 11 12 4 1
12 3 16 25 33 31 21 12 12 8 4
11 2 4 10 19 30 26 10 15 5 5
10 1 5 11 19 14 21 15 17 8
9 1 2 4 4 7 9 20 28 35
8 1 4 12 35 59
7 4 5 17
TABLE 14A - MEANINGS.
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Age. Score for Time Words. Score for Other V/ord3.
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 4 3 2 1 0
17 5 4 1 10
16 1 7 2 9 1
15 2 7 2 1 10 2
14 1 19 16 10 4 3 7 24 19 6 5 6
13 5 28 28 43 16 9 27 58 49 15 14 20
12 1 19 24 34 20 17 51 52 46 12 13 42
11 9 20 24 14 14 45 33 26 17 17 33
10 4 11 8 23 3J- 11 2? 17 25 33
9 4 7 15 26 58 6 8 32 22 42
0 1 15 96 1 2 4 15 91
7
,
1 5 22 2 7 17
TABLE 16A ~ REASONING,
Age.
8
S c 0 r e
10 9 7 6 5 4 .3 2 1 0
17 2 5 2 1






11 11 4 4 1 1 1 2
13 1 27 36 30 29 15 4 3 4 1
12 3 6 26 11 37 25 15 6 6 2 311 1 2 21 27 17 13 2 5 5
10 6 9 12 18 24 14 8 10 10
I 2 1 3 51 151 125 If16 1323
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TABLE 18A ARRAITGEIlENT IN ORDER WITH DATES GIVEN.
Age. Score for A/a Score for A/c 1
3 2 1 0 5 4 3 2 1 0




14 40 4 6 41 1 8
13 91 4 12 39 98 4 3 1 40
12 &3 4 15 59 87 3 2 2 5 62
11 44 4 8 54 47 l 2 1 1 58
10 27 3 7 28 26 2 2 3 32
9 3 1 2 4 1 1
TABLE 19A AKRAHGEILCET I IT ORDER WITHOUT DATES.
Age. Score for A/b Score for A/d
3 2 1 0 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
3.7+ 5 4 •4 3 1 1
16 7 3 6 4
15 5 3 1 5 2
14 18 21 2 9 13 19 5 3 2 1 7
13 64 31 4 47 32 31 22 5 7 1 48
12 53 39 9 60 3.3 33 33 8 4 7°
11 43 20 2 65 6 13 11 10 3 3 64
10 11 13 3 33 1 9 3 8 1 1 42
9 2 4 2 1 1 2
172-
r
TABIDS 20A - DATES AND ORDER.
'
f
Age. Score for Dates . Score for Order.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 l 0
17+ 4 l l 1 l 1 6 2 l
l6 2 1 2 2 l l l 4 2 1 1 1 l
15 2 2 l l 1 1 1 4 1 l l
14 1 6 3 5 7 5 6 3 3 4 7 3 10 6 5 4 l 1 l 2 l l6
13 3 7 15 10 6 18 14 22 32 21 l 16 15 10 8 7 4 2 5 7 71
12 2 5 6 14 15 21 27 3? 39 6 12 17 21 4 12 6 6 98
11 3 1 14 18 17 26 31 3 7 3 9 6 3 2 3 74
2 3 7 13 23 17 l 2 3 3 2 l 3 1 49





TABLE 21A - EVENTS.
I
Age. Score for Events •
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
17+ 1 1 2
'
2 2 1
16 1 4 1
'
1 2 1
15 3 2 2
8
1
14 3 1 4 3 8 3 7 13
13 1 1 3 2 7 14 28 28 29 33
12 1 1 4 5 5 11 19 30 34 51
11 1 2 2 8 20 34 43
10 4 19 19 23
9 1 5
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TABLE 25A - LIETHOD 01? ARRAHGEHEHT OF HISTORICAL DATA.









15 4 1 1 1 1
14 2 26 7 8 7
13 P 1 P 18 33
12 1 84 2 16 13 49
11 4 40 9 17 40
10 1 18 1 2 8 36
9 1 5
TABLE 26A - YES OR HO.
Age. Score












11 5 8 6 1
25 27 10 20 7
27 33 28 19 13
17 13 22 15 §
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